Commanding Texts: Knowledge-ordering, Identity Construction and Ethics in 'Military Manuals’ of the Roman Empire by Chiritoiu, Daniel Alexandru
1 
 
Commanding Texts: Knowledge-ordering, Identity Construction 
and Ethics in 'Military Manuals’ of the Roman Empire 
 
Contents 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 3 
1. Different approaches to military manuals ............................................................................................ 3 
2. A holistic approach to military manuals ............................................................................................... 6 
I. Authors, projects and the tradition of ‘military writings’ ...................................................................... 11 
1. The authors and their work ................................................................................................................ 12 
2. The works and the ‘tradition’ of military writing. ............................................................................... 20 
2.1 Earlier texts, extant and lost. ........................................................................................................ 21 
2.2. Later texts, extant and lost .......................................................................................................... 27 
2.2.1 ‘Military’ and ‘artillery’ manuals ................................................................................................ 27 
2.2.2 Different ‘genres’/groups of ‘military manuals’ ........................................................................ 33 
3. Audience: The emperor, Greeks, Romans, ‘general audience’ and ‘specialists’ ................................ 47 
4. Military manuals and practicality ........................................................................................................ 56 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 65 
II. Ordering ‘military knowledge’ in a new world: integration and/or opposition? ................................ 66 
1. Integration by uniformity: Onasander – Greeks and Romans or Greeks as Romans ......................... 69 
1.1 Presenting the material: Greek principles as Roman and mixing the ‘Roman’ and the ‘Greek’ .. 69 
1.2 Presenting one’s authority: Onasander as master of a continuum of knowledge ....................... 79 
2. Integration by exempla: Frontinus’ Strategemata ............................................................................. 85 
2.1. Presenting the material: diversity in stratagem .......................................................................... 85 
2.2. Presenting one’s authority: Frontinus, ‘reinvention’, different voices and ‘real’ authority ........ 90 
3. Separation by exempla: Polyaenus’ Strategika .................................................................................. 94 
3.1. Presenting the material: uniformity in stratagem. ...................................................................... 94 
3.2 Presenting one’s authority: Macedonian Polyaenus and channeling authority ........................... 97 
4. A mixed approach to military knowledge: Arrian and Aelian’s Taktika ............................................ 101 
2 
 
4.1.1. Presenting the material: Aelian – Homeric precedence, integration and ‘empires of 
knowledge’ ........................................................................................................................................ 102 
4.1.2. Presenting one’s authority: Aelian, Homer, Greek tactical authorities, Alexander and 
Frontinus ........................................................................................................................................... 111 
4.2.1 Presenting the material: Arrian – competition, ‘succession of empires’ and rehabilitating 
Greek knowledge. ............................................................................................................................. 113 
4.2.2. Presenting one’s authority: Arrian, Xenophon, Greek scholarship and personal authority ... 127 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 128 
III. Tactics, identity and ‘Roman’ Greece ................................................................................................. 130 
1. Ektaxis – rhetoric and impersonation ............................................................................................... 131 
2. The Ektaxis and the geography of the army ..................................................................................... 142 
3. The Taktika, Alexander, Greek phalanxes and the emperors’ military image .................................. 148 
3.1. Arrian’s Taktika and Hadrian ‘the commander’. ........................................................................ 148 
3.2 The Greek phalanx: advertising Greek military achievements and building up the emperors’ 
military knowledge............................................................................................................................ 153 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 164 
IV.‘Ethics’ and ‘moral qualities’ in ‘military manuals’............................................................................. 165 
1. A Greek and Roman ‘ethical code of conduct’ in war? ..................................................................... 167 
2. Fairness and ‘military manuals’. ....................................................................................................... 180 
2.1 Fairness, stratagem and trickery: the case of Frontinus’ Strategemata..................................... 181 
2.2 Just war ....................................................................................................................................... 189 
2.3 Oaths, tyrants and fairness ......................................................................................................... 191 
3. Ius in bello. Virtues and dealing with the enemy. ............................................................................. 198 
3.1 Frontinus ..................................................................................................................................... 200 
3.2 Polyaenus .................................................................................................................................... 204 
3.3 Onasander ................................................................................................................................... 208 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 211 
V. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 212 






This thesis is about military manuals—synoptic pedagogic texts on military matters – produced 
in the first few centuries of the Roman imperial period. These are not the most popular of 
Classical texts, often described as dry, practical, and straightforward, but this thesis argues that 
they merit far more attention and appreciation than they have received in the scholarship so 
far, and will explore some of the areas in which this more sustained scrutiny is particularly 
fruitful.  Before doing so, however, it is worth providing a short summary of the present state of 
the field, since the study of ancient military manuals has been associated mainly with the 
discipline of military history and has altered as that discipline itself has changed over the last 
decades, and since Classics itself also extended its textual horizons over the same time frame. 
This thesis builds on this recent work, as well as developing themes and questions about empire 
and identity, power and knowledge in the Roman world that have emerged from other areas of 
ancient historical enquiry.       
1. Different approaches to military manuals 
‘Traditional’ military history focuses mainly on topics that have to do with campaigning, in 
particular strategy, tactics, battle formations and weapons. Military historians usually take a 
strictly utilitarian approach, being interested in the very practical aspects of all these 
components. Such an approach, which has been applied to the Classical world as well, is 
reinforced by the belief popular amongst military historians that certain parameters remain 
constant, irrespective of cultural background and time period, and that similar methods of 
investigation will yield similar results.1 
Ancient military manuals – from Aeneas Tacticus’ fourth-century B.C. work on how to survive a 
siege to Vegetius’ fourth or fifth century A.D. epitome of the military art (and beyond) – have 
been considered rich sources, because they provide precisely the sort of information sought out 
by this line of inquiry. But the traditional military historians’ relationship with the manuals has 
                                                          
1 Köchly and Rüstow (1852), Droysen (1888), Delbrück (1920), Kromayer and Veith (1928), Anderson (1970).  
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been limited, with little attention paid to the potential agendas and overall projects of these 
texts.  
In recent decades, military history and its approaches have evolved and diversified. Arguably, 
the publication of John Keegan’s The Face of Battle in 1976 revolutionised the way scholars 
looked at battle and warfare, through its focus on the personal experience of the soldier – on 
what one would have done and felt on an individual level.2 Many of his methods and 
approaches, his questions and ideas, have since been applied to the Classical world.3 
Subsequently more complex issues of warfare, such as the psychology of the battlefield, post-
traumatic stress, morale, the depiction of the self and the enemy, and the relationship between 
social, cultural and practical factors in different types of war-related practices have attracted 
attention (with the Greek phalanx receiving particular attention). Methods from psychology, 
anthropology and sociology have been deployed in order to understand ancient warfare and 
warriors in a more rounded way. Scholars have moved away from the ‘traditional’ utilitarian 
analysis of military history, to think more deeply about how combat was conceptualised and 
whether the ways in which men fight are dictated by factors other than efficiency, such as 
social norms, expectations and reputation, with even the traditional topics of tactics and 
weapons being scrutinised from this viewpoint.4 
Although military history has branched out, its relationship with military manuals has remained 
limited. Indeed, they have actually faded in importance – or worse, became even more 
decontextualised, bundled together with other sources in attempts to (re)create the 
aforementioned ‘face of battle’. With their apparent focus on tactics, formations and weapons, 
they have not seemed to offer the data relevant to the new directions being taken, and scholars 
                                                          
2 Keegan (1976); for a good overview of Keegan’s method and impact on the writing of military history see Ostwald 
(2012), thought he seems to have been mainly influential in anglo-saxon literature and Ostwald mentions that 
French scholarship has had a “long-standing preference for ‘war and society’ studies”. 
3 Victor Hanson’s (1989) book brought Keegan’s approach to ancient history, but see also Philip Sabin’s (2000) 
article for a similar approach with respect to the Romans, Goldsworthy (1998), (2007) and Daly (2002). 
4 Hanson (1989) and van Wees (2004) are perhaps the most influential. Also Crowley (2012) and Kagan and 
Viggiano (eds.) (2013) for a mixture of old and new approaches and theories. But cf. French scholarship, always 
interested in the more social aspects of warfare; for example Ducrey (1968), Harmand (1967), Vernant (1968) 
Garlan (1972) and (1989), Le Bohec (1998). For understandable reasons, German scholarship after World War II 
has taken little interest in warfare. For a more complete discussion see Hanson (1999).  
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have looked more to writers of historical narrative for answers about psychology, cultural 
connections and individual experience in ancient warfare.5  
In as far as ancient military manuals have attracted recent scholarly attention this has, broadly 
speaking, taken two forms, both of which are connected to a wider move within classical 
studies, a move to extend and challenge the literary canon, to find value and interest in 
traditionally non-canonical works from the Greek and Roman worlds, and to be more holistic in 
approaching ancient culture.  Thus, a range of more or less obscure and overlooked texts, 
including some on how to build artillery engines, fortify a military camp, and command an 
army, on strategy and tactics in warfare, have received new editions, translations, and 
commentaries, and been more generally discussed by those focusing on particular treatises or 
authors.6 Secondly, military manuals have been caught up in the recent outburst of activity 
around ancient technical literature, as it treats an array of subjects, in an array of styles.7  
In the first case, the quality of editions and translations, studies and analysis has been mixed. 
Everett Wheeler and Peter Krentz’s translation and commentary on Polyaenus’ Strategemata, 
for example, published in 1994 is very useful, and has helped the work achieve a higher profile 
in scholarship more broadly.8 Others, such as James DeVoto’s edition and translation of Arrian’s 
Taktika and Ektaxis, and Christopher Matthew’s of Aelian’s Taktika, are marred by inaccuracies, 
a poor understanding of the manuscript tradition, and a tenuous grasp of the Greek language.9 
Similarly, although some recent articles and essays have strong individual points to make, 
others are more superficial and summary in their treatment, and the discussion remains rather 
                                                          
5 For example Lee (2013) relying mainly on Xenophon, Thucydides and Herodotus; Heckel (2013) on Diodorus; Sage 
(2013) on Polybius and actually faulting ‘military manuals’ in not being useful in recreating the ‘actual’ history of 
tactical developments. 
6 Whitehead (1990), (1992), Burliga (2008), on Aeneas Tacticus, and Garlan (1977) on siege warfare more 
generally, Milner (1993) on Vegetius, Grillone (2012) for Ps-Hyginus, Stoll (2012) on Xenophon’s Hipparchikos. No 
new English translations of Frontinus’ Strategemata have been attempted since Bennett’s (1925) but there are 
relatively new Italian and French editions of the text; Laederich (1999) for the French one and Galli (1999) for the 
Italian one. See also Petrocelli (2008) and Sestile (2011) for new Italian editions of Onasander’s and Aelian’s 
treatises. 
7 Formisano (2017) on Vegetius and Onasander, König (2004) and (2017) on Frontinus, Roby (2016) on the ‘artillery 
manuals’. 
8 Krentz and Wheeler (1994); also more recently Broadersen (2011). 
9 DeVoto (1993); Matthew (2012) with Wheeler (2016) for the numerous problems of the edition. 
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disparate and fragmented, underdeveloped and un-joined up, so far.10  The most important 
contributions have been Philip Stadter’s and Brian Bosworth’s discussions of Arrian’s military 
texts in the context of his other works, of his complete oeuvre, and of the author himself,11 
Everett Wheeler’s attempts to discover the purpose of Arrian’s Taktika and analysis of it in the 
context of his relationship with Hadrian, and Delfino Ambaglio, James Chulp and Christopher 
Smith’s articles on Onasander, discussing his focus on psychology and the moral aspect of 
generalship, as well as his emphasis on ‘just warfare’ (Smith also tackles the background of the 
author and of his patron, Q. Veranius).12 
In the second case, scholars have moved away from regarding technical literature as simply a 
factual ‘source’ from which to cull ‘accurate information’ and have focused on the rhetoric, self-
positioning and overall agenda of the authors.13 Scholars have explored the way knowledge is 
ordered and presented and how authors present themselves as experts and compete with each 
other, and how (Greek) ‘knowledge’ and (Roman) ‘power’ and the different types of knowledge 
and expertise related to one another.14 Military manuals have been partially integrated in this 
discussion, but there is more to be done, as there has been no overall analysis of the whole 
‘genre’ of the ancient military manual, nor have they been treated as a whole in any way.15 This 
thesis brings the two aforementioned approaches together in a holistic way, examining a series 
of texts from the Empire in a thematic manner, dealing with both their practicality and with 
questions asked about technical literature in more general terms.  
2. A holistic approach to military manuals 
                                                          
10 Stadter (1978) and Dain (1946) attempt a parallel between Aelian, Arrian and Asclepiodotus as the ‘parent text’.  
11 Stadter (1980); Bosworth (1993). 
12 Ambaglio (1981), Chulp (2014), Smith (1998). 
13 Most recently König and Woolf (2017). For rhetoric in the history of science see Latour (1987); Gross (2006); 
Pera (1994).  König (2004) 6-7 points out that ‘texts about technical knowledge are generally considered to be 
simple’ and do not constitute ‘the object of reflection’, scholars considering that ‘they do not carry ethical or 
political values’ and that they are ‘not an essential part of the culture that produced them’; also Cuomo (2000); on 
Frontinus especially being read as a practical, no-nonsense guy Laederich (1999) 34; Campbell (1987) 28. 
14For all these themes see König and Woolf (2017) 1-17, Whitmarsh and König (2007) 5-6; Barton (1994); Nutton 
(2009); von Staden (1997); van der Eijk; for excessive philotimia as negative König and Woolf (2017) 16-25; for 
competition between different kinds of expertise Formisano and van der Eijk (2017), Parry (2007); Rihl (1999) 13-
16; A. König (2017); for (Greek) ‘knowledge’ vs. (Roman) ‘power’ Wallace-Hadrill (1988); Whitmarsh (2005); Barton 
(1995), J. König (2009), A. König (2009). 
15 See esp. König and Woolf (2017). 
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This thesis will examine Frontinus’ Strategemata, Arrian’s Ektaxis and Arrian and Aelian’s 
Taktika, Onasander’s Strategikos and Polyaenus’ Strategika in an attempt to flag up some of the 
bigger themes and problems that have been discussed in relation with other, more prominent 
technical texts, and show how ‘military manuals’ are an integral and significant part of the 
history of knowledge and have much to contribute to the discussion about experts and 
expertise in antiquity. 
The approach that I take here has been inspired by Brian Campbell’s 1987 article which brings 
all the texts that I consider in this thesis together and treats them as a ‘genre’ or at least a 
distinctive group, raising issues such as their potential audience, purpose and comparison to 
other Lehrbucher but also asking more traditional questions related to their practicality and 
usefulness.16  
Comparison of the texts considered here to Lehrbucher or ‘manuals’ raises the question of their 
practicality for instructing readers about warfare and generalship, as does the label of ‘technical 
text’ or technical literature.17 Indeed if one reads the second half of Arrian’s Taktika, one might 
wonder whether there is anything to be learned from the description of ‘parade’ cavalry drills, 
or whether we should place more emphasis on the way that military knowledge is constructed, 
presented and evaluated.18 At the same time, we cannot disregard Campbell’s observations 
about the lack of an actual system of instruction for generals and officers in the Roman Empire 
(i.e. a ‘Roman military academy’) so the practical value of the texts cannot be so readily 
dismissed, especially when they do not necessarily fit into our own scheme of what constitutes 
a manual.19 Having an agenda need not be seen as excluding an intended practicality.20  My 
intention in bringing ‘military manuals’ into the frame of ‘technical texts’ is to deploy in relation 
to these military works the more sophisticated, complex analyses that have been used with 
regard to other technical texts, analyses that do not assume that the authors were only writing 
practical guidelines on how to perform a specific task or master a specific discipline, but show 
                                                          
16 Campbell (1987). 
17 Also Formisano and van der Eijk (2017) esp. 2-11. 
18 For example A. König (2017) investigates Frontinus’ discourse on practical know-how and theoretical expertise.  
19 Campbell (1987) 22. 
20 Campbell (1986) 24. 
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how the works reflect the authors’ broader concerns about learning, knowledge, its (and their) 
position within the political world, among other things. 
The texts that have been discussed as part of ‘technical literature’ are varied in nature, 
spanning both topics that are considered traditionally ‘technical’ – such as mathematics, 
architecture and medicine – and topics dealing with law, historiography and philosophy.21 One 
of the primary arguments which has emerged from this comparative approach concerns the 
importance of the way in which knowledge is ordered in these treatises, especially in relation to 
texts and authors of the Roman Empire (which is also concerned with ordering), but also in 
relation to the accumulated knowledge of the past. 22  
The ‘military manuals’ have been overlooked in this approach and indeed their concern with 
ordering knowledge will constitute one of the main guiding threads of the thesis. We shall see 
that the ordering and categorising done by the military manuals is not just an ordering of the 
topic(s) discussed and the information available, but also a cross-cultural ordering and ranking 
of Greek and Roman knowledge, with particular focus and attention to precedence. In doing so, 
the authors not only build up and compare ‘empires of knowledge’ with the physical Roman 
empire ‘of power’, but square off different Greek and Roman ‘empires of knowledge’ against 
each other, often using ‘Greek knowledge’ to define Roman identity – but also their own 
identity as authors – and to point out and explain diversity. So ordering and presenting 
knowledge are also interconnected with authority and competition, and, as König and Woolf 
assert in introducing their recent collected volume on Authority and Expertise in Ancient 
Scientific Culture, ‘scientists’ in the Ancient world had to work much harder at making 
themselves authoritative because there was no formal institution that could accredit them as 
experts, and they, therefore, worked just as hard to construct authoritative authorial personas, 
emphasising – in the first person – their own knowledge and expertise.23 Rhetoric and 
rhetorical persuasion are therefore an important part of ‘handbooks’, not only for self-
                                                          
21 König and Woolf (2017) 1-3. 
22 For example Whitmarsh and König (2007) 5-6. 
23 König and Woolf (2017) 1-2. Despite this competitive element, Whitmarsh and König (2007) 21-22 point out that 
even though oftentimes authors create parallel ‘empires of knowledge’, they do not always have to compete with 
the political empire of Rome, their agendas playing a much more complicated game of ‘subversion’ and support.   
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promotion but also for the promotion of the content therein, and the way in which material is 
presented against other similar material is often the greatest source of authority (and this is 
especially true for a body of knowledge which at first seems very similar). 24 
We shall therefore examine, in the second chapter (after the first chapter which will 
contextualise and provide more information about each text, engaging with issues such as the 
identity of the author, the intended audience of the work, and the ‘genre’ to which the work 
belongs), how authors tackle the issue of ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ knowledge, categorising and 
ranking it and, in doing so turning it into a tool of self-promotion. We shall see how Roman 
knowledge is both undermined and subverted but also praised, and how Greek knowledge is at 
the same time placed above Roman knowledge and integrated into a narrative of continuity 
with it, in an attempt to bolster the authorial personas of the authors and to create both a 
ranking and a unified concept of military ‘science’.25 We will discover in Arrian and Aelian’s 
Taktika how different rhetorical strategies are used to persuade the reader not only of the 
prominence of a certain type of ‘military knowledge’ but also that a particular author can offer 
the best interpretation of this said knowledge.  
This type of discussion will also tie closely into existing debates about the relationship between 
‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ in the ancient world (especially between ‘Greek knowledge’ and 
‘Roman power) – or knowledge-ordering and politics.26 The ways in which authors approached 
their dedicatee(s), and positioned their expertise with respect to these persons of power and 
influence, which has been explored in new – and more nuanced – ways in other texts, will now 
also be examined with respect to ‘military manuals’ throughout chapters two and three – but 
especially in the latter with a special focus on the relationship between Arrian and Hadrian.27  
The theme of identity will also feature prominently in chapters two and three in light of the 
explicit polarisation in the texts of ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ knowledge, but chapter three in 
                                                          
24 For example A. König (2009) about the presentation of architecture in Vitruvius. 
25 For self-promotion and self-defacing in technical literature see König and Woolf (2017) 2; 7-9; they give the 
example of Galen as a classic one of self-assertion with Barton (1994); Nutton (2009); von Staden (1997); for 
excessive philotimia as negative König and Woolf (2017) 16-25. 
26 For example Wallace-Hadrill (1988); Whitmarsh (2005); Barton (1995).  
27J. König (2009); esp. A. König (2009) for the relationship between Augustus and Vitruvius. 
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particular will focus on the use of Greek knowledge in the construction of Roman identity, of 
the identity of Arrian himself but also the identity of the Roman Empire. However, because 
structural divisions are often artificial, the theme of order and ordering will not be too far from 
this latter chapter either, and we shall see how Arrian uses Greek knowledge to give shape and 
to organise his Roman world. 
A brief look at Aelian’s preface will give a taste of how all these themes are an essential part of 
his agenda and demonstrate how they have so far been overlooked and how they can 
contribute to and inform recent debates in scholarship on technical literature: 
Τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ὁμήρου χρόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαν, 
αὐτόκρατορ Καῖσαρ υἱὲ θεοῦ Τραϊανὲ σεβαστέ, πολλοὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν συνέγραψαν οὐκ 
ἔχοντες, ἣν ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐπιστεύθημεν ἕξιν ἔχειν. 
‘Imperator Caesar son of the deified [Nerva] Traianus Augustus, tactical theory among the 
Greeks goes back as far as the time of Homer, and has been written by many whose 
standing in scholarship was not reputed equal to mine’28 
In one sentence we see how the importance of Greek knowledge on the matter is being flagged 
up and placed before an existing body of knowledge, but also how the author is emphasising his 
own role in the ordering of said knowledge because of his superior scholarly skills (ἐν τοῖς 
μαθήμασιν ἐπιστεύθημεν) and implicitly putting himself first in the order of those πολλοὶ τῶν 
πρὸ ἡμῶν, ‘many before him’, who had written about the topic. So we see how in just three 
lines Aelian talks about Greekness, about his own authority in ordering Greek knowledge and – 
by addressing the emperor Trajan – about his importance in the ‘order’ of the empire and for 
ordering the empire. The mention of Greekness here – and of the knowledge coming from 
Homer – is essential and ties into broader discussions of the social acceptability of a certain 
kind of knowledge and how Greek knowledge in some forms was treated with suspicion and 
skepticism. As Whitmarsh and König emphasise, ‘elite Romans had to tread a delicate balance 
                                                          
28 Ael. Tact. Pr. 1, all translations by A.M. Devine, unless specified otherwise. 
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between excessive devotion to Greek knowledge and ignorance of it’ and this is particularly 
true for the military sphere. 29  
As mentioned, the second approach in this thesis will be connected to more traditional 
preoccupations of military history, namely ascertaining if the texts were in any way practical or 
didactic, and I turn to this particularly in the last chapter of the thesis, with a focus on ethics. 
Studies such as Pierre Ducrey’s Traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique: des 
origines à la conquet̂e romaine ask whether there was a code of battle conduct in the Classical 
world, but make no systematic use of ‘military manuals’ as sources of information, despite the 
need for a comparison between ‘practice’ and ‘theory’, and do not ask whether certain types of 
practices that have deep cultural connections are considered unethical or whether there are 
ethical taboos/recommendations that transcend the boundaries of ‘Greekness’ and 
‘Romanness’.30 Therefore, the fourth and final chapter will attempt first to determine whether 
there was indeed an ethical code of conduct in battle in the Classical world – and if yes, 
whether it was shared by both Romans and Greeks and/or different from general ethical norms. 
I shall then examine whether these texts engage in any way with this ‘code’, whether their 
individual approaches have anything in common, or whether there are fundamental 
differences.  
My aim in this thesis is to deepen our understanding of these – in a way – much used texts but 
also to diversify our approach to them and fit them into the broader questions and problems of 
cultural history. 
I. Authors, Projects and the Tradition of ‘Military Writings’ 
 
In what follows I will discuss in some depth the authors and their works which are the focus of 
this thesis. The main issue tackled will be whether the authors operate within a specific, pre-
existing category of writing which conditions or influences their choice of topics and material, 
                                                          
29 Whitmarsh and König (2007) 23.  
30 Save in Gilliver (2011). 
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that is whether there were several established groups or ‘genres’, of military writing, and how 
they relate to other traditions of technical texts. Questions of audience, both the audiences 
these texts construct for themselves and which the broader history of the Roman world 
suggests for them, will also be addressed and finally the issue of their practicality.  This will also 
lead to the justification of the specific choice of authors which has been made in this thesis, as 
the contrast between our texts and others which also might be considered ‘military manuals’ 
will become clear.  Chronology will be secondary to the discussion, though information about 
when the authors lived and worked will be provided.  
We shall see, however, that answering all these questions, providing context and definition, is 
not an easy task because of the scarcity of material that survives, and the uncertainty about 
what has been lost. While I shall be providing several interpretative suggestions, in dialogue 
with previous scholarship on these matters – and express my preference for one of them – I will 
in no case discount the other possibilities.  
1. The authors and their work 
Before even approaching the more complicated topic of ‘genre’ or ‘genres’, we can start by 
noticing that the texts we are discussing can be grouped into three categories in terms of their 
scope. The first one, represented solely by Onasander’ Strategikos, is characterised by a general 
approach to military matters, where topics which can be considered more ‘specialised’ – such 
as battle formations and manoeuvres – are discussed together with more ‘general issues’, such 
as what qualities a general should possess, what men make the best generals and what the 
psychological factors that influence warfare are. I am putting Onasander in his own category 
simply because, as we shall see later on, there are other earlier texts (such as Aeneas Tacticus’ 
Poliorketika) which are very similar. The second group is represented by Frontinus’ and 
Polyaenus’ collections of stratagems – that is short anecdotes about the deeds of famous 
generals – and I will attempt to elucidate the history and origins of this type of, apparently 
more innovative, composition in what follows. The last – and perhaps the most interesting – 
group of texts is represented by Arrian and Aelian’s Taktika, both very detailed accounts of how 
to marshal and arm one’s troops (and Arrian’s Ektaxis could also be included here, though it is a 
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particular case that it needs discussion in and of itself), which exclude most other matters, such 
as examples, and it is on these and their authors that we shall focus first.31 
As mentioned in the introduction, Arrian is the better known of the two.32 Born in Nicomedia, 
he was a senator and then consul at Rome, perhaps in 125 or 126 A.D. (but more likely in 129 
A.D.), a protégé of one of the most prominent senators under Trajan, C. Avidius Nigrinus.33 
After holding the consulship he went on to become the first Bithynian provincial governor and 
one of the few Greeks in charge of a province with legions – Cappadocia – where Cassius Dio 
tells us he repelled an attack of the Alans (although it is less certain that there was an actual 
battle).34 Following his governorship, he retired to Athens, where he held the office of 
eponymous archon in 145/146.35 But Arrian – as Stadter points out – was also ‘a philosopher 
and a hunter, a general and a historian’.36 He was equated with Xenophon even in antiquity, 
engaging in the same activities as he did and writing about it, but also referring to himself as 
Xenophon repeatedly  (whether that was his given name or one he took up).37 In a Xenophontic 
manner, he wrote a treatise on hunting (Kynegetikos), meant to be read alongside that of 
Xenophon, a history of Trajan’s wars against Parthia as part of his Parthica (which is now lost, 
along with his Events after Alexander, the local history Bithyniaka, the Alanike, and his 
biographies, Dion, Timoleon and Tillorobus), an account of the teachings of the Stoic 
philosopher Epictetus of whom he was a student (and he was a Stoic ‘philosopher’ himself, as 
was well known in antiquity) and the Techne taktike here in question, composed in the 
                                                          
31 I acknowledge that the titles of the works are sometimes problematic. For example modern scholars refer to 
several of the Roman treatises on warfare as de re militari without knowing whether that was their actual title. In 
this thesis, the titles used are those that have been traditionally accepted, for the sake of brevity and convenience, 
and with the caveat that sometimes the works would have perhaps been called differently by their respective 
authors. For the same purporse of brevity, the ‘military manuals’ of both Aelian and Arrian will be referred to as 
Taktika. Moreover, all the abreviations of the titles of the works and names of the authors are those used by the 
Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek Lexicon and the Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary. The only exception is Arrian’s Ektaxis 
kata Alanōn, where I have preferred the abbreviation Ektax. to the Latin one Alan.=Expeditio contra Alanos.  
32 For a detailed account of Arrian’s life see Stadter (1980) 1-17; for a comparison between Aelian and Arrian see 
Stadter (1978) 118-119. 
33 Stadter (1980)1; 7-8; 11. 
34 D. C. 69.15; also Stadter (1980) 47; Devine (1993) 313.  
35 Arr. Cyn. 1.4; Stadter (1980) 15; 17. 
36 Stadter (1980) 1. 
37 Stadter (1980) 2 believes Xenophon was his actual name and not one he took up; but see note 11 in Stadter for 
the view not being a widely accepted one, as well as the more detailed discussion in chapter III of this thesis. 
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twentieth year of Hadrian’s reign, 136/137 A.D. (therefore after he had become governor of 
Cappadocia). 38  
On a non-Xenophontic note, but relevant for our purposes (and Xenophon never being too far 
away), there are his other literary works. Arrian wrote a Periplus documenting his 
circumnavigation of the Black Sea during an inspection tour of his province and very similar to 
his Indike –a story of Nearchus’ journey on the Indian Ocean to Babylon. He also produced the 
Ektaxis, a detailed but literary account of his battle plan against the Alans, which will also be 
discussed in a following chapter, whose date of composition is not certain – we only know that 
the expedition happened in 135 A.D. so naturally the work would have been written after that 
time.39 
So it is clear just from a brief outline of his life and work that Arrian is very consciously 
positioning himself as part of a certain tradition of Greek writing, and by his association with 
Xenophon, linking himself to a particular strand of Greek military writing. Knowing what we do 
of Xenophon’s own more ‘technical’ military texts, such as the Hipparchikos – where he 
combines practical advice with that which falls into the category of ‘battlefield psychology’–  it 
is thus notable that Arrian excludes an important component of warfare – psychology – from 
his text altogether. So, there is a sense in which he is also trying to distance himself from 
Xenophon in the Taktika and locate himself somewhat differently. This difference, as will be 
explored is connected to the Roman Empire in which he lived and wrote, though whether 
Stadter’s description of him as a ‘man of two worlds’, both ‘Greek’ and a ‘Roman’, is helpful will 
be left open for the moment.40  
While we have a significant amount of information about Arrian which helps us understand and 
contextualise his works, we are not so fortunate in the case of Aelian, as everything we know 
about him comes from his own Taktike theoria.41 From his reference to his more learned nature 
                                                          
38For the lost histories see Stadter (1980) 166-153; Devine (1993) 314-315 for Arrian being better known as a 
philosopher than a historian and his identification as the ‘New Xenophon’; also Bosworth (1993) 272-275. 
39 For Arrian’s complete works see Stadter (1980) 32-163 and for his minor works Bosworth (1993). 
40 Stadter (1980) 1. 
41 For the date Arr. Tact. 44. 3; Devine (1993) 315; Stadter (1980) 41; see Dain (1946) 20-23 for different figures 
with the name Aelian.  
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and from the general tendency of philosophers to include warfare in the activities they 
theorised about (as for example Asclepiodotus, Onasander and not least of all Arrian himself) 
we might deduce that he too was a philosopher.42 We also know that he was a close friend of 
Frontinus – a Roman general and official of the late first century A.D. discussed further below – 
but he himself emphasises that he had no experience as a commander.43 He also mentions in 
the preface that it is mostly due to Frontinus that the work was completed, as it was the latter’s 
advice and encouragement during their meeting at Formiae which enabled him to go through 
with the project. However, we know of no other works by Aelian and even the date of his 
Taktike theoria is problematic, not least of all because of the aforementioned story of the 
meeting with Frontinus. 
The problem stems from the fact that the manuscript tradition preserves two versions of 
Aelian’s text: a shorter version, present in the oldest manuscript available, the Laurentianus 
55.4 (which was also copied in other later manuscripts), and a longer version, preserved in the 
Codex Venetus Marcianus 516 and another manuscript once in the Library of St. Mark’s 
Cathedral, Venice, now lost.44 All of the surviving manuscripts give Hadrian as the Emperor to 
whom the work is dedicated, but the philologist Andrew Devine has argued (following the 
French Hellenist and Byzantinist Alphonse Dain), that the mention of the emperor’s deified 
father Nerva in the preface, of the emperor’s skill in battle and of his excellence in ‘great wars’ 
make it more likely that the manuscripts are corrupt, and the work was in fact dedicated to 
Trajan.45 According to him then, the text should be dated between 106/7 A.D. – the end of the 
Dacian wars – and 113 A.D. – the beginning of Trajan’s Parthian campaign.    
The ancient military historian Christopher Matthew, however, has a different view. According 
to him, the two versions of the text represent two different stages of composition. He bases 
this on Aelian’s account (in the preface of the Taktike theoria) of how he had started composing 
the work, but set it aside because he did not think himself worthy, then, after meeting with 
                                                          
42 Matthew (2012) 135; Stadter (1978) 118; see below for the possibility of him being a Stoic.   
43 Ael. Tact. pr. 1-2; Devine (1989) 31. 
44 Devine (1989) 33. 
45 Ael. Tact. pr. 3 for Nerva; Devine (1989) 31; Dain (1946) 18-19. 
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Frontinus, he was reassured and decided to finish it. 46 The Codex Laurentianus thus contains 
the incomplete, pre-Frontinus draft, which he started under and dedicated to Trajan, while the 
fuller versions reflected his completed, post Frontinus work which he then rededicated to 
Hadrian, changing only the name of the emperor.47 The rest – Matthew continues - fitted 
Hadrian as well so did not require any additional changes: Trajan – Hadrian’s adoptive father - 
was Marcus Ulpius Nerva Traianus, having been adopted by Nerva, and the ‘great wars’ which 
the emperor commanded could refer to Hadrian’s military activities ranging from Britain to the 
Near East.  
However, it must be noted that this is a clarification of Matthew’s argument, as one struggles to 
understand exactly what he is trying to put forward.48 This is mostly because Matthew does not 
seem to have examined any manuscripts when putting together his new edition of Aelian’s text, 
but refers mostly to printed editions – in fact giving  most credence to Robertollo’s 1552 editio 
princeps, calling it the ‘best edition’.49 The reason behind this is that it included the longest 
version of the text, with chapters not found in any of the subsequent editions, and of course 
also missing from the oldest manuscript, the Laurentianus 55.4. However, Devine follows Dain 
in arguing that the ‘missing chapters’ are in fact interpolated mid-tenth century Byzantine 
comments meant to ‘elucidate the material in the shorter authentic recension by incorporating 
additional material from other Hellenistic tactical manuals, now lost’, which presents a big 
problem for Matthew’s theory.50 I believe Devine’s view must be the correct one, not least 
because the shorter version of the Laurentianus 55.4 was copied in subsequent manuscripts, 
while the ‘interpolated version’ exists only in two, one of which is lost.51 I also believe Devine is 
right in thinking the emperor to whom the work is dedicated is indeed Trajan, as all the current 
manuscripts have ‘Hadrian’ as the name of the dedicatee, which makes it easier to believe that 
there was confusion between the two emperors and ‘Trajan’ was replaced with ‘Hadrian’, 
                                                          
46 Matthew (2012) 135-136. 
47 Matthew (2012) 137.  
48 Also Wheeler (2016) 580-581. 
49 Matthew (2012) xvi; Devine (1989) 33. 
50 Matthew (2012) xvii-xviii.; Devine (1989) 59; Dain (1946) 77-115 puts forth a more detailed analysis of the 
interpolated recension; see esp. 88-89 where Dain follows Köchly’s demonstration.  
51 For a very good review of Matthew’s use of manuscripts and printed editions see Wheeler (2016) 578-581. 
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whereas, in order for Matthew’s interpretation to work, the names of both emperors would 
have to appear in different manuscripts, since the ‘shorter version’ would be dedicated to 
Trajan whilst the ‘longer’ would be dedicated to Hadrian. The former hypothesis of the 
confusion is supported by Wheeler as well, who points out that early manuscripts (especially 
those containing military texts) have a very hard time differentiating between Trajan and 
Hadrian, so we could easily believe that this is the case here as well.52 Irrespective of whom the 
text is dedicated to, it is clear that it precedes that of Arrian.53  
Since we mentioned Aelian’s connection with Frontinus, it is only fitting that we continue the 
discussion with the collections of stratagems, one of which bears his name, his Strategemata, 
together with Polyaenus’ Strategika. We are fortunate in knowing far more about Sextus Iulius 
Frontinus than we do about Aelian.54 He was probably born in Narbonese Gaul sometime in 
Tiberius’ reign and we first learn of him being praetor urbanus in 70 A.D., though his early 
career is not known. He then went on to become consul three times (in 73, 98 and 100 A.D.), 
two of which were together with the Emperor Trajan, which led some scholars to believe he 
must have played a significant role in Trajan’s succession of Nerva as emperor.55  He also held 
the most prestigious post of proconsul of Asia and that of curator of the water supply, all 
amounting to a very impressive career.56  Perhaps more importantly, Tacitus speaks very highly 
of him as governor of Britannia (in 74 A.D.), praising him for dealing with the raids of the very 
powerful and bellicose Silures despite the difficulties of the terrain.57 This would only have been 
a part of his very successful military career, which most likely involved him being legatus 
legionis during the Rhineland revolt in 70 A.D., since he himself states he accepted the 
surrender of the Lingones, but Tacitus’ praise is remarkable considering that his father-in-law 
                                                          
52 Wheeller (2016) 380-381. 
53 For all the copies of the text in the Laurentianus 55.4 see Devine (1989) 33; Dain (1946) 19 thinks the manual 
was offered to Trajan in the first decade of the second century A.D. 
54 For a detailed account of his life and career see Rodgers (2004) 1-5. 
55 E.g. Syme (1958) 16-17, Eck (2002) 219-226 and Rodgers (2004) 4. 
56 Bennett (1925) xiii-xviii; Laederich (1999) 5-15. 
57 Tac. Agr. 17.4. 
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Agricola was Frontinus’ successor in Britannia, and this adds weight to Frontinus’ reputation 
and skill as a commander.58 
So one way we can understand the Strategemata – though far from the only way, as we shall 
see – is as the work of a highly proficient general interested in passing on his expertise, and 
naturally interested in the military deeds of other great commanders. As for the work itself, 
based on internal evidence – namely references to Domitian as Germanicus, a title acquired in 
83 A.D.  – the first three books were most likely composed between 84 and 96 A.D.59 It also 
comes, of course, as part of a larger literary output, including a treatise on aqueducts, De Aquis, 
one on land surveying, and most importantly a treatise on ‘the art of war’, De re militari, to 
which he refers in the preface of the Strategemata but which is now lost to us. It seems his 
military expertise was highly valued particularly because of this more general treatise, as 
Vegetius refers to it twice in his much later Epitoma rei militaris – a work promising to put 
together Roman military expertise from the past alongside that of the author’s present. 
Vegetius emphasises that he is merely summarising Frontinus’ words, the implication being the 
same as Aelian’s exercise in modesty, that the De re militari is far superior to their own works 
and cannot really be improved upon.60 
We only have a brief entry on Frontinus’ counterpart, Polyaenus, in the Suda, which the 
Classical military historians Peter Krentz and Everett Wheeler use to reconstruct his career 
along with ‘some scattered fragments and personal references in the prefaces of the 
Strategica’.61 According to them he was born in Bithynia in around 100 A.D. to an elite family of 
Macedonian descent– but everything else in their reconstruction seems to be a matter of 
guess-work, except the fact that by 161 A.D. he was pleading cases in the courts in Rome, and 
therefore was most likely a Roman citizen who knew Latin and Roman law.62 Krentz and 
Wheeler assume that, like many other of his ambitious Bithynian countrymen, Polyaenus too 
left his home ‘to pursue fame and fortune, seeking literary patronage and work as a teacher of 
                                                          
58 Rodgers (2004)1. 
59 Bennett (1925) xxi. 
60 Rodgers (2004) 3; Veg. Mil. 1.8, 2.3. 
61 Krentz and Wheeler (1994) ix. 
62 For the full account see Krentz and Wheeler (1994) ix-xvi. 
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rhetoric or an advocate in the courts’.63 There are surviving fragments of a Greek speech of his, 
On Behalf of the Macedonian Assembly, which suggest his wider rhetorical prowess. In the 
preserved fragment of his On Thebes (also mentioned in the Suda) he calls himself ‘Athenian’, 
which makes the way in which he constructs his identity that much more interesting, because – 
like Arrian – he could choose to highlight whichever aspect of his identity was more suitable for 
him at a given time: Athenian, when he was delivering speeches and Macedonian when he was 
writing about war (which is not to say he did not spend time in Athens).64  
Polyaenus’ arrival at Rome cannot be dated. However, the date of the composition of the 
Strategika – a collection of stratagems written in Greek – is given by his reference to the 
Parthian war of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. As Krentz and Wheeler point out, Lucius 
Verus’ departure to the East in 162 A.D. is noted in the preface to book six, so the first five 
books must have been written by then, especially since they believe that Polyaenus will have 
been very enthusiastic about the opportunity to dedicate his work to the emperors at such a 
moment, to offer a treatise that could serve as a guidebook in this war. 
The last category of texts, namely the ‘general manual’ is – as previously mentioned – 
represented by Onasander’s Strategikos. As for the author himself, we do not have much 
information except an entry in the Suda stating that he wrote a commentary on Plato’s Republic 
(which has not survived), so we might suspect that he was a philosopher like Asclepiodotus and 
Aelian – though attempts to reconstruct his Platonic views from the actual Strategikos have 
been less successful.65 His Strategikos is a work on generalship written in Greek dedicated to 
Quintus Veranius, one of the consuls of 49 A.D., who died 10 years later in 59 A.D. Because of 
this the philologist and historian Charles Oldfather reasonably considered the latter as the 
terminus ante quem for the composition of the treatise.66 The Strategikos is made up of forty-
two chapters containing military principles on various themes ranging from the choice of the 
best general and the factors that should influence it, to the importance of psychological factors 
                                                          
63 Krentz and Wheeler (1994) x. 
64 Krentz and Wheeler (1994) x. 
65 Smith (1998) 152; for the different variations of Onasander’s name see Oldfather (1923) 345-347.  
66 Oldfather (1923) 347; for a detailed account of Quintus Veranius’ career and his relationship to Onasander see 
Smith (1998) 152-156.  
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and battle formations.  Unlike Aelian’s text this is addressed to ‘professionals’ (to the extent to 
which any Roman general can be called professional) and the chapters are somewhat self-
contained, each discussing a topic that is not necessarily related to the previous or subsequent 
one. 67 
2. The works and the ‘tradition’ of military writing. 
The particular texts discussed in this thesis do not stand alone but come as a part of a larger 
group of surviving military writings from the ancient world and as an even smaller part of what 
we may call ‘technical writings’ more broadly. These latter are texts which present a certain 
type of knowledge required for a specific field of activity, whether intended for other experts 
and/or a broader audience. They may also, as already mentioned, be much more than 
‘technical’ in their oulook and content, often engaging with broader ideas and problems of 
empire, power and knowledge. 
I refrain from using words such as ‘tradition’ and ‘genre’ at this point about the military writings 
because, as we shall see, we do not possess enough extant texts to establish what this 
‘tradition’ might have been and whether there is indeed a norm that ‘military manuals’ follow. 
We shall, therefore, further divide the discussion into two sections. In the first part we shall 
examine the ‘military manuals’ which survive from before the middle of the first century A.D., 
that is which precede the composition of the texts which are the main focus here, and those 
earlier texts which we know about (or suspect the existence of) but are now lost both in Greek 
and Latin. We shall also look at a group of related texts that scholars have generally studied 
separately from ‘military manuals’, namely artillery manuals. In the second section, we will 
continue the discussion of both military manuals and artillery manuals with those written in the 
Roman Empire that include our own texts, and try to establish some relationships between 
these various groups and traditions. On what grounds are military and artillery manuals 
distinguished? To what extent can the variation visible within the set of surviving military 
writings from the early Roman Empire already mentioned be traced earlier? How far do the 
later works seem to follow patterns and how far do they seem to take different paths?     
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2.1 Earlier texts, extant and lost. 
There are three surviving, earlier Greek texts which might be considered to come under the 
rubric of the military manual: Aeneas Tacticus’ Poliorcetica, Xenophon’s Hipparchikos, and 
Asclepiodotus’ Taktika. There are naturally other Greek historical texts that engage with the 
specifics of warfare, such as Polybius’ Histories, and other Greek technical texts on other 
military matters, namely the artillery manuals mentioned before and we shall discuss them all 
briefly in what follows.68 
 Aeneas Tacticus wrote a ‘manual’ about siege warfare in the fourth century B.C. (sometime 
between 370 and 346), mixing in very detailed technical knowledge about how to lock gates 
and how to prevent mining operations under fortifications, with insights into the psychology of 
a besieged city and the need to beware of plots and ‘the enemy within’.69 Written closely in 
time to Aeneas’ text is Xenophon’s Hipparchikos.70 Addressed more specifically to the holder of 
the office of cavalry commander at Athens, the text also combines practical advice, with tips on 
how to use deception and take advantage of perception. Paul Cartledge contends, however, 
that the main emphasis of the text is on the morality of the man who would occupy the 
commander’s role, focusing more specifically ‘on the moral and religious qualities required to 
lead men as a cavalry commander in any situation, place or time’, something that we also find 
in Onasander’s later text.71   
While arguably the two aforementioned texts refer to more specific circumstances, 
Asclepiodotus’ Taktika seems to be putting forward general principles to be followed in any 
situation. Asclepiodotus was a first century B.C. philosopher and disciple of the Stoic 
Poseidonius.72 His text is divided into twelve chapters (each with respective subchapters) and it 
                                                          
68 For a survey of all the texts in this section see Spaulding (1933).  
69 For the name of Aeneas’ treatise see Hunter-Handford (1927) x-xi; for a detailed discussion Whitehead (1990) 5-
17; for the dating see Whitehead (1990) 8-9. For plots and ‘the enemy within’: chapters 1 to 5, 10 to 14, 17 to 32 
and 40; gates: 28; mining operations: 37. 
70 For the date see Cartledge (1997) 65-66; Marchant (1925) xxviii-xxix. 
71 Cartledge (1997) 66; for the purpose of the text also Stoll (2012). 
72 Oldfather (1923) 233-234. 
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discusses the very practical matters of organising, marching and manoeuvring troops, without 
the added elements of psychology or morality.  
Aeneas Tacticus himself talks about two of his other books, one on ‘preparations’ (ἐν τῇ 
Παρασκευαστικῇ βίβλῳ) and one on supplies (ἐν τῇ Ποριστικῇ βίβλῳ), and Aelian adds that 
Aeneas put together many books on generalship (στρατηγικὰ βιβλία ἱκανὰ συνταξάμενος) 
which may have included more general matters, since Aelian also tells us that Aeneas discussed 
the definition of tactics.73 This is in relation to a dispute with Polybius on the subject, and Aelian 
mentions a τακτικὰ by ‘Polybius the Megalopolitan, a man of great learning and a companion of 
Scipio’ while Arrian names him as one of the writers ‘about such things’ (ἔστι συγγράμματα 
ὑπὲρ τούτων […]Πολυβίου; presumably military matters, though the beginning is lost). 
 Obviously, Polybius includes many military specifics in his histories – most notably his 
description of the Roman army in book six, but also the later comparison between the Roman 
legion and the Macedonian phalanx, which might overlap with a more general military work to 
which he refers in his Histories, and which is no doubt the one that Arrian and Aelian are 
referring to. 74 Moreover, the material has echoes in Asclepiodotus. Again we learn from Aelian 
and Arrian that Poseidonius ‘the stoic philosopher’ also wrote a treatise on warfare and the 
argument has been made that it is Polybius who was the inspiration for this.75 Furthermore, it 
has been argued that the text of Asclepiodotus is actually an ‘edited’ version of his master’s 
manual, which might be the reason why he is not named among the authors of Taktika, whilst 
Poseidonius is. It is this Poseidonian treatise, then, which would have been the original source 
for the Taktika of Arrian and Aelian.76 
There are other Greek authors mentioned by Aelian and Arrian such as Cyneas the Thessalian, 
Pyrrhus the Epirote and his son Alexander, Clearchus, Pausanias, Evangelus, Eupolemus and 
Iphicrates.77 However, the existence of some of these texts is put into question by the desire of 
                                                          
73 Aen. Tact. 7.4; 14.2, Ael Tact. 1.2 and 3.4 but this could also be part of any work so is in no way a clear indication 
of the existence of a separate treatise.  
74 Plb. 9.20.4 and Walbank (1972) 15. 
75 Arr. Tact. 1; Ael. Tact. 1.2; Devine (1980) 33 and (1993) 318. 
76 The discussion is summarized in C.H. Oldfather and W.A. Oldfather (1923) 233-238; also Devine (1993) 318. 
77 Ael. Tact. 1.2. 
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the two later authors to fit into a Greek tradition of writing about warfare and to establish the 
precedence of Greek military science (this shall be explored in depth in chapter II). It seems 
almost too good to be true – although not entirely implausible – that several famous Greek 
generals such as Pyrrhus, Alexander, Pausanias and Iphicrates (although Arrian mentions that 
this is not in fact the Athenian general, something not found in Aelian) all had literary 
preoccupations and happened to write treatises on military matters. The habit of writing under 
the name of a famous figure in the field, or in history, was a well-established one in the ancient 
world, as the rich range of surviving pseudepigraphic work attests.78 Arrian and Aelian may 
have been particularly susceptible to such material, wishing to demonstrate that the Greeks too 
had men of action whose wisdom stands the test of time. At the same time, we cannot discount 
the possibility that such works contained worthwhile material, regardless of their authorship.   
On the Latin side little is preserved, unfortunately. There are the vestiges of Cato the Elder’s De 
re militari (of an unknown date), sections of which have survived but not enough to tell us how 
he treated his subject matter and what he discussed, and while Vegetius – who used Cato, as 
pointed out by Astin and Milner – is extant, it would be difficult and dangerous to argue from it  
which parts may or may not originally have been in Cato’s text, since it is ‘virtually certain that 
he did not have access to Cato’s work’.79 The six books de re militari by Cincius, an antiquarian 
author probably writing in the first century B.C., are cited by Aulus Gellius in his erudite third 
century A.D. miscellany, the Attic Nights.80 Judging from Gellius, its contents ranged from how a 
legion was arranged and the names of its component parts to the recruitment of soldiers. 
Vegetius also mentions the encyclopaedist Celsus among the early Roman military writers.81 A 
book on military matters was part of his encyclopaedic Artes, composed in the reign of Tiberius, 
and also encompassing five books on agriculture, seven on rhetoric, perhaps six on philosophy, 
and, of course, the almost intact eight books on medicine for which he is most well-known.82 
                                                          
78 As is the case of medical texts such as Ps-Pythagoras and especially Ps-Democritus. 
79 Astin (1978) 184 (for the quote) that is to say he did not have direct access, but read digests of Cato; 184-185 for 
the treatise in general; Milner (1993) xviii.  
80 Gell. 16.4; see also Kierdorf (2006) accessed on 1/6/2017. 
81 Veg. Mil. 2.8. 
82 On Celsus see Langslow (2000) 41-48, particularly 41-44 for the organisation of his work and its dating.  
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Then there is a group of texts from the same period that focused specifically on the 
construction of artillery, giving very technical details and specifications. Surviving are Biton’s 
Construction of War Engines and Artillery, Philon’s Belopoeica, Athenaeus’ On Machines in 
Greek, and the book on siege machines in Vitruvius’ De architectura in Latin.83 Little is known 
about the first but the work is addressed to a certain Attalus of Pergamum which Eric Marsden, 
writing a history of Greek and Roman artillery (and publishing the texts of Biton, Philon, Heron 
and Vitruvius), identifies as Attalus I based on technical factors in the description, therefore 
dating the treatise to the 240s B.C. The work addresses the construction of several engines: a 
stone-throwing engine, a giant siege-tower, a Sambuca, a belly-bow catapult and the mountain 
belly-bow. Marsden also dates Philon’s Belopoeica to the last third of the third century B.C. 
based on the fact it seems to draw on Ctesibius, an Alexandrian author in the mathematical and 
mechanical traditions active in the earlier third century, the manual containing a very technical 
description of existing artillery but also some ways to improve it.84  
However, it must be noted that Philon’s Belopoeica comes as a part of a larger work on 
mechanics, the Mechanike Syntaxis of which there would have been nine books: 1. 
Introduction, 2. The Lever (Mokhlika), 3. Harbor Construction (Limenopoiika), 4. Artillery 
Construction (Belopoeika), 5. Pneumatics (Pneumatika), 6. Automaton Construction 
(Automatopoeika), 7. Siege Preparations (Paraskeuastika) 8. Siege Craft (Poliorketika) and 9. 
Stratagems (Strategemata). Books five, seven and eight are extant (though fragmentary), and 
the latter two on sieges focus specifically on the positioning and use of siege machines such as 
catapults, but also on more general aspects to do with preparations for a siege and on the 
psychology associated with sieges.85 Therefore, given this multiple focus on different aspects – 
some of which we encounter in ‘military manuals’ as well, such as the importance of betrayal in 
sieges, found both in Aeneas Tacticus and Philon – Philon’s Mechanike Syntaxis when taken as a 
whole (based on what we can deduce from the Belopoeika, Paraskeuastika and Poliorketika) 
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demonstrate the sometimes artificial ways in which we differentiate between ‘artillery 
manuals’ and ‘military manuals’ which will be explored further below.86  
Athenaeus probably wrote his treatise On Machines sometime in the later half of the first 
century B.C. It starts with a history of simple siege equipment as far as Alexander and then goes 
on to detail the construction of several machines such as portable towers, tortoises, sambucas 
and rams, and then describes the pithekion (‘little ape), forwheel goblet-joint and city-taker in a 
category which the same scholars call ‘innovation’.87 Interestingly, much like Aelian and Arrian, 
Athenaeus also gives a list of previous authorities in the field of war-machines: Deimarchus, 
Diades and Charias, all of whom went on Alexander’s expedition and wrote Poliorketika and 
then Pyrrhus the Macedonian who wrote on Siegecraft Equipment.88 But Athenaeus lavishes 
the most praise upon his – and Vitruvius’ – master, Agesistratus, from whom he says he learned 
everything mentioned in his book. We learn – from both Athenaeus and Vitruvius – that he was 
a technical innovator, creating catapults with more range by modifying designs for spring-
frames.89 
All of these later texts are now lost but it is interesting that Pyrrhus of Epirus is also identified as 
a writer of an ‘artillery manual’, which could mean that either famous commanders viewed 
‘military’ and ‘artillery’ manuals as closely related and chose to engage with both topics 
indiscriminately, or that authors writing in the two ‘genres’ sought to construct the tradition of 
their particular expertise in similar ways – in this case by invoking the involvement of famous 
commanders with their topic. Both of these possibilities again show that the two categories of 
texts could be seen as more closely related than modern scholarship has tended to give them 
credit, but we should also not ignore the importance of certain tropes and methods of 
constructing authority that – as we shall see below – seem to transcend categories and genres, 
that are more widely shared and so make all divisions problematic. 
                                                          
86 For Philon on betrayals and psychology see Campbell (2004) 161. 
87 For a detailed discussion see Whitehead and Blyth (2004) 15-19; for the structure 32. 
88 Ath. Mech. 5-6; Whitehead and Blyth (2004) 69-71 for the identification of these figures.  
89 Ath. Mech. 8; Vitr. 7. Pr. 14. 
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Amongst the most significant artillery works that have been lost are those of the 
aforementioned ‘most famous of Alexandrian engineers’ Ctesibius (in fact none of his works are 
extant, although we do know he was a prolific writer).90 Marsden points out his importance to 
the other artillery writers by emphasising that his name is present in the title of Heron’s 
Belopoeika, that is ‘Heron’s edition of Ctesibius’ Construction of Artillery’ from which we 
naturally deduce that Ctesibius had also written a Belopoeica, and Marsden also argues that 
Heron’s description of the gastraphetes was based closely on Ctesibius’ Commentaries, also 
now lost.91  
The Roman Vitruvius wrote one book on artillery as part of a larger work in ten books entitled 
De Architectura and dedicated to Augustus. This work covered a variety of topics – in the words 
of Alice König – ‘stretching well beyond what we usually define as “architecture” today’, and 
amongst which are the suitable sites for the foundations of cities, bulding materials, 
construction of temples, supply of water and clocks and sundials.92 König goes on to say that it 
has been pointed out that the text goes beyond even contemporary conceptions of the subject 
indicating the author’s professional, intellectual and literary ambition, and we might note here 
again the variety of authors who choose to write on military matters as well as their different 
background and interests.93 All these literary traditions were flexible and adaptable. 
These are the main texts – both extant and lost – that we know of from before the mid-first 
century A.D., but military writing continued in the Roman Empire and we shall now turn to the 
directions it took and try to ascertain whether there is any reason to believe there were several 
‘genres’ with different characteristics and audiences. So far we have evidence of the existence 
of a variety of texts. These include taktika such as that of Asclepiodotus (and perhaps 
Poseidonius and Aeneas), works on generalship such as Xenophon’s, as well as more specific 
works on different topics such as that of Aeneas on sieges, but also preparations for warfare 
and supplies. On the Roman side there were the ‘military’ works (de re militari) of Celsus, Cato 
and Cincius, whose subject matter is harder to determine but which also seems to have been 
                                                          
90 Marsden (1971) 2. 
91 Marsden (1971) 2. 
92 A. König (2009) 31; her article is a good starting point for recent bibiography on Vitruvius, especially note 5. 
93 A. König (2009) 31. 
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quite broad, spanning from recruitment to training and tactics. There were also works on 
artillery, some more narrow in scope, such as Biton’s, and others containing information that 
could be said to pertain more generally to the field of war-machines, such as Philon’s 
Mechanike syntaxis which also discusses sieges and the preparation for them. So far, however, 
we shall see that there is no evidence for individual collections of stratagems, and this will be 
discussed below.  
2.2. Later texts, extant and lost 
Among these later texts are, of course, our particular texts but also, in the category of ‘military 
manuals’ the most important absentee is Frontinus’ lost De re militari which he refers to 
himself in his preface and which Vegetius also mentions in his treatise.94  The literary tradition 
of the artillery manual also continues in the Roman imperial period, with Heron of Alexandria 
and Apollodorus of Damascus, whose works are extant. Heron wrote two quite different works 
in the first century A.D. The Belopoeica describes the construction of the earliest non-torsion 
arrow-shooting engine, the gastraphetes, but also presents a constructional history of torsion 
catapults, while the Cheirobalistra is essentially a list of components for a recently introduced 
type of machine.95 Apollodorus wrote a quite technical and machine-oriented Poliorketika 
dedicated to the emperor Trajan, which talks about how to protect the attackers in a siege, 
excavations against fortifications, rams and their effects, towers, ladders and an assault raft for 
crossing rivers.96 
In what follows, therefore, we shall attempt at first to make the case why we should indeed be 
talking about ‘military manuals’ and ‘artillery manuals’ as separate categories, after which we 
will establish – given all we know about both earlier and later texts – whether we can talk about 
different ‘genres’ of military manuals. 
2.2.1 ‘Military’ and ‘artillery’ manuals  
                                                          
94 Veg. Mil. 2.8. 
95 Marsden (1971) 1-2. 
96 Whitehead (2010) 17-24.  
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As I have hinted on a couple of occasions now, the distinction between ‘artillery’ and ‘military’ 
is to a certain extent a modern choice made in order to help with classification, and one could 
point out that the ‘military’ in fact encompasses the ‘artillery’. But there are some fundamental 
differences that, despite the similarities, make it worthwhile for us to think of this type of texts 
as perhaps serving a different purpose and addressing a different audience than the ‘military 
manuals’. 
One of the fundamental differences between the ‘artillery texts’ and the ‘broader military 
manuals’ (both the earlier ones and those discussed in this thesis) is the level of technicality. All 
of the former describe in detail how to construct and assemble various pieces of artillery for 
what one might assume was an audience made up of ‘specialists’, since they seem little 
concerned with accessibility.97 Indeed, there seem to be certain centres where artillery making 
was focused – such as Alexandria and Rhodes – and it appears that authors interact in one way 
or another with such centres and discuss their work and designs with other experts. We see this 
in the case of Philon of Byzantium who visited Alexandria and would have spoken to those who 
worked with the artillery expert Ctesibius.98  Philon also seems to make this explicit in his 
treatises. His Belopoeica is addressed to a certain Ariston the identity of whom is unknown but 
who – judging from the context – could be another ‘expert’ or at least someone more familiar 
with artillery construction: 
τὸ μὲν ἀνώτερον ἀποσταλὲν πρὸς σὲ βιβλίον περιεῖχεν ἡμῖν τὰ λιμενοποιικά. νῦν δὲ 
καθήκει λέγειν, καθότι τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διάταξιν ἐποιησάμεθα πρὸς σέ, περὶ τῶν βελοποιικῶν, 
ὑπὸ δέ τινων ὀργανοποιικῶν καλουμένων […]ὅτι μὲν οὖν συμβαίνει δυσθεώρητόν τι τοῖς 
πολλοῖς καὶ ἀτέκμαρτον ἔχειν τὴν τέχνην, ὑπολαμβάνω μὴ ἀγνοεῖν σε 
‘The book we sent you before comprised our ‘Making of Harbours’. Now is the time to 
explain (in accordance with the programme we laid out for you) the subject of artillery 
                                                          
97 Cf. Roby (2016). 
98 Marsden (1971) 6. 
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construction […] I understand that you are fully aware that the techne contains something 
unintelligible and baffling to many people’99 
The subject matter described would seem more complicated as well and requiring significant 
knowledge of engineering. For example, Philon writes: 
ἔστω γάρ τις εὐθεῖα δεδομένη τῆς διαμέτρου, ἧς λόγου χάριν δεῖ εὑρεῖν διπλασίονα κύβῳ, 
ἡ Α· διπλασίον’ οὖν ταύτης ἐθέμην αὐτῇ πρὸς ὀρθὰς τὴν Β, καὶ ἀπ’ ἄκρας τῆς Β ἐξέβαλον 
πρὸς ὀρθὰς τὴν Β, καὶ ἀπ’ ἄκρας τῆς Β ἐξέβαλον πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἄλλην τὴν Γ ἄπειρον, καὶ 
κατήγαγον ἀπὸ τῆς γωνίας, ἐφ’ ἧς Θ, εὐθεῖαν τὴν Κ, καὶ διεῖλον αὐτὴν δίχα καὶ ἔστω τὸ 
διαιροῦν σημεῖον κατὰ τὸ Κ. 
‘Let there be a straight line, A, given of this diameter, of which, for the sake of argument, 
we must find the double to the power three. I put a line, B, double A and at right angles to 
it; from the end of B I drew at right angles another line, Γ, of unknown length. From the 
corner Θ I drew a straight line, K, and dissected it; let the point of bisection be K.100 
Heron addresses his Cheiroballistra to a knowledgeable audience, Marsden pointing out that he 
‘assumes a different role, that of a technical expert writing for the benefit of other experts a 
detailed specification for a new or recently introduced type of machine’.101 Indeed, Heron does 
not include a preface to his work instead going directly into the very technical building 
specifications: 
Γεγονέτωσαν κανόνες δύο πελεκινωτοὶ, οἱ ΑΒ ΓΔ, ἐν τετραγώνοις πελεκίνοις, ὧν θῆλυς μὲν 
ἔστω ὁ ΑΒ, ἄῤῥην δὲ ὁ ΓΔ.  Καὶ τὸ μὲν μῆκος ἐχέτω ὁ ΑΒ πόδας τρεῖς καὶ δακτύλους 
τέσσαρας, τὸ δὲ πλάτος δακτύλους ΓΣ, τὸ δὲ πάχος δακτύλους ΔΣ. 
                                                          
99 Ph., Bel., 49-50, all translations from Biton, Philon and Heron are by E.W. Marsden. 
100 Ph., Bel., 52. 
101 Marsden (1971) 2. 
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Fashion two dowetailed boards, AB and ΓΔ, with quadrilateral dovetails, of which let AB be 
the female and ΓΔ the male. Let AB have a length of 3 ft. 4d, a breath of 3½d, and a 
thickness of 4 ½ d.102  
Heron also takes a different approach in other treatises, playing a double role. His Belopoeica, 
for instance, is much more similar to Aelian’s Taktika in terms of stated intention, Heron 
claiming in the preface that he aims to make his work more accessible: 
Ἐπεὶ οὖν οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν πλείστας μὲν ἀναγραφὰς περὶ βελοποιικῶν ἐποιήσαντο μέτρα καὶ 
διαθέσεις ἀναγραψάμενοι, οὐδὲ εἷς δὲ αὐτῶν οὔτε τὰς κατασκευὰς τῶν ὀργάνων 
ἐκτίθεται κατὰ τρόπον οὔτε τὰς τούτων θεται κατὰ τρόπον οὔτε τὰς τούτων χρήσεις, ἀλλ’ 
ὥσπερ γινώσκουσι πᾶσι τὴν ἀναγραφὴν ἐποιήσαντο, καλῶς ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐξ 
αὐτῶν τε ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἐμφανίσαι περὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἐν τῇ βελοποιίᾳ, ὡς μηδὲ ἴσως 
ὑπαρχόντων, ὅπως πᾶσιν εὐπαρακολούθητος γένηται ἡ παράδοσις. 
‘Writers before me have composed numerous treatises on artillery dealing with 
measurments and designs; but not one of them describes the construction of the engines 
in due order, or their uses; in fact they apparently wrote exclusively for experts. Thus I 
consider it expedient to supplement their work, and to describe artillery engines, even 
perhaps those out of date, in such a way that my account may be easily followed by 
everyone.’103 
This claim to clarity is not the only similarity between Aelian’s text and Heron’s. An antiquarian 
interest is manifest in both, as Marsden points out that Heron in fact reproduces Ctesibius’ 
outdated ideas instead of newer practices, and this might be done with the purpose of 
preserving a Greek tradition and showing its continued importance and relevance. Aelian and 
Biton’s work also have in common dedication to an emperor and king respectively, and – 
although less explicit in Aelian perhaps – the express desire that the information contained in 
the text be of use: 
                                                          
102 Hero, Cheiroballistra, W123. 
103 Hero, Bel. 73. 
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Λιθοβόλου ὀργάνου κατασκευὴν ἐπιβέβλημαι γράψαι, ὦ Ἄτταλε βασιλεῦ· καὶ μὴ σκώψῃς, 
εἴ τινα ἑτέραν αὐτοῦ εἰς ὑπόθεσιν πίπτοντα τυγχάνει ὄργανα, ... δι’ ὧν πέπεισμαι, ὅτι 
ταῦτα τὰ κατὰ τὰς προσβολὰς τῶν πολεμίων ὄργανα ῥᾳδίως ἀναστρέψεις, 
ἀντιστρατευόμενος ταῖς ὑπογεγραμμέναις μεθόδοις. 
‘I have set out, king Attalus, to describe the construction of a stone-throwing engine; and 
do not scoff at me if some engines perhaps belong to a type different from this. I am 
convinced that, with their assistance, you will easily repulse those engines employed in the 
offensives of your enemies, if you counter attack by the methods described below.’104 
But as Campbell points out, there are other technical texts which display similarities with both 
‘military manuals’ and ‘artillery manuals’. While the topics of these are varied, it is agricultural 
manuals that Campbell thinks are the closest because they also claim to be of practical use to 
the reader.105 The difference is – much like with ‘artillery manuals’ – that the agricultural 
authors claim to be drawing on personal experience, which is only true for a part of those 
writing ‘military manuals’, and they do offer specific and situational advice on farming, 
something which again the ‘military manuals’ do not do.106 However, we cannot discount the 
fact that many of these apparent similarities can also be viewed as tropes that extend to an 
even broader range of texts – such as the claim that one’s text will give clarity and order to a 
seemingly complicated field, or the statement that one is writing at the behest of someone else 
(or for friends), as is the case with Polyaenus and Apollodorus, or claims of lack of competence 
– such as is the case with Aelian.107 Therefore, while these tropes do connect ‘artillery manuals’ 
and ‘military manuals’, one has to note that these similarities in presentation are of a broader, 
more general nature. Then, we have to ask ourselves whether the addressees of a text and 
their dedicatees, their level of technicality, their presentation or they way in which they 
construct authority should be in any way left to dictate or separate categories, or that they 
rather play out across categories as different authorial strategies in general.   
                                                          
104 Bito, 43-44. 
105 Campbell (1987) 18-19. 
106 Campbell (1987) 19. 
107 J. König (2009) 41-44. 
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The texts and traditions discussed so far do themselves suggest a self-conscious distinction 
between ‘military’ and ‘artillery’ manuals: that these were considered different if connected 
traditions at the time. First, there are indications that our ‘military manuals’ were viewed as 
being broader in scope and reach than more specialist artillery texts. I believe there is no 
coincidence in the fact that both Cato and Celsus wrote on military matters as part of larger 
projects dealing with more artes and perhaps we have to understand that the ‘military arts’ are 
part of a broader category of knowledge that would be useful to a cultured Roman, as part of – 
for lack of a better word – their ‘general education, whereas the very technical aspects of 
artillery building were not. Then there is the fact that these also seem to refer back to different 
authors and different traditions of writing ‘military’ and ‘artillery’ manuals respectively. Aelian 
and Athenaeus, as mentioned, listed a distinct set of previous authorities, also signalling that 
the ancients themselves perhaps believed these to be two different strands. The only notable 
exception is Pyrrhus of Epirus, who – again if Aelian and Athenaeus are to be believed – wrote 
both a ‘military’ and an ‘artillery’ manual. However, this is perhaps simply meant to show that 
artillery was regarded as part of the general’s necessary preoccupations (as the dedication of 
Apollodorus’ text to Trajan – keen on cultivating the image of an accomplished general – would 
also indicate), alongside other issues in ‘military’ manuals. The distinction lies in the fact that, 
while a general had to be interested in both artillery and the issues we find in other manuals, 
the ‘educated Roman’ only needed to be concerned with the more general issues. The presence 
of Pyrrus in both traditions, therefore, is to be ascribed to him being a general and naturally at 
the intersection between two kinds of knowledge.  
The manuscript tradition mentioned before also supports the view of different traditions since 
the majority of the texts we call ‘military manuals’ (except Frontinus, obviously being Latin) are 
grouped in one great manuscript, the Laurentianus 55.4. So it is clear that at least in for tenth 
century Byzantine copyists and/or readers (and perhaps earlier ones too) they were a group, to 
the exclusion of others.108 To put it differently, they perhaps constituted the elementary level 
of knowledge which any general needed in order to be successful, and the fact that they were 
copied and commented on thoroughly in the Middle Ages supports the idea. 
                                                          
108 The Laurentianus 55.4 contains the Excerpts of Polyaenus; see Krentz and Wheeler (1994) xix-xxi. 
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2.2.2 Different ‘genres’/groups of ‘military manuals’ 
To summarise my argument so far, we have seen that there are different types of texts that 
precede our own ‘military manuals’, and that we can perhaps draw a very thin line between 
‘artillery’ and ‘military’ manuals due to their different levels of technicality, different scopes and 
because of the way in which they position themselves relative to a tradition of military writing. 
Closely related to the issues of technicality and diversity of subject matter we should ask the 
question whether within ‘military manuals’ there are multiple ‘genres’ or groups of military 
text. I am wary of applying the term ‘genre’ too firmly, hence the scare quotes. What I am really 
interested in, rather than getting bogged down in complex issues related with the much 
debated definition of genre, is whether the specific categories in which texts operate impose 
certain rules or patterns from which the texts cannot (or should not) deviate.109  
This question was first prompted by the great similarity in subject matter and organisation of 
the Taktika, which scholars have repeatedly pointed out, and seems to mark them apart from 
the other texts. As we shall see, while all the other authors seem to take a more varied 
approach to their content, including both more technical aspects such as battle formations and 
marching orders alongside considerations of a more moral and psychological nature and what 
could also be characterised ‘common sense military knowledge’, the Taktika restrict their 
subject matter to weapons, the divisions of the army, how to and arrange troops in formations 
and how to march them. It is therefore my aim to determine if the Taktika in particular 
constitute a group, separate from all else, which should contain only this kind of information 
and nothing more. However, following my investigation of the Taktika, I discovered that there 
is another category of texts which resembles them in their ‘single-mindedness’ of presentation, 
focusing on conveying knowledge through examples, namely collections of stratagems, but 
these are not so restricted in subject matter, since the stratagems contain both moral and 
psychological aspects. I shall therefore also consider whether the Strategemata are a separate 
group as well and if so when they originated.  
                                                          
109 For genre see Kroll (1964), Depew, M. and Obbink, D. (eds.) (2000), Conte (1996), Farrel (2003). 
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As previously mentioned, Aelian sets his tactical ‘manual’ up by explaining how it will be clearer 
than those of his predecessors (some of which he names) – something which the use of figures 
and pictures will aid – and is not only aimed at those who are already familiar with the 
terminology and with what is described.110 If one sets aside the chapters which Dain and Devine 
consider to be late interpolations, his treatise is a description of what is primarily Alexander’s 
army, with a focus on infantry and cavalry (and  some mention of chariots and elephants), their 
divisions and weapons, the names of their particular units and officers (with emphasis on the 
number of men each unit must contain) and how they are drawn up, their manoeuvres, types 
of marches and finally how to give them commands and a chapter on the importance of 
silence.111  
While Arrian’s preface and potential explanation for writing is now lost to us, and his text is in 
many respects similar to that of Aelian, unlike the latter it is divided into two distinct sections. 
The first, comprising chapters 1-32, deals with roughly the same Alexander-type army and 
discusses the same topics as Aelian, but with some significant differences, notably the 
discussion of current Roman practices alongside Greek ones. Then, chapters 33 to 44 tackle the 
contemporaneous Roman cavalry, with a focus on its drills. 112  The treatise ends with an 
exhortation to the emperor emphasising his role in ever improving the Roman army. Scholars 
have argued that the first part of the treatise is an abbreviation of the same kind of information 
found in Aelian, which Arrian tries to liven up with examples, and that the second part is where 
Arrian really comes into his own, as he is describing practices with which he is accustomed.113 
But Arrian’s reasons for the curious choice of pairing cannot be as easily explained away as 
some have tried to, because of the lack of the preface and a lacuna in the manuscript in chapter 
32, where Arrian did offer some reason for it, so this will need to constitute the object of 
another discussion.  
                                                          
110 Ael. Tact. 1.5-6. 
111 Ael. Tact. Pr.6. for the army described as Alexander’s, 22-24; 2.3-2.12; 8.3-9.10 and 15-20; 3-23; 24-34; 36-39; 
35, 40 and 42.1; 41. 
112 Bosworth (1993) 257-258 for current practices discussed alongside ancient ones. 
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The great similarities between Aelian and Arrian’s treatises do indeed warrant the question of 
whether they constitute a separate ‘genre’ or group which is operating under certain 
restrictions or assumptions, but such questions are difficult to answer mainly, as we have seen, 
due to a relative scarcity of surviving texts. Still, I shall attempt to provide at least partial 
solutions by examining the texts that are extant. There is a clear opposition between the 
subject matter in the Taktika (including that of Asclepiodotus’) and the texts of Aeneas, 
Xenophon and finally Onasander. The last is a good example of a work that spans a diversity of 
topics such as characterise all three texts, ranging from the moral qualities which a general 
needs and the psychological aspects of warfare – such as how to encourage a frightened army 
and how to show courage when facing adversity – to the more practical aspects of warfare such 
as how to make camp, battle formations and how to give watchwords.114 Nor is there a clear 
separation between these larger themes within the text itself, as Onasander discusses practical 
issues such as pursuing the enemy and receiving messengers, then moves on to the psychology 
of troops and how to encourage them, only to return to battle formations and the use of 
skirmishers and again to psychology, discussing how to announce favorable news and how to 
make sure friends fight next to friends in order to inspire courage.115 
It seems, then, that there is a category of surviving Greek ‘military’ writings which generally 
have a different emphasis than Aelian’s and Arrian’s texts, favouring a more varied approach, 
but they are by no means in the majority. So based on the limited evidence that we do possess, 
we could argue that some authors of earlier Greek texts believed a general should possess a 
more varied skill-set than just practical knowledge of the marshalling of troops, such as Aelian 
and Arrian present, or, at least, they write that way. However, because we have so few ‘military 
manuals’ in general, it is hard to establish what constitutes the norm and the exception. Even if 
we take the examples mentioned, there are three texts that mix psychology and practical 
knowledge, and there are also three texts that only focus on practical aspects, so hardly enough 
to draw any serious conclusions.  
                                                          
114 Also Oldfather (1923) 348;Onos. 2 for moral qualities, 14 for encouraging the army, 13 for courage in the face of 
adversity, 8 for making camp, 15 for battle formations and 26 for watchwords.  
115 Onos. 11 for pursuing and messengers, 17 for skirmishers, 23 for news, 24 for friends fighting together. 
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So then how are we to understand these two apparent strands of ‘military manuals’? Two 
solutions could be presented. The first is that the Taktika is a particular type of text with a long 
pedigree, going back to the Classical period, which only dealt with the marshalling of troops –
psychology et alia falling outside of its scope. This is in fact what Vegetius suggests:  
Lacedaemonii quidem et Athenienses aliique Graecorum in libros rettulere conplura quae 
tactica uocant; sed nos disciplinam militarem populi Romani debemus inquirere, qui ex 
paruissimis finibus imperium suum paene solis regionibus et mundi ipsius fine distendit. 
The Spartans, it is true, and the Athenians and other Greeks published in books much 
material which they call tactica, but we ought to be inquiring after the military system of 
the Roman People, who extended their Empire from the smallest bounds almost to the 
regions of the sun and the end of the earth itself. 116 
It is not clear though what conplura actually represents, however. Nor what the content of 
these works was, that is what Vegetius thought ‘Tactica’ comprised.  For Vegetius himself takes 
quite a broad approach on occasion. 
If we had Aeneas’ work (presumably also a Taktika) which Aelian and Arrian include in the 
tactical category, then matters would become clearer. But the disagreement between Polybius 
and Aeneas on the very definition of tactics, as seen in Aelian – with the latter describing it as 
‘the science of military movements’ and the former as ‘whenever anyone takes an unorganised 
crowd, organises it, divides it into files, and grouping them together, gives them a practical 
training for war’– makes it less likely that the lost Taktika of the two were that similar, and so 
they may not be part of the same group.117 There could have indeed been different variations 
permitted within the group of the Taktika as long as certain information – such as 
organisational patterns – was present. The hypothesis of the Taktika as a separate 
‘genre’/group dealing with only certain aspects of warfare could also be supported by Aeneas 
Tacticus’ reference to his two other books, on Preparations and on Supplies. While we cannot 
possibly know how these two topics were dealt with (and it is possible – though perhaps less 
                                                          
116 Veg. Mil.8; all translations are by N.P. Milner, unless specified otherwise. 
117 Ael. Tact. 3.4.  
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likely – that Aeneas included very refined references to human psychology there as well), the 
existence of these two categories makes us think that there were authors who divided the 
subject matter in such a way as to make it more mangeable. This eventually gave birth to 
different groups of military writings with material specific to each group that had to be 
presented in a certain order and perhaps in a certain style. This would explain why the Taktika 
are written in a more ‘dry’, ‘objective’ style than, say Onasander’s Strategikos. Aelian certainly 
emphasises that Aeneas had written many books which had been epitomised, so for all we 
know there could have been several works On Supplies by several authors with some variations, 
just as there were several Taktika later on.  
Going back to the Taktika of Arrian and Aelian, it is Polybius’ definition of tactics that is the one 
that more closely describes them, which brings us to the second possible solution to 
understanding them. That is, as part of a distinct strand of military writing starting with Polybius 
– as the ‘parent text’ – which emerged due to the intrusion of the Romans in the Greek 
world.118 This would not mean that they are not a separate ‘genre’, but simply provides a 
reason why said ‘genre’ appeared. This type of military writing then, so dissimilar to Xenophon 
and Aeneas’ line (if we indeed believe that he took an all-inclusive approach in all his texts), 
could have started to serve Roman needs of knowing more about their enemies’ way of fighting 
but also Greek needs to ‘show off’ their own tactical organisation and discipline in response to 
the mighty manipular legion. Considering the latter, it is interesting that Polybius compares the 
self-same manipular Roman battle array to the Macedonian phalanx, in an attempt to find out 
which one is better, but also that it is the Macedonian phalanx that both Aelian and Arrian 
describe, with Arrian also placing it in an – albeit different – comparative context alongside the 
Roman cavalry. 
Ultimately it would be difficult to ascertain which interpretation is more justified. There is also a 
third possibility - though less likely in my view, despite modern scholars arguing for it - that 
what appears to be a separate group/‘genre’ is in fact one text which is being copied and 
slightly altered by different authors, starting with Asclepiodotus copying Poseidonius, Aelian 
                                                          
118 For Polybius as the ultimate source of the manuals of Asclepiodotus, Aelian and Arrian see Devine (1995). 
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copying Asclepiodotus and Arrian copying Aelian. The apparent similarities between the three 
Taktika we possess may also come from the fact that the source material that writers of Taktika 
have to deal with is much drier and more confined, so they will always look repetitive, whereas 
when one discusses psychology and morale, there are more possibilities and more material to 
expand on. In any case, it seems certain that the Taktika follow a certain organisational pattern 
(presentation of the types of troops, their weapons, their arrangement and manoeuvres) which 
must always be present, but that they allow for variation, interpretation and addition. 
On top of this, one might also ask the closely connected question whether or how Roman 
tactical writings themselves might have influenced the development of such different strands of 
Greek military writing. Unfortunately again, it is impossible to have a definitive answer because, 
as we have seen, we possess no early Roman military manuals. Based on the passage of 
Vegetius quoted above, however, we can say that there does seem to be a reaction to Greek 
military knowledge manifested in the author’s desire to return to the old Roman teachings. 
Indeed previous Roman authors who wrote on military matters are mentioned, including 
Frontinus, Celsus and interestingly Paternus: 
Haec necessitas conpulit euolutis auctoribus ea me in hoc opusculo fidelissime dicere, quae 
Cato ille Censorius de disciplina militari scripsit, quae Cornelius Celsus, quae Frontinus 
perstringenda duxerunt, quae Paternus diligentissimus iuris militaris adsertor in libros 
redegit, quae Augusti et Traiani Hadrianique constitutionibus cauta sunt. 
‘This requirement made me consult competent authorities and say most faithfully in this 
opuscule what Cato the Censor wrote on the system of war, what Cornelius Celsus, what 
Frontinus thought should be summarised, what Paternus, a most zealous champion of 
military law, published in his books, and what was decreed by the constitutions of 
Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian.’119 
This may mean that our Greek ‘military manuals’ did have a significant impact on how Romans 
thought about warfare and while it does not tell us much about how Latin texts would have 
                                                          




influenced Greek ones, it perhaps implies they were somewhat different in focus. Despite this, 
Vegetius’ treatise seems to be similarly discussing psychology alongside organisation, as well as 
moral expedients (which are also present in Onasander), so either his argument seeks to again 
emphasise Roman superiority, or earlier Latin texts emphasised different aspects – practical, 
psychological, moral – in different proportions, with perhaps more focus on the moral. This 
might be likely because of Vegetius’ insistence on the moral decline of his present (although 
this theme is never too far from Latin authors in general), for example when discussing the 
current status of recruits or the loss of tradition:120 
Sed huius rei usum dissimulatio longae securitatis aboleuit. Quem inuenias, qui docere 
possit quod ipse non didicit? De historiis ergo uel libris nobis antiqua consuetudo repetenda 
est. 
But the illusion of a long-lasting safety abolished the practice of this subject. Whom can 
you find able to teach what he himself has not learned? We must therefore recover the 
ancient custom from histories and (other) books.121 
Perhaps Roman ‘manuals’ placed more emphasis on discipline – something we shall see as well 
in respect to Frontinus in a later chapter – and it is not insignificant that the first chapter 
heading of the first book of Vegetius is Romanos omnes gentes sola armorum exercitatione 
uicisse/‘That the Romans conquered all peoples solely because of their military 
training/disicipline’.122 This is also important in terms of reaction to Greek manuals and pre-
eminence, as we shall see that Aelian chooses to start his manual with a chapter Ὅτι Ὅμηρος 
πρῶτος περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τακτικῆς θεωρίας ἔγραψεν/’That Homer was the first to write 
about tactical theory in war’. Focus on discipline is also confirmed by the interesting reference 
to Paternus. According to Milner, he was ab epistulis Latinis to Marcus Aurelius in the 170s, 
then praefectus praetorio to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (180-182 A.D.). He wrote a 
‘juristic work on the Roman army’ of which we have a few fragments, mainly in Justinian’s 
Digest, one of which indeed refers to discipline and its importance:  
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Paternus quoque scripsit debere eum, qui se meminerit armato praeesse, parcissime 
commeatum dare, equum militarem extra provinciam duci non permittere, ad opus 
privatum piscatum venatum militem non mittere. nam in disciplina augusti ita cavetur: " 
etsi scio fabrilibus operibus exerceri milites non esse alienum, vereor tamen, si quicquam 
permisero, quod in usum meum aut tuum fiat, ne modus in ea re non adhibeatur, qui mihi 
sit tolerandus". 
‘Paternus has also written that a general who is mindful that he commands armed troops 
ought to grant leave very sparingly, ought not to permit a stallion belonging to the army to 
be taken outside the province, nor dispatch a soldier on his own private business or out 
fishing or hunting. For in the disciplina Augusti provision is made in these words: ‘Even 
though I know that it is not inappropriate for soldiers to be employed on jobs as craftsmen, 
I nonetheless fear that if I should permit any such thing to be done for my convenience or 
yours, limits tolerable to me would not be imposed on this practice’123 
But in the remaining fragments, especially in John Lydus’ De magistratibus, Paternus focuses 
more on questions of hierarchy and different positions in the Roman army. He discusses the 
position of the tirones in relation to the other soldiers and how those holding a certain position 
in the army (such as doctors, craftsmen, bowmakers, hunters etc.) were exempt from the more 
burdensome munera.124 So indeed this might mean that the Roman manuals had a more 
legalistic focus, unsurprising given the general Roman interest in law and procedure, and this is 
perhaps something that Vegetius wants to preserve and expand upon as – along with discipline 
– it reflects a higher level of order and organisation that the Greek manuals lacked. 
Coming back to the influence of Roman writings on Greek ones, I believe there is no greater 
influence than in the elaboration of collections of stratagems. Strategemata have not been 
mentioned as part of the pre-existing ‘military’ tradition because there is a serious possibility 
                                                          
123 Dig. 49.16.12, all translations by T. Mommsen, P. Krueger, and A. Watson. 
124 Joan. Lyd. De mag., 1.47. 
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that they originated with Frontinus – and this is what we shall look at next, starting with the 
way the surviving texts in this category are organised and respond to each other.125 
Frontinus Strategemata is divided into three books organised thematically, as the author 
himself explains in the preface to book one: 
Quo magis autem discreta ad rerum varietatem apte conlocarentur, in tres libros ea 
diduximus. In primo erunt exempla, quae competant proelio nondum commisso; in secundo, 
quae ad proelium et confectam pacationem pertineant; tertius inferendae solvendaeque 
obsidioni habebit στρατηγήματα; quibus deinceps generibus suas species attribui. 
‘Moreover, in order that these may be sifted and properly classified according to the 
variety of subject-matter, I have divided them into three books. In the first will be examples 
for use before the battle begins; in the second, those that relate to the battle itself and 
tend to effect the complete subjugation of the enemy; the third contains stratagems 
connected with sieges and the raising of sieges. Under these successive classes I have 
grouped the illustrations appropriate to each.’126 
To these, a fourth book has been added with a different thematic approach – focusing on what 
Alice König refers to as ‘ethics’ – which modern scholars now believe is authentic and written 
by the author himself.127 Moreover, as Laederich has observed through comparison with 
Polyaenus’ work, Frontinus’ treatise is very structured, providing guidance to the discussion in 
the form of categories and chapter headings which he points out in each of the four prefaces, 
and the authenticity of which we have no reason to doubt.128  
By contrast, Polyaenus’ work is not organised thematically, but in eight books which contain 
individual stratagems named after their protagonist, sometimes arranged in chronological 
order. The author does not at any point manifest any intention to organise his material 
thematically; however Krentz and Wheeler have picked up on some patterns in its presentation. 
                                                          
125 Also see Wheeler (2010) 19-23. 
126 Front. Strat.1. Pr.; all translations are by C. Bennett unless otherwise specified. 
127 König (2004) 117; Laederich (1999) 36-37 cf. Bennett (1925) xix-xxv. 
128 Laederich (1999) 35 comments on Polyaenus: ‘mais c’est un inextricable fouillis où le lecteur ne discerne aucune 
méthode, aucune logique, aucun ordre comparable à la rigueur de Frontin.’ 
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According to them each book was published separately and Polyaenus did not review the whole 
work after its publication, and each covers ‘a central people, theme, or chronological period’ 
despite these getting blurred because of the author’s rush to publish. They consider that book 
one best reflects Polyaenus’ original design ‘for a universal stratagem collection’ and presents 
stratagems in chronological order from mythical times to the return of the Ten Thousand. Book 
two loses its internal logic and chronology, but starts with fourth century Spartans and 
Thebans, then various peoples of Dorian origin. Books three and four are about Macedonians, 
while book five would have intended to treat Sicilian history and book six shows an 
ethnographical pattern. Book seven is entirely about barbarians whilst book eight contains the 
stratagems of Romans and women.129 
Modern authors have assumed that there were Hellenistic collections upon which Frontinus 
and Polyaenus later drew. Thus Roth states: ‘Much of the technical Greek military writing of the 
period (i.e. Hellenistic) was devoted to the collection of such stratagems’ and he references 
Wheeler’s Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery, but the latter discusses the 
terminology of Greek stratagem in Polyaenus, Polybius, Plutarch, Thucydides, Xenophon and 
other authors (with mention of Philo of Byzantium though), with no references to actual 
Hellenistic collections of strategemata, conceding that even the term itself is quite rare in 
Greek literature.130 Hornblower also seems to assume a Hellenistic date for collections of 
stratagems, comparing them to fourth century B.C. works such as Aeneas Tacticus’ Poliorketika, 
and the Aristotelian Oeconomica, a book about economic devices, both of which present 
examples alongside theory.131 The same assumption is made by Krentz and Wheeler in their 
introduction to Polyaenus, stating that ‘both authors (namely, Frontinus and Polyaenus) drew 
either directly or indirectly upon numerous earlier collections.’132  
There are two reasons why we could think that there were stand-alone collections of 
stratagems before that of Frontinus, which would constitute a separate group of military texts. 
Firstly, we have the mention of book nine of Philo of Byzantium’s Mechanike Suntaxis entitled 
                                                          
129 Krentz and Wheeler (1994) xiv; also Wheeler (2010) 19 who names Frontinus as the first known author.  
130 Roth (2006) 369; Wheeler (1988) 3; 7 for Philo.  
131 Hornblower (2007) 51. 
132 Krentz and Wheeler (1994) viii. 
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Strategemata. But we know nothing of the actual contents of this book and one could assume, 
in a treatise on mechanics, that the focus would again be on war-machines and perhaps quite 
different from the exempla of famous generals found in Frontinus and Polyaenus. Moreover, 
we need not assume that anything entitled Strategemata necessarily contains exempla in the 
same way as Frontinus’ and Polyaenus’ collection, since Onasander refers to the theoretical 
principles in his text as περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ στρατηγημάτων ἠθροισμένων – ‘the acts of 
generals collected in this book’.  Also, we cannot ignore the fact that book nine is simply a part 
of a larger work containing both theory and examples, and that in this respect it would not 
differ from the Aristotelian and Aeneas’ works. Moreover, we have Valerius Maximus’ 
Memorable Deeds and Sayings in which one section of book seven is dedicated to stratagems 
(with examples of cunning behaviour from other contexts being dealt with under different 
categories), so if the inclusion of strategemata in a wider collection constitutes evidence for the 
existence of a separate group/‘genre’ then indeed we would not need to look any further than 
that, but I do not believe this is the case.133 The argument could be made that there is a 
potential difference between Valerius Maximus’ and Aeneas Tacticus’ works, which could more 
easily be read together as a whole, and the various books of Philon in the Mechanike Syntaxis 
which – as we have seen in the case of the Belopoeica, Paraskeuastika and Poliorketika – could 
work as individual pieces. Furthermore, we could say, based on Frontinus’ preface and his 
advertising of the Strategemata and his more theoretical work together, that they too are part 
of a larger framework and need not be that different conceptually from Philon’s Syntaxis. 
However, it is clear in Frontinus’ case that the Strategemata is meant to function separately 
and that it is not part of the same overarching work. Besides the fact that Valerius’ work could 
also easily be read piecemeal, it is also difficult in the absence of all the books of Philon to see 
how these would have worked together and complemented each other, and therefore we may 
be easily tricked into seeing them as functioning as individual texts because we do not possess 
the entire treatise.  So book nine of the Mechanike Syntaxis proves only that there was interest 
in such tricks before Frontinus (especially since we do not really know what kind of tricks would 
have been included in it) but not necessarily that there was a whole ‘genre’ dedicated to them. 
                                                          
133 See Langlands (2011) for an example of using examples situationally as well as for bibliography on Valerius.  
Bloomer (1992) and Morgan (2007) are also good bibliographical starting points. 
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The second piece of evidence that has led scholars to believe there were such stand-alone 
collections before Frontinus’ appears to be only a brief comment in his preface.134 Thus 
Frontinus states:  
At multa et transire mihi ipse permisi. quod me non sine causa fecisse scient, qui aliorum 
libros eadem promittentium legerint.  
‘And so I have purposely allowed myself to skip many things. That I have not done this 
without reason, those will realise who read the books of others treating of the same 
subjects.’135 
Thus the aliorum libros eadem promittentium have been interpreted as books of stratagems, 
but doing this means taking the phrase out of context. In the previous paragraph Frontinus 
hints that, although historians and writers of notabilia included such examples of stratagems in 
their work, he was the first to systematise them into a single compendium.136 Thus, while it is 
not entirely clear what he means when he mentions the aliorum libros eadem promittentium 
and he may indeed be talking about other collections of stratagems, it is more likely that he is 
referring to those histories and books collecting notabilia which he had mentioned before. 
Therefore the eadem is more likely to mean exempla than strategemata, as otherwise he would 
be contradicting his statement about originality, and indeed we have other collections of 
examples such as Valerius Maximus’. 
While it could be argued that claims of originality need not necessarily mean anything (in fact 
Frontinus also claims to be the only one who has systematised the res militaris while there were 
several known Greek manuals of tactical theory before his own) the fact that we have no 
explicit evidence for stand-alone collections of stratagems before that of Frontinus adds 
strength to his claim. Though examples feature as part of other manuals, and the practice of 
collecting examples was established in the Greek tradition, especially in pinacography and 
                                                          
134 Wheeler (1988) 18. 
135 Front. Strat.1. praef. 3 
136 Front., Strat., 1.praef.2.  
45 
 
paraxodography, these which seem to me to be a separate manner.  Frontinus could, of course, 
have been influenced and inspired by all these collecting practices.137 
The idea expressed by Krentz and Wheeler that ‘most of the earlier stratagem collections must 
have circulated privately without formal publication’ is puzzling to say the least.138 While one 
could understand such a practice if strategemata were regarded as some sort of arcane 
knowledge, the fact that a general would become famous for his stratagems and they were 
present in several historians – as Frontinus himself points out – clearly shows this was not the 
case. Even if one chooses to believe that there were similar collections before Frontinus’ there 
would have been nothing to stop him from organising his material in whichever way he liked, as 
we have Polyaenus’ collection which is centred on figures and not themes. If one thought that it 
was traditional to approach the subject thematically, there would still be no reason to believe 
that Frontinus could not have chosen any examples he wanted in order to fill those categories, 
for instance focusing only on Roman figures for the entirety of the treatise, or on Greek figures 
for one section and Romans for others.  
Thus the organisation of Polyaenus’s text may be deliberately aimed to be different from that 
of Frontinus, in order to subvert his authority, and that the group/‘genre’ of the stand-alone 
strategemata may have been in fact ‘created’ by Frontinus and then challenged by 
Polyaenus.139 It is very plausible that Polyaenus was reacting to Frontinus’ text since he could 
read Latin as a lawyer in the Roman courts, and would also have known that Frontinus’ sister 
had been married to Marcus Aurelius’ great-great grandfather. The connection between the 
family of the emperor and Frontinus would have made Frontinus’ text a must-read on two 
accounts, firstly because of the similarity of topics approached and secondly it would have 
boded well to read a similar work written by someone in the extended family of the emperor. 
Also, the invention of the Strategemata as a distinct group would not be uncharacteristic of 
someone, namely Frontinus, who claimed to have systematised all knowledge about warfare. 
We could say that Frontinus did the same thing with the strategemata that he had done with 
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the res militaris in his previous manual, in that he took an existing concept and/or category and 
reorganised it, making it both Roman and his own.140 This rediscovery and incorporation of a 
Greek concept into a Roman superstructure may explain what Wheeler calls ‘the “golden age”’ 
of Strategemata’, as Frontinus’ claim to be the authority in collecting and ordering stratagems 
would have encouraged other Greek authors, such as Hermogenes son of Charidemus and the 
Athenian sophist, Melesermus, to write collections of their own, which also may have sought to 
challenge this newly asserted Romanitas of stratagems. Unfortunately, since none of these has 
been preserved, it is impossible to tell for sure what their approach would have been.141 
The final text which will be discussed in this thesis is Arrian’s Ektaxis kata Alanon. I have 
deliberately not included it in any category because it seems to resemble no other known text. 
It is simply a series of orders in the imperative and infinitive, divided into thirty-one chapters, 
which are meant to make up a battle array against the imminent attack of the Alans. As such, it 
reads more like a written-down oral account of what Arrian would have actually said to his 
officers at the time of battle. However, as we shall see in a following chapter, this apparent 
orality is a carefully constructed image which is meant to allow the reader to step into the 
author’s world but also to allow Arrian to step into a different – and yet similar – world.    
Therefore, we could say that there are several ‘genres’ or groups that impose certain 
restrictions upon authors in this larger universe of topics relating to generalship, and the reason 
for the choice of subject matter and style in the case of each is only one interesting aspect of 
works which are more complex than they have been given credit for. This is especially the case 
for the Taktika which have been called ‘strictly utilitarian’.142 The works also have to be read in 
the broader context of technical literature in general and as a part of similar texts about 
knowledge, such as those of Celsus and Strabo. While there are of course many differences, 
there are also problems which can be clarified by the comparative approach, such as the issue 
of precedence of knowledge, of Greek knowledge in the Roman Empire and of its positioning. 
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I am also not unaware that such a discussion of the ‘Greekness’ and ‘Romanness’ of ‘military 
science’ begs the question of how we should read these texts in relation to the movement 
which has been dubbed the ‘Second Sophistic’ by Philostratus (and modern scholars have 
followed suit), especially since Arrian himself is considered an important representative of its 
historiographical component.143 This will also be tackled in a subsequent chapter, where I will 
discuss why Arrian and Aelian chose to write in this particular ‘genre’ and to describe Hellenistic 
armies – and Alexander’s in particular – something which lies outside the Classical period 
(although Arrian does make some Classical references, the Macedonian phalanx is still the 
centrepiece of his work) which Bowie argues constituted the most prominent go-to timeframe 
for Greeks writing about their past glory.144 However, the questions of whom these texts are 
written for and whether they are practical are more basic and immediately pressing. So this is 
what we shall turn to in the last two sections of this chapter. 
3. Audience: The emperor, Greeks, Romans, ‘general audience’ and ‘specialists’  
All texts construct an internal audience, either explicitly, for example by referring to a 
person/group that the work is dedicated to in the introduction, or implicitly, by the choice of 
language, subject matter or level of technicality – as we have seen in the case of the artillery 
manuals. Our authors are no different in setting up such an audience, and for most it seems to 
be commanders – as is the case for Frontinus and Polyaenus – or in some sense ‘experts’ 
(though what an expert at warfare is might or might not differ considerably from, say, an 
‘expert’ in medicine) as is the case of Onasander, but there is also the desire to engage the 
interest of a broader group of people as we have already seen in the case of Aelian.145 The 
constructed audience is also sometimes explicitly a double one, as in the case of Polyaenus who 
dedicates to both emperors and their commanders, or Aelian who dedicates his Taktika to both 
Trajan and a more general audience. 
Needless to say the ‘real’ audience of the text need not be limited to the audience the authors 
themselves refer, and there are often other factors at work in shaping how a text positions 
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itself. The claim to clarity, for instance, is a topos, and thus needs to be read with care. There is 
also no reason why a ‘general’ text would not be used by a more specialised audience, or why 
something like Onasander’s Strategikos would not provide a sort of ‘general specialised 
knowledge’, aimed at commanders who might just be starting their careers. Ideally we would 
be able to corroborate the use of such texts with external sources, such as in the case of 
Frontinus’ treatise on warfare where Aelian’s and Vegetius’ later references let us infer that it 
was indeed known and read widely by ‘experts’ (or at least those purporting to elaborate 
military theory).146 But such examples are rare, and most of the time we are left in the dark 
about a text’s ‘real’ audience. It is nonetheless possible to guess that it might have been 
broader in some cases than others. So, Frontinus and Polyaenus deal in exempla, a means of 
teaching common to both Greek and Roman paideia, which could have been understood and 
interpreted by more than commanders, and that might suggest wider reach. It is, moreover, 
possible to speculate further about the social and cultural characteristics of a possible audience, 
who the ‘commanders’ reading these books might be. Therefore, in what follows I shall first 
examine how the texts themselves construct and address their audience, beginning with their 
dedications and the problems associated with them, then think more broadly and examine 
more specifically who their audience might have actually been comprised of. 
Some scholars have argued that the main reason for the composition of some of the treatises, 
such as Arrian’s Taktika and Polyaenus’ Strategika, is to gain favour with the dedicatee, namely 
the emperor.147 However, dedicating one’s work to the emperor was not an unusual practice, 
nor – given the number of authors doing this – should we expect a close relationship between 
said author and the emperor or indeed that the emperor would have read everything dedicated 
to him, let alone granted any tangible benefit to any of these authors based on what was 
written (as Wheeler argues about Arrian’s hopes of having his command in Cappadocia 
prolonged in virtue of the expertise displayed in the Taktika).148 If anything, it seems that 
perhaps authors who have a close relationship with emperors, such as Frontinus with Trajan – 
perhaps the most well regarded Roman author of a ‘military manual’, at least if Vegetius is to 
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be believed – do not dedicate their work to them. Of course we do not have Frontinus’ De re 
militari which might have been addressed to Domitian (although it could be even earlier than 
that), or the beginning of Arrian’s Taktika (which does mention Hadrian at the end), but it does 
seem that perhaps those confident in their expertise and social standing did not feel the need 
to ‘ingratiate’ themselves with the emperor, as Wheeler seems to suggest.  
This is not to say that authors did not seek patronage by the emperor or other members of the 
elite, especially since, as Jason König argues, ‘so many different areas of knowledge were at 
least in theory dependent on the Emperor’s patronage, in a society where ideals of Imperial 
omniscience and ubiquity were so prevalent.’149 We should also then perhaps understand that 
on many occasions authors believed it almost compulsory to dedicate their works to the 
emperor, playing into this image of him as an all-encompassing expert. But even in the context 
of patronage we should not view the texts as simply contributing to an ‘imperial agenda’, 
thinking that they always hold and promote an ‘official line’ (or to any kind of agenda for that 
matter).150 Often the relationship between emperor and author is more complex, as Alice König 
argues of that between Vitruvius and Augustus in his De architectura, where Vitruvius uses the 
same rhetoric to describe the emperor and himself (and other architects), exploring ideas about 
authority and power in the newly established empire, while at the same time both contributing 
to the Augustan programme and challenging it.151 In König’s own words Vitruvius, ‘as a subject, 
client and author, is not simply toeing the party line but fighting for power of his own by 
borrowing it from his patron’. Therefore, while we might suspect that, given Trajan’s interest in 
military matters and Hadrian’s care to cultivate a military persona that matched that of his 
predecessor, Aelian and Arrian too are trying to appeal to the emperor’s interests and at the 
same time gain his patronage and share in his authority, it is exactly this type of fluid 
relationship where positions seem to be constantly adjusted and renegotiated that we shall see 
in their texts as well.152  
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While, as I mentioned, generally there is no reason to believe the emperor is actually reading all 
texts dedicated to him, sometimes authors make more explicit reference in their text. 
Polyaenus, for instance, mentions in the preface to his fifth book that the emperors Marcus 
Aurelius and Lucius Verus commended him on his work.153 In cases like this in particular – but 
also in others where we have imperial dedications – dedicating to the emperor is perhaps more 
a way of addressing the elites more generally. Polyaenus is a good example because he 
explicitly mentions in the preface to book one that his book will be useful not only to the 
emperor but also to his envoys, who will have been part of the elite: 
προσφέρω, ὅσα τῶν πάλαι γέγονε στρατηγήματα ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς πολλὴν ἐμπειρίαν παλαιῶν 
ἔργων, τοῖς τε ὑπὸ ὑμῶν πεμπομένοις πολεμάρχοις ἢ στρατηγοῖς ἢ μυριάρχοις ἢ χιλιάρχοις 
ἢ ἑξακοσιάρχοις 
‘I offer past stratagems as an experience in the deeds of old, both to you and those sent by 
you, polemarchs and generals or tribunes or commanders of ten thousand men or those of 
six hundred men.’154 
It is not only the elite in general that Polyaenus is referring to here, but more specifically the 
military elite and military commanders. So is it reasonable to believe that the elites, military or 
otherwise, would have reason to read Polyaenus books and ‘military manuals’ more generally? 
Firstly, it is clear that technical literature of all sorts had a wider appeal, circulating and being 
read by more than just ‘specialists’, and authors tried to position themselves as writers of 
something that was broader than a simple techne.155 If we think of the possibility of ‘military 
manuals’ being read by the ‘Roman elites’, we have to remember that the Romans considered 
that they were superior than all others when it came to warfare, as Virgil, among others, points 
out at the end of the sixth book of the Aeneid: 
Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera, 
credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore voltus, 
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orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus 
describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent: 
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento; 
hae tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem 
parcere subiectis, et debellare superbos. 
‘Others, I doubt not, shall with softer mould beat out the breathing bronze, coax from the 
marble features to the life, plead cases with greater eloquence and with a pointer trace 
heaven’s motions and predict the risings of the stars: you, Roman, be sure to rule the world 
(be these your arts), to crown peace with justice, to spare the vanquished and to crush the 
proud.’156 
While others might be better at the artes – and although they are not named, the allusion here 
is surely to the Greeks – the Romans are the best at what really matters, namely war, peace and 
rule.157 The fundamentality of this view of superiority is proven by the fact that Vegetius still 
argues it – albeit perhaps from a desire to return to original Roman practices due to recent 
Roman failures – much later.158 He says no one would doubt that the Greeks conquered the 
Romans so far as the artes and prudentia were concerned (Graecorum artibus prudentiaque nos 
vici nemo dubitavit) but that the Romans were better and won against all other peoples by 
being better at every aspect of warfare: ‘careful selection of recruits, instruction in the rules, so 
to speak, of war, toughening in daily exercises, prior acquaintance in field practice with all 
possible eventualities in war and battle, and strict punishment of cowardice’ (tironem sollerter 
eligere, ius, ut ita dixerim, armorum docere, cotidiano exercitio roborare, quaecum evenire in 
acie atque in proeliis possunt omni in campestri meditatione praenoscere, severe in desides).159  
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So because of this view, a member of the Roman elite would have surely wanted to have some 
knowledge of the intricacies of warfare so that he may at least be able to converse on the topic, 
and confirm the assumption about Roman superiority in these matters. A member of the elite 
might turn to texts such as Frontinus’ Strategemata to show familiarity with deeds of foreign 
and Roman commanders and perhaps use the examples in different ways and for different 
purposes, rhetorical or conversational. The same elite might also perhaps use the knowledge 
contained in the Taktika or parts of it to show that they still possessed the kind of detailed 
knowledge of warfare that made the Romans so great. At the same time, however, some of the 
self-same Greeks that Virgil was alluding to were also part of the ‘Roman elite’, and some even 
held military posts and had been decorated for their service.  
If we look at the equestrian order, which would have initially been based on aristocratic military 
participation but whose membership soon came to be based primarily on wealth, one observes 
‘Greeks’ as much involved as ‘Romans’, as early as the Julio-Claudian period. Such as is the case 
of C. Stertinius Xenophon, from Cos and Ti. Claudius Balbilus, from Ephesus.160 The former was 
a medic and personal physician to Tiberius, but also a tribunus militum in Claudius’ expedition 
to Britain (46 A.D.) decorated with a golden crown and lance for his service, and later named in 
charge of the emperor’s Greek correspondence, which made him into a de facto liaison with the 
Greeks (ad responsa Graeca).161 Balbilus has a similar cursus, starting out as a praefectus 
fabrorum then also was decorated with a corona muralis and hasta pura for his service in 
Britain, and finished his career by occupying the most prestigious magistracy an equestrian 
could attain – the praefectura Aegypti.162 Later under the Flavii, T. Flavius Varus Calvisianus 
Hermocrates, a member of a prominent family of Phocaea, both held a series of local offices in 
his own native town and was commander of a cohort and tribune of a legion, both in 
Cappadocia.163 T. Iulius Alexander Capito, part of the wealthy and prestigious priestly family of 
Sardes, was also a tribunus legionis and a praefectus alae, both in Egypt, but also procurator of 
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Achaia and Asia under Nerva/Trajan.164  Whether they saw actual military service or not, or 
whether people such as Xenophon and Balbilus were just decorated symbolically is not 
particularly relevant, as these ‘Greeks’ would have also been interested in engaging with the 
same topics as the ‘Romans’ since they too were now part of this elite which had a strong 
military tradition.165 One could argue that they would want to assert their military knowledge 
even more if they did not actually engage in military activities, and would need to engage more 
with literature that could teach them about warfare and compensate for their lack of ‘real 
world’ experience. If we also consider their Greekness, manuals such as the Taktika of Aelian 
and Arrian would be all the more appealing, as they would allow them to bring both aspects of 
their cultural identity together, namely Greekness and Romanness. The Taktika would then give 
them knowledge of past Greek military practices (but also the opportunity to compare their 
Roman present to the Greek past) which they would be able to use as a ‘cultural currency’, 
showing how Greek knowledge can also inform and educate on military matters.  
Thinking about the equestrians is the perfect way of transitioning from a ‘general elite’ 
audience to a more ‘specialised’ one, since many of the ‘officers’ that Polyaenus mentions 
would have come from their ranks. Is there then reason to believe that his text, along with 
those of the others, would appeal to a more ‘specialised’ audience? Firstly, as Brian Campbell 
has pointed out, there was no ‘military academy’ in ancient Rome which would teach one how 
to command, or even the basics of warfare. 166 Ever since the Republic, the Romans had relied 
on doing and observing in order to learn, and Polybius mentions that young aristocrats had to 
participate in ten military campaigns before they could enter the cursus honorum.167 According 
to Rosenstein, they would have had the opportunity to observe the general and the workings of 
camp life in these ten years, but even so commanders in the Republic were often inexperienced 
and were expected to rely on the expertise of  ‘officers’ such as centurions for advice on more 
practical matters.168 Later on in the empire, participation in the military sphere became slightly 
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more specialised, and equestrians tended to be the ones more involved in military commands 
and more interested in military careers, though by no means exclusively.169 Thus, the tres 
militiae came into being early into the empire to regulate the carreers of equestrians interested 
in military posts. This was a succession of military commands whereby equestrians would start 
as the prefect of a cohort, move on to the military tribunate of a legion and then to the 
prefecture of an ala.170 This does not mean that career paths were separated, and it was still 
common for ‘military’ and administrative posts to be present in the careers of the elites, 
equestrians included, despite the existence of some figures who focused on more on one or the 
other.171  
Still, since now there was a clearer military career path for the elites and somewhat more 
specialisation, there would have been more interest in acquiring military knowledge. The 
interest could have been practical, and there were perhaps members of the elite who, having 
chosen to try their luck at a military post, would have wanted as many opportunities for 
learning as possible. Indeed, earlier on, in the consular elections, Sallust’s Marius had 
contrasted his experience in the field with the knowledge of his rivals, which had been acquired 
from books.172 However, this would not mean that ‘actual commanders’ would have been less 
interested in the military knowledge expressed in ‘military manuals’ as ‘cultural currency’. Even 
more as a general, one might have been expected to know how different armies drilled and 
marched, and be familiar with the deeds of the past generals of a tradition that they were now 
part of. The same interest in comparing and contrasting Greek and Roman armies and finding 
the significance of Greek military knowledge, that we have mentioned before, would have been 
greater in Greeks who were very active in the military field, men such as the famous Pergamene 
aristocrat C. Iulius Quadratus Bassus.173 He, among other military charges, was right in the thick 
of the Dacian wars both as a praepositus vexilationis legionis Scythicae et legionis XII fulminatae 
in 101-102 A.D., and as adlectus inter comites Augusti in the second expedition in 106 A.D., but 
                                                          
169 Adams (2007) 214-215. 
170 Adams (2007) 214, Brunt (1983a) 52, Eck (2006). 
171 Adams (2007) 2015; Campbell (1975). 
172 Sall. Jug. 85.11-12; Rosenstein (2007) 139. 
173 Pflaum (1960) 48-49.  
55 
 
also a governor of provinces with legions, Syria in 115-117 A.D. and Dacia in 117 A.D.174 As a 
man of vast military experience, he would have been the perfect ambassador for Greek 
knowledge, but also interested in the intertwining of Greek and Roman traditions that the 
Taktika and the Strategikos presented. 
Besides commanders in various forms, with different degrees of specialisation, there was also 
another category of more specialised officers which constituted the backbone of the Roman 
legions and who would have been perhaps interested in the ‘manuals’, namely centurions. 
Centurions had begun to form a somewhat separate class since at least the campaigns of 
Caesar, who relied on them heavily for different tasks and missions.175 They continued to be the 
core-officers in the empire, and overall could be considered the most experienced officers in 
the army. They would often be promoted from the ranks of soldiers, though there were other 
channels of appointment, such as patronage, and they could also come from the equestrian 
order, while higher up centurions such as the primi pili also attained equestrian rank.176 
Therefore they also constituted a somewhat mixed group, and while the majority probably 
would have had significant experience of warfare, there were also some with very little, and 
Pliny the Younger mentions that he secured the appointment of such a centurion with no prior 
experience in one of his letters.177 We might imagine that those equestrians who had been 
appointed centurions were literate, but there is also evidence of literacy as an overall 
requirement for appointment.178 Furthermore, there are several examples of centurions 
engaging in literary activities and composing hexameter poems, such as those of Quintus 
Avidius Quintianus and M Porcius Iasucthan found at the outpost of Bu Njem in Africa and 
dated to the early 200s A.D., with the poem of Iasuchtan talking about camp life specifically.179 
There is also evidence of them being more generally interested in literature but also of 
bilingualism, several centurions dedicating inscriptions in Greek and Latin.180  
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Considering all of this it is not unlikely that this category would have made use of ‘military 
manuals’. Those centurions with limited experience would have looked to them as potential 
sources of making up for it in an environment where most of their peers would have had 
intimate knowledge of warfare over a significant number of years. However, the reverse is 
probable as well, and given the literary interests and bilingualism of some of the centurions 
from the lower classes, they would have perhaps used ‘manuals’ to build up an ‘encyclopaedic’ 
knowledge of warfare, which would have served them when moving up the ranks. Those who 
would look to enter the ranks of the equestrians would perhaps have found the knowledge 
contained in ‘manuals’ particularly useful in presenting themselves as a sort of ‘cultured’ 
expert, who was well-versed in all kinds of practices and curiosities of warfare.  
So then we must understand Polyaenus’ audience of ‘commanders’ – but also the ones of the 
other texts – as a far more diverse one then we would have thought. We must also understand 
that it is partly because of the backdrop of alleged Roman superiority, but also of the blurred 
boundaries between Greeks and Romans in terms of participation in military endeavours that 
Greek authors were willing to write about a topic which could be considered exclusively Roman. 
Coming back to the dedication of Polyaenus, we see how by talking about the ‘experience of 
old’ he might expect the text to be useful in some practical way to his audience. We have 
already hinted at some of the uses that these texts might have had for different types of 
audience, but we shall now delve more deeply into the question of their practicality. 
4. Military manuals and practicality 
The most common modern assumption about ‘military manuals’ has been that they are 
practical tools. Scholars have emphasised their usefulness for generals in understanding 
formations and weapons from the past and how to potentially deploy them in the field.181 
Victor Davis Hanson, one of the leading figures in the history of Classical warfare, starts his 
chapter on modern historiography of ancient warfare in the Cambridge History of Greek and 
Roman Warfare by stating that ‘originally fourth century B.C. essays such as Xenophon’s 
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Cavalry Commander or Aeneas Tacticus’ On the Defense of Fortified Positions were probably 
intended as pragmatic guides for commanders in the field’. He then goes on to explain that ‘by 
Hellenistic and Roman times formal contemplation about war-making became more academic 
and theoretical, both in the scientific realm […] and on matters tactical (Poseidonius and 
Asclepiodotus concerning the Macedonian phalanx) – in addition to becoming simply 
antiquarian, such as the collections of stratagems by Frontinus and Polyaenus’.182 There is 
extensive analysis of how diagrams – such as those used by Asclepiodotus – are supposed to 
make generals better able to get to grips with the information explained therein and how 
clearer, more accessible, explanations were meant to make knowledge from the past more 
easily applicable and relevant.183 The historian Rosemary Moore emphasises the practical role 
of these manuals, but also – as Hanson hints more subtly – makes the point that they provided 
‘a traditional component of an elite male’s education’ and were meant to provide ‘a basis of 
knowledge to officers presumably less experienced than the soldiers they were ordered to 
command’ while at the same time ‘such works were doubtless also meant to entertain, and 
perhaps were never intended to be applied completely in the first place.’184  
This section does not need to reprise arguments and examples about practicality extensively. At 
the same time, recognising that these texts are not always meant to be practical in the strictest 
sense, but educational and entertaining, opens the door to looking at them in much more 
nuanced ways. Realising that the texts are meant to stir up some pleasure makes us think of 
them perhaps as ‘practical’ in the sense of pieces of conversation in a ‘banquet-type’ situation, 
much like in Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistai. We can see manuals as aids in debating Greek and 
Roman military achievements in a more ‘academic’ way – such as we find in Livy’s and Polybius’ 
discussions of Alexander versus the Romans or the legion versus the phalanx.185  
One could wonder, then, whether these texts were in any way part of a general paideia and 
whether not knowing certain facts included in them might be perceived negatively. Although as 
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far as I can tell no author mentions any ‘military manual’ explicitly, the case could be made that 
the authors of manuals would have intended for them to be a useful part of a general 
education or to be used in discussions of a more general, intellectual nature. An example of this 
sort of discussion is comparisons between Alexander’s military success and that of the Romans, 
which were quite popular in the first century A.D: Livy and Plutarch provide a few significant 
examples. Livy’s comparison of Alexander and the Romans and their respective battle arrays as 
a significant deciding factor is precisely the kind of scenario where the information found in 
‘military manuals’ would be particularly useful: 
statarius uterque miles, ordines seruans; sed illa phalanx immobilis et unius generis, 
Romana acies distinctior, ex pluribus partibus constans, facilis partienti, quacumque opus 
esset, facilis iungenti. 
‘Both armies were formed of heavy troops, keeping to their ranks; but their phalanx was 
immobile and consisted of soldiers of a single type; the Roman line was opener and 
comprised more separate units; it was easy to divide, wherever necessary, and easy to 
unite.’ 186 
The level of technicality in Livy’s analysis is worth noting. He discusses (albeit very generically) 
the kind of information we find in Aelian, Asclepiodotus and Polybius, about units, mobility and 
fighting order. Livy claims that some Greeks state that Alexander was greater than the Romans, 
implying that this was a popular topic of discussion, and the fact that he brings in very technical 
military details to show how this was not true means that these were the sort of counter 
arguments which were usually deployed in this kind of intellectual discussions.187  
With this in mind we might wonder whether Aelian’s very specific statement that his reader 
‘will observe Alexander the Macedonian’s efforts in marshaling his troops’ (τοῦ Μακεδόνος 
Ἀλεξάνδρου τὴν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν ἐπιβολὴν) is not in fact also intended to make his text 
attractive to those members of the elite who might want to be able to engage in such 
intellectual discussions, since marshalling and battle order is precisely the point in Livy’s 
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chapter. Thus we might say that Aelian wishes his Taktika to be part of a more general type of 
education and also, as he claims, to appeal to an ‘educated’ audience rather than an ‘expert’ 
one (of course the two are not mutually exclusive).188  
Several chapters in Aulus Gellius’ Attic Nights also show us how the information in our ‘military 
manuals’ could be interesting and useful for a wider audience and therefore might have been 
considered as part of paideia. We find that Gellius and Antonius Julianus, his rhetoric teacher, 
discussed whether hurling spears and missles from below makes them more accurate or 
whether it is more efficient to throw from above – a topic close to Arrian’s description of the 
throwing of spears on horseback.189 The fact that this is a discussion between Gellius and his 
teacher encourages us to believe that such specifically technical military topics were considered 
important also in rhetorical training and in ‘general education’. 
Similarly, Gellius also analyses the description of the historian Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius of 
the battle of Titus Manlius Torquatus and the Gaul, where we see that Claudius pays attention 
to the details of combat, such as how the Gaul advanced according to his method of fighting, 
‘with shield advanced and awaiting an attack’ (suo disciplina scuto proiecto cantabundus).190 
Gellius also pays attention to how the Roman army was drawn up and what the names of the 
formations were.191 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that our more techinal texts 
would have been read as more than just specifically ‘technical’, as pieces which provided 
information for the construction of arguments in more general debates and arguments on 
warfare, or at least would have tried to present the information they offered as such. The fact 
that Gellius is interested in the organisation of the Roman legion, and the detailed names of its 
weapons and formations, and debates their usage, would explain why authors such as Arrian 
parallel Roman weapons and formations with those of the Greeks. This can be seen, in my view, 
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as an attempt to include Greek military practices as well into this sphere of educated learning 
which would have focused mainly on their Roman conterparts.192  
How else is then one meant to use a ‘military manual’? Do they encourage certain patterns of 
thought and a certain mindset, being didactic in a more active way than in a scholastic way 
which simply involves the memorising of certain practices which the general might ‘pull out’ of 
his bag of tricks at an appropriate time, or briefly implement in his army? How would one use 
texts such as Arrian and Aelian’s Taktika? It is difficult to believe they could simply be pulled out 
on the battlefield and consulted, and the more likely – and obvious – interpretation is that – as 
Hanson points out that ‘manuals’ slowly make the transition to ‘more analytical’ – they might 
have constituted tools of ‘research’, to be consulted beforehand and then discussed with other 
like-minded individuals.193 If we should give any credence to Plutarch, this is the case with 
Brutus, who, whilst on campaign, spent his evenings studying Polybius’ writings.194 But there is 
perhaps more to be learned – in terms of practicality – from all these works if one goes beyond 
what the hard facts could teach and think about the essence of the treatise and whether it 
contributes in any way to building up a certain mindset of generalship.   
If we look at all the Taktika we see that their essence is – not unexpectedly – a focus on order 
and discipline, and their practicality is perhaps simply to drill into the general the idea of order 
and its importance in the past, and continued importance. There is great emphasis on 
mathematics, precision and numbers in Aelian, and even the ideal number of men in a phalanx 
is established at 16,384, as this would enable its optimal division into smaller units.195 The 
different marching orders are also proportionally connected to the number of troops, and 
emphasis is placed on the exact space that troops occupy when marching.196 This should be 
understood as part of the central message of the text, that a well-marshalled army wins battles, 
so a focus on absolute precision in formations is what any general should have in mind – even if 
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he does not use the particular order expounded by the text itself.  Arrian’s treatise also has at 
its core the importance of order, and he explicitly emphasises this at the beginning: 
πρῶτον μὲν δὴ καὶ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν στρατηγίᾳ ἔργων παραλαβόντα πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων 
ἀθρόον καὶ ἄτακτον ἐς τάξιν καὶ κόσμον καταστῆσαι. 
The first and most important job in generalship is to take a disordered crowd of people and 
arrange it in order and formation.197  
Apart from that, by paralleling Greek and Roman practices, Arrian also emphasises the practical 
importance of adaptability and blending the old and the new. This is the case that has been 
made about the Ektaxis, that it is a practical expression of the principles expressed in the 
Taktika.198 
The mindset that Onasander encourages in the general is similar, by suggesting adaptability and 
keeping an open mind. We can see this exemplified in the chapters on the selection of the 
general. While there are certain criteria, they act more like guidelines and it is a man’s skill that 
is essentially the most important factor. Others – such as wealth or belonging to a famous 
family – are secondary when making a choice for a general: 
Φημὶ δὲ μήτε τὸν πλούσιον, ἐὰν ἐκτὸς ᾖ τούτων, αἱρεῖσθαι στρατηγὸν διὰ τὰ χρήματα, 
μήτε τὸν πένητα, ἐὰν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ, παραιτεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν· οὐ μὴν χρή γε τὸν πένητα 
οὐδὲ τὸν πλούσιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν πλούσιον καὶ τὸν πένητα· οὐδ’ ἕτερον γὰρ οὔθ’ αἱρετὸν 
οὔτ’ ἀποδοκιμαστέον διὰ τὴν τύχην, ἀλλ’ ἐλεγκτέον διὰ τὸν τρόπον.[…]  Προγόνων δὲ 
λαμπρὰν ἀξίωσιν ἀγαπᾶν μὲν δεῖ προσοῦσαν, οὐ μὴν ἀποῦσαν ἐπιζητεῖν, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ 
τινὰς κρίνειν ἀξίους ἢ μὴ τοῦ στρατηγεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ τὰ ζῷα ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων πράξεων 
ἐξετάζομεν, ὅπως εὐγενείας ἔχει, οὕτω χρὴ σκοπεῖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐγένειαν. 
‘A wealthy man in my opinion must not be chosen general on account of his wealth, if he 
has not these qualities; nor must a poor man, provided that he be competent, be rejected 
on account of his poverty. It is not necessary that the general be rich or poor; he may be 
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one or the other. Neither the one nor the other must be chosen nor rejected on account of 
his fortune in life, but must be tested by the standard of charater. […] An illustrious family 
name we should welcome if it be present but if lacking it should not be demanded, nor 
should we judge men worthy or unworthy of commands simply by this criterion; but just as 
we test the pedigrees of animals in the light of the things they actually do, so we shold 
view the pedigrees of men also’ 199 
The most important principle, therefore, that comes out of Onasander is that one has to be 
adaptable, not prejudge a situation and take the moving variables into consideration. This is 
also apparent in what he thinks about pre-conceived plans, and there might have been a bigger 
debate on the importance of learning from examples and planning ahead in ‘military science’ as 
opposed to thinking on the spot, as we shall see when comparing it with Frontinus’ 
recommendations: 
Τῶν δ̓ ἐκ προλήψεως καὶ πρὶν ἢ συμβαλεῖν ἐπινοουμένων στρατηγοῖς αἱ παῤ αὐτὸν τὸν 
τῆς μάχης καιρὸν ἐπίνοιαι νίκης καὶ ἀντιστρατηγήσεις ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ πλείους καὶ 
θαυμασιώτεραι γίγνονται τοῖς τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἠσκηκόσιν, ἃς οὐκ ἔστιν 
ὑποσημῆναι λόγῳ ἢ προβουλεῦσαι. 
‘Plans and counter stratagems for victory that are originated at the very moment of battle 
are sometimes preferable to those which are conceived and contrived by generals in 
anticipation and before the engagement, and they are sometimes more worthy of remark, 
in the case of those made by men who are skilled in military science, thought they are 
things which cannot be reduced to rules or planned beforehand’200 
The primary thrust of the passage must surely be that it is better to be adaptable than to have a 
preconceived plan. It also implies that it is less useful to try to apply certain tricks learned in 
advance, such as stratagems of past generals, thus making the listing of such examples 
pointless. Onasander emphasises this point using the simile of the pilot who fits his ship with 
everything before a voyage: when a storm hits he does not do what he wants, but what is 
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necessary, ‘and calling to their aid no memory of their past practice but assistance appropriate 
to the existing circumstances’.201 He goes on to say that ‘just so generals will prepare their 
armies as they believe will be best, but when the storm of war is at hand repeatedly shattering, 
overthrowing, and bringing varied conditions, the sight of present circumstances demands 
expediences based on the exigencies of the moment, which the necessity of change rather than 
the memory of experience suggests’ (οὕτως οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐκτάξουσιν, ὅπως 
σφίσι νομίζουσι συνοίσειν, ἐπειδὰν δ’ ὁ τοῦ πολέμου περιστῇ χειμὼν πολλὰ θραύων καὶ 
παραλλάττων καὶ ποικίλας ἐπάγων περιστάσεις, ἡ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψις 
ἐπιζητεῖ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ἐπινοίας, ἃς ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς τύχης μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ μνήμη τῆς ἐμπειρίας 
ὑποβάλλει).202 
Frontinus’ approach is slightly different.  He states that he feels it is his duty to collect the 
examples of commanders as a completion of his previous work: 
deberi adhuc institutae arbitror operae, ut sollertia ducum facta, quae a Graecis una   
στρατηγημάτων appellatione comprehensa sunt, expeditis amplectar commentariis. 
‘I still feel under obligation, in order to complete the task I have begun, to summarise in 
convenient sketches the adroit operations of generals, which the Greeks embrace under 
the one name strategemata.’203 
We might object that any agenda and essence that the text has is obscured by this statement 
because the Strategemata is only a counterpart of his more theoretical work and cannot be 
considered to have any stand-alone value. However, I believe Frontinus’ statement simply 
means that the two works will constitute a conceptual whole, and if Frontinus had wanted to 
illustrate his principles with examples he could have done it in the same work, the way we see 
Aeneas Tacticus do. Therefore, it is pretty clear that he wanted the book of examples to be a 
text in its own right from which commanders could learn without reference to any other 
theoretical framework, and this is what he essentially states: 
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Ita enim consilii quoque et providentiae exemplis succinti duces erunt, unde illis 
excogitandi generandique similia facultas nutriatur 
 ‘For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, 
which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds’.204 
What it seems to me that Frontinus is trying to prove here is that reading examples of other 
stratagems can provide you with a particular mind-frame adept to trickery –’the power of 
conceiving and executing like deeds’/generandique similia facultas which is essential for 
warfare. Therefore he does not encourage the repetition of the same devices irrespective of 
context, but the possibility of thinking along the same lines when the situation calls for it.205  
So both Onasander and Frontinus believe that a general should have a particular frame of mind 
which he can apply in the moment of battle. This frame of mind is built with the help of 
knowledge, although Onasander perhaps believes more in the importance of general principles 
while Frontinus is an advocate of both general principles and examples.  
Polyaenus’ approach is different. What his treatise seems to suggest in terms of practicality is 
that there are certain patterns that repeat themselves, and that there are certain set solutions 
that have a broader applicability. As the stratagems are presented, they read as a long list with 
no real theme except Greekness. Most of the time, at least the modern reader struggles to 
identify all the figures named, especially since some only appear once, and some are really 
generic figures such as for instance a certain Lacedaemonian Harmost who is not even named 
and who is faced with an Athenian siege.206  
This example is particularly interesting because we cannot tell from any sort of internal 
evidence which war this is, when it was waged and what was at stake. Certainly, some figures 
would have been famous and – as in the case of Frontinus – the readers would have been able 
to form their own judgements and interpretations based on their previous knowledge, but 
some – as is the case of the aforementioned Harmost – would have been hard or impossible to 
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identify (especially some minor commanders of the fourth century B.C.). There is perhaps much 
truth in Krenz and Wheeler’s statement that Polyaenus seems in a rush to finish his work, and 
thus frequently any organisation that he might have had in mind is obscured.207 What could 
also be argued from the lack of context is that context is sometimes not important for 
Polyaenus because it is only the specific deed that is described that must be valued. Thus, his 
readers should not care who the protagonists were, when the events happened and what the 
eventual outcome was, but only take what was related at face value and perhaps integrate this 
stratagem more efficiently within multiple situations. If we consider the lack of context 
correlated with the case of the repetition of a certain stratagem, it becomes even clearer that 
the essence of the stratagem, namely what was actually done as opposed to who did it, is what 
is supposed to shine through.  Certainly, the repetition might also mean that this is a stratagem 
which has historically been often deployed to good effect, hence its inclusion in the collection, 
but it does not take anything away from the possibility that Polyaenus might be endorsing this 
message. Therefore, as opposed to Frontinus, the message in many cases in Polyaenus may be 
that the success of certain stratagems does not depend on the person who is performing it, but 
that they are generally applicable and performable. Therefore, one should always be on the 
look out for recognisable patterns for which a certain set of answers already exists.  
Therefore, I believe that, beyond the very technical and precise aspects of the treatises, they 
also have an overall message that has to do with practicality, a nucleus that is meant to provide 
the reader with a general principle to follow beyond the specifics, that he can take away and 
apply on the battlefield or when planning and organising a campaign.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, I have established that, despite the similarities in presentation and the use of 
similar topoi, we can talk still about ‘military manuals’ and ‘artillery manuals’ as separate 
groups, and therefore an analysis of the former group in this thesis is justified. This is partly 
because of the different traditions that they themselves claim to belong to but also in part 
because of the different audiences they seem to address, despite the audiences intersecting in 
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the case of generals. We have also seen that we can perhaps talk about different groups within 
military manuals themselves, and the Taktika and Strategemata seem to constitute particular 
groups of text that place restrictions on their authors in terms of subject matter and style. The 
Taktika exclude psychology and moral aspects among others and are perhaps meant to be 
written in a certain, more objective style, while the Strategemata are meant to be collections of 
generals’ deeds, with little interpretation or commentary.  
We have also established that the audience of these texts would have been a broader one than 
might be expected. They could be used in various ways by a more specialist audience, either as 
tools of learning or self-promotion, as well as having a wider reach. The practicality of the texts 
then varies from a more general, ‘intellectual’ practicality, meant to give the reader the 
possibility of engaging convincingly in intellectual conversation on a topic that was considered 
the principal domain of the Romans, namely warfare, to a more ‘specific’ practicality. This 
latter, also general in a sense has more to do with a central message or mindset that the texts 
attempt to convey, rather than with the actual application of the details of the texts in real life. 
 
II. Ordering ‘Military Knowledge’ in a New World: Integration 
and/or Opposition?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
The battlefield is the place where the Romans considered themselves most at home, so 
naturally they would regard their own knowledge about military matters very highly. How 
would Greek writers rank and order their knowledge in response to this? Do Greek and Roman 
authors such as Aelian and Frontinus really think of Greek and Roman knowledge as opposed? 
Do they rank them – and implicitly themselves – as higher and lower? Or do they try to place 
them together, as equal and equivalent, and if so how and why? Are there authors that blur the 
boundaries between ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’, and can we see a theme of identity underlying 
knowledge? Finally, does the ranking of knowledge reflect back upon the authors themselves 
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and their position as experts, or, conversely, do their claims to expertise and authority alter the 
way in which knowledge is ranked? The questions that this chapter sets out to answer have 
long preoccupied cultural historians, as they are framed by several overarching themes such as 
the process of ordering knowledge and its political ramifications, how authority and expertise 
are constructed and the relationship between ‘Greek knowledge’ and ‘Roman power’.  
As Whitmarsh notices, the Greeks were keen on representing themselves as lacking in power 
but compensating by paideia (not that this self-representation reflected in any way a real 
division, with power being the preserve of the Romans and culture that of the Greeks), and 
Roman authors too – most notoriously Vergil and Horace – presented the interactions between 
the two along those same lines.208 However, Swain pointed out that ‘the Greek past was not 
the preserve of the Greek elite alone, but was open to use by other groups, including non-
Greeks’ and I believe in studying our ‘military manuals’ we can see both how aspects of Greek 
‘identity’ can be blended with Roman practices and made universal, but at the same time how 
authors can use it to reject a unitary conception of military knowledge, or present a picture of 
both subversion and integration.209 We shall also see how our authors navigate the problem of 
potentially subverting the established order of power and knowledge, as Wallace-Hadrill argues 
that certain disciplines within Greek paideia might do, and we shall specifically focus on 
whether the subject matter of military manuals subverts the Greek culture/Roman power 
dichotomy by expanding the boundaries of normal Greek paideia with something which is 
considered a Roman domain, namely the art of generalship, and whether they do so in a 
manner that is meant to reconcile and not threaten. 210 
To briefly sum up my analysis then, I will show how authors of military manuals seem to take 
three different approaches to the problem of ordering and organising ‘military knowledge’. 
Firstly, a non-ethnic/political and non-differentiating (and perhaps integrating, as I shall 
attempt to prove) approach is represented by authors such as Onasander and Frontinus. By this 
I mean that they seem to give the same importance to Greek and Roman knowledge, without 
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ranking them or emphasising the importance of certain Greek or Roman figures. An ‘exclusive’ 
(and even divisive) approach is represented mainly by Polyaenus who gives prominence to 
Greek figures and Greek knowledge, while Arrian and Aelian could be said to take an approach 
that combines the two.  
To explain further, Onasander announces in his preface that his material will all be Roman, but 
chooses to describe practices that are recognisably Greek alongside recognisably Roman ones, 
without explicitly designating them as such. By doing so, I believe he wants his audience to 
understand how Greek and Roman theory about warfare constitutes a unitary whole. Frontinus’ 
approach seems to be an integrative one as well, as examples of both Roman and Greek 
generals performing stratagems are placed alongside each other as equivalent, but also 
together with Persian and Carthaginian commanders. Polyaenus’ text seems to be reacting to 
such ideas of integration by organising its collection of stratagems prosopographically rather 
than thematically, and Polyaenus tries to prove the prominence of Greek figures by tackling 
roughly the same themes as Frontinus, but illustrating them with Greek examples. Finally, 
Aelian and Arrian’s Taktika seem to emphasise the pre-eminence of Greek knowledge in various 
ways – one of which being to show how much older and more complete it is – thereby 
challenging Roman knowledge, but at the same time integrate the two into a continuum of 
knowledge.  
We will also have time to explore how these approaches relate to the authors’ self-
presentations, and the construction of authority in their texts.  We will see how Frontinus 
appears as reinventor, both when it comes to the techne taktike but also with the strategemata 
in that he redefines and appropriates a concept which he himself identifies as Greek, investing 
it with his own authority, and how his ‘real life’ authority impacts on the way in which he does 
this but also, more generally, shapes the presentation of his text. Onasander does the same 
with Greek and Roman knowledge, showing how he as an author is in the position of choice and 
inclusion, and that what recommends him as a writer, what demands respect from his 
audience, is that he is able to put this mixed Greco-Roman theory together. The authorial 
strategy of Arrian and Aelian is one of challenge and of incorporation. They make themselves 
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authoritative by being the vehicle of transmission of a still relevant Greek knowledge, and being 
part of a Greek tradition, but also by drawing authority from Roman figures such as Frontinus 
and relying on personal experience, in the case of Arrian.  
In terms of the organisation of the chapter, for each of the approaches and authors who 
represent them we will have a section where we discuss the presentation of the material in the 
texts and the relationship between Greek and Roman knowledge, and then move on to how 
this presentation shapes the construction of their authority and authorial personas.  
1. Integration by uniformity: Onasander – Greeks and Romans or Greeks as 
Romans 
In the first section of this chapter dedicated to ordering, comparing and ranking, we will first 
look at how Onasander purports to derive his theory from the deeds of the Romans but then 
proceeds to present principles that are derived from mainly Greek practices, but also mixes in 
theory that could be identified as Roman and practices that could be considered both Greek 
and Roman. In the second section we will see how this is done purposely in order to construct a 
continuum of knowledge that integrates both Greek and Roman ideas, and how this is 
Onasander’s way of creating his own authority and of presenting himself as an expert at putting 
together a new type of theory of warfare and in evaluating what should be included in this 
theory.  
1.1 Presenting the material: Greek principles as Roman and mixing the ‘Roman’ 
and the ‘Greek’ 
Onasander explains twice in his proemion how the practices that he will describe are based on 
the personal experience and deeds of Romans: 
ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ στρατηγημάτων ἠθροισμένων τοσοῦτο προειπεῖν, ὅτι 
πάντα διὰ πείρας ἔργων ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν τοιούτων, ὧν ἀπόγονον ὑπάρχει 
Ῥωμαίων ἅπαν τὸ γένει καὶ ἀρετῇ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο πρωτεῦον. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐσχεδιασμένον 
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ἀπολέμῳ καὶ νεωτέρᾳ γνώμῃ τόδε περιέχει τὸ σύνταγμα, ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ πράξεων καὶ 
ἀληθινῶν ἀγώνων κεχωρηκότα μάλιστα μὲν Ῥωμαίοις 
‘I consider it necessary to say in advance, about the acts of generalship (stratēgematōn) 
collected in this book, that they have all been derived from experience of actual deeds, 
and, in fact, of exploits performed by those men from whom has been derived the whole 
primacy of the Romans, in race and valor, down to the present time. For this treatise (to 
syntagma) presents no impromptu invention of an unwarlike and youthful mind, but all the 
principles are taken from authentic exploits and battles, especially of the Romans.’211 
Despite the purported origin of the material, as Smith notes, ‘all examples can be traced back to 
Greek history’, but what he means is that they can be identified in several Greek authors.212 
However, Onasander himself does not call anything ‘Greek’ or ‘Roman’ per se and there are no 
names of generals, peoples or cities or actual examples of any deeds or battles as such present 
in the treatise. I do not fully agree with Smith’s contention either, and I think sometimes we can 
perhaps see ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ practices together despite the overall impression that the 
general Onasander has in mind is working primarily within a Greek framework. We shall see, by 
going through a few examples, how the world in which we are operating seems to be primarlily 
a Greek one, but also how this changes gradually when practices whose origins cannot be 
clearly established and which could be considered both ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ are introduced. 
When reading Onasander’s text, in the case of some passages, both a Greek and Roman reader 
would be able to relate to what was put forward and consider it a ‘Greek’ or ‘Roman’ principle 
respectively. This is simply because at least part of the subject matter was chosen by Onasander 
particularly in order to create this effect. 
Ambaglio and Smith have both written detailed analyses of the treatise, showing how the 
material presented is very Greek in spirit, and how Onasander finds inspiration in Xenophon, 
                                                          
211 Onos. pr. 7. Also Onos. pr. 2: εὐτυχοίην τ̓ ἄν, εἰ, ἃ δὴ Ῥωμαίοις δυνάμει καὶ δἰ ἔργων πέπρακται, ταῦτ̓ ἐγὼ λόγῳ 
περιλαβεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι παρὰ τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι δοκιμασθείην (‘I should be fortunate if I should be considered 
capable, before such men, of making a summary sketch of what the Romans have already accomplished by their 
mighty deeds). 
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Asclepiodotus and Aeneas Tacticus.213 Therefore, in what follows we shall only refer to a few 
examples that illustrate this Greekness, and then move on to examine the more ‘ambiguous’ 
material that I believe elicits this response of recognition in both Greek and Roman readers. 
Thus at the very beginning of the treatise we see that the world of Onasander’s strategos is one 
where the priests are chosen according to their birth – as opposed to them being co-opted, as 
was Roman practice at least at the end of the Republic.214 Also, his reference to gymnasiarchs 
and the comparison of the general to a wrestler make one think of Greek wrestlers, since at 
least some more traditional Romans had poor views of gymnasia, such as Tacitus who chastises 
Nero for establishing a gymnasium ‘where oil was furnished to knights and senators after the 
lax fashion of the Greeks’ (praebitumque oleum equiti ac senatui Graeca facilitate).215 For 
Onasander, on the contrary, the general’s appropriation of the qualities of a wrestler is meant 
to be viewed positively: 
διόπερ καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν παλαιστὴν προδεικνύειν μὲν καὶ σκιάζειν εἰς πολλὰ μέρη δεῖ 
περισπῶντα καὶ ἐπισφάλλοντα δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε πρὸς πολλὰ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους, ἑνὸς δὲ ζητεῖν 
ἐγκρατῶς λαβόμενον ἀνατρέψαι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα τῆς πόλεως.  
‘On this account, just as a good wrestler, the general must make feints and threats at many 
points, worrying and deceiving his opponents, here and there, at many places, striving, by 
securing a firm hold upon one part, to overturn the whole structure of the city.’216  
The fact that the generals are few (ὡς ὀλίγους αἱρουμένους στρατηγοὺς) would again lead us 
to think Onasander is thinking about a Greek context, whereas his focus on psychology – 
particularly on fear and the difference between reality and impression – throughout the 
treatise is very similar to Aeneas Tacticus’, and his attention to mathematical precision reminds 
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of Asclepiodotus. 217 We can see both these preocupations in the following example, Onasander 
discussing the ‘mathematics of the camp’, and the difference between appearence and reality: 
Ὁράτω δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολὴν ἐμπείρως: μήτε γάρ, ἐὰν ἐν ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ 
κατὰ κύκλον ἴδῃ κείμενον βραχὺν τὴν περίμετρον καὶ συνεσταλμένον χάρακα, δοκείτω 
τοὺς πολεμίους ὀλίγους εἶναι — πᾶς γὰρ κύκλος ἐλάττω τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ὄψιν ἔχει τῆς ἐξ 
ἀναλόγου στερεομετρουμένης θεωρίας, καὶ πλείους δύναται δέξασθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ 
περιγραφόμενον εὖρος, ἢ ἰδὼν ἄν τις ὄψει τεκμήραιτο  
‘The general should skillfully inspect the camp of the enemy. If he sees a circular palisade 
contracted into a small circumference, lying in a plain, he should not conclude that the 
enemy are few in number; for every circle appears to contain less than it actually does by 
the theory of proportionate geometrical contents, and the space enclosed within a circle 
can hold more men than one would think to see it.’218 
The same belief that theoretical mathematics has many applications in marshalling troops is 
found in Asclepiodotus: 
Περὶ διατάξεως τῶν ἀνδρῶν καθ̓ ὅλην τε τὴν φάλαγγα ἢ κατὰ τὰ μέρη Διατέτακται δὲ ἥ τε 
ὅλη φάλαγξ καὶ τὰ μέρη κατὰ τετράδα, ὥστε τῶν τεσσάρων ἀποτομῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην κατ̓ 
ἀρετὴν τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος τετάχθαι δεξιάν, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ἀριστερὰν τοῦ λαιοῦ καὶ 
δεξιὰν τὴν τρίτην, τὴν δὲ τετάρτην τοῦ δεξιοῦ λαιάν. οὕτω γὰρ διατεταγμένων ἴσον εἶναι 
συμβήσεται κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῷ λαιῷ: τὸ γὰρ ὑπὸ πρώτου καὶ τετάρτου, 
φασὶ γεωμέτριοι, ἴσον ἔσται τῷ ὑπὸ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου, ἐὰν τὰ τέσσαρα ἀνὰ λόγον ᾖ. 
 ‘The entire army as well as its units is disposed on the basis of a fourfold division, so that 
of the four half-wings the bravest holds the right of the right wing, the second and third in 
point of valour the left and right, respectively, of the left wing and the fourth the left of the 
right wing. For with the units ordered in this manner the right wing will have the same 
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strength as the left, since, as the geometricians say, the product of the first and the fourth 
will equal that of the second and third, if the four be proportionate.’219 
The attention to the difference between impression and reality is another characteristic of 
Greek military theory, and is also shared with (or maybe derived from) Aeneas Tacticus and 
Xenophon, especially the Hipparchikos.220 For example, we see how retreats of the enemy 
should be treated suspiciously and how a general should pay attention to the terrain when he is 
pursuing them, so as not to be drawn into an ambush.221 The general must not confuse 
impression with reality; the former may be that the enemy is afraid, whilst in reality he is 
leading the general into a trap. The importance of the same distinction is also emphasised by 
Xenophon: 
οὐδὲ δόρατα μὴν παραλείψω ὡς ἥκιστα ἂν ἀλλήλοις ἐπαλλάττοιτο. δεῖ γὰρ μεταξὺ τοῖν 
ὤτοιν τοῦ ἵππου ἕκαστον σχεῖν, εἰ μέλλει φοβερά τε καὶ εὐκρινῆ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἅμα πολλὰ 
φανεῖσθαι. 
‘I will add a word on the position in which the lances should be held to prevent crossing. 
Every man should point his lance between his horse’s ears, if the weapons are to look 
fearsome, stand out distinctly and at the same time to convey the impression of 
numbers’222 
The final two examples perhaps illustrate two of the most Greek military principles 
masquerading as Roman. The first is that lovers should fight beside lovers in the battle line: 
Περὶ τοῦ οἰκείους πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρὸς γνωρίμους τάττειν Φρονίμου δὲ 
στρατηγοῦ καὶ τὸ τάττειν ἀδελφοὺς παῤ ἀδελφοῖς, φίλους παρὰ φίλοις, ἐραστὰς παρὰ 
παιδικοῖς: ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ τὸ κινδυνεῦον τὸ πλησίον προσφιλέστερον, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀγαπῶντα 
φιλοκινδυνότερον ὑπὲρ τοῦ πέλας ἀγωνίζεσθαι: καὶ δή τις αἰδούμενος μὴ ἀποδοῦναι 
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χάριν ὧν εὖ πέπονθεν αἰσχύνεται καταλιπὼν τὸν εὐεργετήσαντα πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἄρξαι 
φυγῆς. 
‘It is the part of a wise general to station brothers in rank beside brothers, friends beside 
friends, and lovers beside their favourites. For whenever that which is in danger nearby is 
more than ordinarily dear the lover necessarily fights more recklessly for the man beside 
him. And of course one is ashamed not to return a favour that he has received, and is 
dishonoured if he abandons his benefactor and is the first to flee.’223 
This recommendation perhaps reveals Onasander’s Platonic influences, the idea being most 
famously expressed in Plato’ Symposium:224 
εἰ οὖν μηχανή τις γένοιτο ὥστε πόλιν γενέσθαι ἢ στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν τε καὶ παιδικῶν, 
οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ἄμεινον οἰκήσειαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἢ ἀπεχόμενοι πάντων τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ 
φιλοτιμούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ μαχόμενοί γ’ ἂν μετ’ ἀλλήλων οἱ τοιοῦτοι νικῷεν ἂν 
ὀλίγοι ὄντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους.   
‘So that if we could somewise contrive to have a city or an army composed of lovers and 
their favourites, they could not be better citizens of their country than by thus refraining 
from all that is base in a mutual rivalry for honour; and such men as these, if they actually 
fought alongside each other, one might almost consider able to make even a little band 
victorious over all the world.’225 
The second one is the discourse on standing one’s ground and fighting in line as opposed to 
deserting, which has a definite Greek ring to it, especially in the indication that those who flee 
will die shamefully whilst those who remain will die gloriously, which evokes the rhipsaspia – 
the crime of abandoning one’s shield:  
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οἵ τινες γὰρ πεπεισμένοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν, ὡς φεύγοντες μὲν αἰσχρῶς 
ἀπολοῦνται, μένοντες δ̓ εὐκλεῶς τεθνήξονται, καὶ χείρον ̓ ἀεὶ προσδοκῶσιν ἐκ τοῦ 
καταλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ φυλάττειν, ἄριστοι κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ἄνδρες ἐξετάζονται. 
‘For the men in the lines who chance to believe that if they flee they will perish shamefully 
while if they remain in rank they will die a glorious death, and who constantly anticipate 
greater dangers from breaking the ranks than from keeping them, will prove themselves 
the best men in the face of danger.’226  
One might also note the use of εὐκλεῶς as part of the Homeric concept of glorious death, 
reserved for those who preserve the ranks of the phalanx, as a particularly Greek concept.227  
So it seems that Onasander’s promise to base his material on the practical experience of the 
Romans is a false one, and what we are in fact dealing with is a hypothetical general operating 
in a generic Greek world, and the presentation of Greek practices and principles as Roman 
ones. As I hinted before, I believe that some of the practices and ways of talking about warfare 
chosen by the author are deliberately ambiguous, and one would be able to describe them as 
either Greek or Roman (or both), with some clearly of more Roman inspiration – and it is to 
these that we shall turn to now.  
Chapter fourteen, where the author discusses the importance of a balance between courage 
and fear, reminds us of a similar discussion in Aristotle:  
Καθάπερ γε μὴν ἐν καιρῷ στρατεύματος ἀναθάρσησις ὤνησεν, οὕτως καὶ φόβος 
ὠφέλησεν. ὅτ’ ἂν γὰρ ῥᾳθυμῇ στρατόπεδον καὶ ἀπειθέστερον ᾖ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τὸν ἀπὸ 
τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσημαίνειν δεῖ κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβεροποιοῦντα τὴν ἐκείνων 
ἐφεδρείαν· οὐ γὰρ δειλοὺς ἔσται ποιεῖν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀσφαλεῖς· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς 
δυσθυμίαις θαρρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ῥᾳθυμίαις φοβεῖσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δειλοὺς 
ἀνδρείους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ θρασεῖς προμηθεῖς. ἀμφότερα δὲ συμβαίνει στρατοπέδοις, καὶ 
οὕτως καταπεπλῆχθαι πολεμίους ὥστε μηδὲν ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, καὶ οὕτως καταφρονεῖν 
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ὥστε μηδὲν φυλάττεσθαι· πρὸς ἑκάτερον δὲ δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡρμόσθαι καὶ εἰδέναι, πότε 
δεῖ τἀντίπαλα ταπεινὰ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ σχήματι ποιεῖν, καὶ πότ’ αὐτὰ δεινὰ καὶ φοβερώτερα. 
‘Just as the recovery of courage at a crucial moment benefits an army, so also fear is 
advantageous. For whenever an army becomes idle and inclined to disobey its officers, the 
general should suggest the danger from the enemy, especially by representing their 
reserves to be formidable. It will not be possible thus to make the soldiers cowardly but 
only steady, since in despondency it is necessary to be of good courage, but in idleness to 
fear; for fear makes cowards bold and the rash cautious. These two misfortunes happen to 
armies, to become so terrified of the enemy that they are unwilling to attempt any 
offensive, and so bold that they are unwilling to take any precautionary measures. With 
regard to each the general must arrange his plans, and know when by voice and look he 
must make the enemy appear weak, and when more threatening and formidable’228 
The importance of preserving a balance between fear and courage is also apparent elsewhere 
(φόβος γὰρ εὔκαιρος (well-timed) ἀσφάλεια προμηθής, ὡς καὶ καταφρόνησις ἄκαιρος 
εὐεπιβούλευτος τόλμα/ Well-timed fear is wise precaution, as ill-timed contempt is 
recklessness that invites attack) and resembles a similar discussion in the Nicomachian 
Ethics:229 
περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης [...]ὁ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων 
θρασύς, ὁ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός 
‘The observance of the mean in fear and confidence is courage [...] he that exceeds in 
confidence is rash; he that exceeds in fear and is deficient in confidence is cowardly’230 
While Aristotle’s description of courage as virtue of the mean is most famous, as is his emphasis 
on the usefulness of fear, the idea could be just seen as part of a common-sense military 
thinking that we also find in Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum for instance.  Caesar frequently portrays 
himself as being afraid in a pre-emptive, rational way that leads to the avoidance of danger, 
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while showing how excessive courage can lead to excessive fear. Therefore, in Caesar’s view, 
both are negative since they lead to the loss of reason, but so is the lack of fear which can also 
lead to a disaster.231 So whilst a ‘Greek’ reading the passages on fear in Onasander might 
choose to see them as inspired by Aristotle, a ‘Roman’ reader less familiar with Aristotle would 
perhaps see them as common sense knowledge about warfare. 
Similarly, there is Onasander’s insistence on just war, and in particular on the necessity for the 
war to be a defensive one: 
Τὰς δ̓ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου μάλιστά φημι χρῆναι φρονίμως συνίστασθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ 
δικαίου πᾶσι φανερὸν γίγνεσθαι πολεμοῦντα: τότε γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ συναγωνισταὶ τοῖς 
στρατεύουσιν εὐμενεῖς καθίστανται, καὶ ἄνθρωποι προθυμότερον ἀντιτάττονται τοῖς 
δεινοῖς: εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλ̓ ἀμύνονται, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν 
ἔχοντες ἐντελῆ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται, ὡς, ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ 
τῷ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον, αὐτῇ τῇ οἰήσει, κἂν μή τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων 
ἀπαντήσειν μέλλῃ, προκατορρωδοῦσιν. 
‘The causes of war, I believe, should be marshalled with the greatest care; it should be 
evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, 
become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand 
against the foe. For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a 
defensive war, with consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is 
complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this 
very opinion enter the war with fear, even if they are not about to face danger at the hands 
of the enemy.’232  
These are ideas which can be found in earlier Greek authors as well (as in many other traditions 
too), and it would be fairly reasonable to assume that no one would like to be portrayed as 
carrying out an ‘unjust war’ or as being the aggressor. So, again a ‘Greek’ reader might think 
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that Onasander is simply drawing on a Greek tradition found in many authors before. 233A 
‘Roman’ reader, however, might also rightfully think that what Onasander was putting forward 
was nothing else but the Roman ius fetiale and the belief that the enemy had to be given the 
opportunity to give redress and, should he not do so, that a war should be formally declared, 
which was at the core of Roman thinking about warfare.234 Again, Onasander’s text caters to 
both needs.  
 The following discussion about close formations, although not mentioning it by name, also 
quite clearly reminds the reader of the Roman testudo: 
Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη τῆς τῶν ψιλῶν συμμαχίας, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖεν, 
οἱ μὲν πρωτοστάται πυκνοὶ πορευέσθων ἔχοντες ἀνδρομήκεις θυρεούς, ὥστε σκέπειν ὅλα 
τὰ σώματα τοῖς μήκεσιν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ οἱ κατόπιν τούτων ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων 
ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀράμενοι τοὺς θυρεοὺς τέως ἐχόντων, ἄχρι ἂν ἐντὸς γένωνται βέλους: 
οὕτως γάρ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, κεραμωθέντες οὐθὲν πείσονται δεινὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκηβόλων. 
‘If the general himself should lack an auxiliary force of light-armed troops while the enemy 
has a large force of them, the front rank men should advance in close formation, with 
shields the height of a man, tall enough to protect the whole body, and those who follow 
and the ones behind them, even to the last rank, should carry their shields above their 
heads, while they are within bowshot of the enemy. For thus roofed in, so to speak, they 
will suffer no danger from missiles.’235 
The word designating shields here θυρεούς, makes it clear that he is referring to the Romans in 
particular as it was they who used long, oblong/rectangular shields and we see this equipment 
described as such in Dionysius of Halicarnasus, though the Greek word for testudo, ‘chelone’ 
does not appear anywhere in his text.236 But one might also think that the Greeks used close 
formations and locked shields in the synaspismos, although perhaps not quite in the same way. 
Furthermore, Onasander also talks about the necessity for intervals within the ranks of the 
                                                          
233 E.g. X. Cyr. 1.5.13-14; D. H. 2.72.30; Th. 2.74.  
234 For the ius fetiale and rerum repetitio see Liv. 1.32.5-14 and Rich (1976). 
235 Onos. 20. 
236 D.H. 4.16-18; cf. Liv. 8.8.2-3 
79 
 
army so that light armed troops can retire after they have discharged their weapons.237 This 
seems to be particularly Roman, as we know that the earlier manipular legion used skirmishers 
at the beginning of battle, which would retreat through the gaps between the units, although 
the Romans should not be thought of having a monopoly over this kind of practice.238 Certain 
training exercises - namely the provision that soldiers must be armed with ‘staves or shafts of 
javelins’ and led against each other in sham battle, when they can also throw clods at each 
other – could also be identified as either ‘Greek’ – if one compares them to a passage of 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia - or ‘Roman’ when read against a similar passage in Vegetius, if one 
thinks that Vegetius is keeping his promise and draws only upon earlier Roman material.239 
So we see that Onasander seems to present both Greek practices and more ambiguous 
practices which can be seen as both Greek and Roman and could cater to both Greek and 
Roman readers – or which could be identified by readers as Greek or Roman or both. Therefore, 
in the following sections we shall turn to the question of what were are to make of this mixture 
in light of what the author promises in his preface, that the material he presents is extrapolated 
from the deeds of the Romans.  
1.2 Presenting one’s authority: Onasander as master of a continuum of 
knowledge 
As we have seen, there is a clear preference for Greek practices and a Greek way of thinking in 
Onasander’s manual, but at the same time an inclusion of practices that blur the line between 
Greek and Roman, perhaps with some being more clearly identified as Roman. With this in 
mind, would it be legitimate to ask whether and why Onasander is trying pass off the Greek as 
Roman? Can it just be the ‘pride of authors in the Second Sophistic’, as Smith argues?240 Or is 
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the ‘Roman framework’ merely an opportunity for him to fit this Greek knowledge into a 
category of the existing order.241  
One the one hand, using a Roman framework helps him challenge the paradigms of paideia and 
of culture and power, by still working within them. As a ‘Greek’, Onasander should have been 
concerned with other artes – as Vergil points out – and not write about something which would 
have been considered the domain of Romans who had political power. But by acknowledging 
the Romans as the masters of warfare and passing off Greek knowledge as Roman, he can 
freely advertise the former because he can make the case that the Romans already possessed 
it. Thus Greek military knowledge becomes knowledge already mastered as opposed to ‘newly 
advertised’, when presented in this framework of ‘Roman experience’.  
However, what Onasander is doing is more than just saying Greek practices are actually Roman 
ones – he is making the Greek universal. By particularly choosing examples which constitute a 
natural link between practices, he places emphasis on their homogeneity and on the 
suspension of boundaries. In Onasader there is ‘Greek’, ‘Macedonian’ and ‘Roman’ and his skill 
lies in describing practices which have both Greek and Roman correspondences and which 
could be seen as both Roman and Greek, the result being a blend of knowledge that is neither 
Roman nor Greek but both.  
Vegetius’ treatise emphasises that in his day there was a continuum of military knowledge, 
which starts with the Athenians and Spartans and ends with the Romans: 
Lacedaemonii quidem et Athenienses aliique Graecorum in libros rettulere conplura quae 
tactica uocant; sed nos disciplinam militarem populi Romani debemus inquirere, qui ex 
paruissimis finibus imperium suum paene solis regionibus et mundi ipsius fine distendit. 
‘The Spartans it is true and the Athenians and other Greeks published in books much 
material which they call tactica, but we ought to be enquiring after the military discipline of 
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the Roman people, who extended their Empire from the smallest bounds almost to the 
regions of the sun and the end of the earth itself.’242 
All this knowledge of the Spartans and the Athenians is incorporated and has been taken 
further by those who had attained mastery over the world and this too is Onasander’s message, 
that the Romans have now incorporated the Greek tradition into a universal discourse on war. 
By building this discourse and putting Greek and Roman together and naming it Roman, 
Onasander is also showing how the Greek tradition is now equally part of the Roman Empire, 
serving it, and that there is no need to separate the two. Onasander demonstrates how this 
communal knowledge works, by putting together two examples of seemingly generic battle 
displays that are meant to teach a general how to use formations and the environment. The 
first is an example of how one should place one’s army either next to a river or in a 
mountainous district:  
Ἀγχίνους μὲν στρατηγός τις πολλοὺς ὁρῶν τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτὸς ἐλάττοσι στρατιώταις 
μέλλων κινδυνεύειν ἐξελέξατο καὶ ἐπετήδευσε τοιούτων ἐπιτυχεῖν τόπων, ἐν οἷς ἢ παρὰ 
ποταμίαν ὀφρὺν ταξάμενος ἀπωθεῖται ταύτῃ τὴν κύκλωσιν τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ παρώρειαν 
ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἀποκλείσει τοὺς ὑπερκεράσαι βουλομένους, ὀλίγους 
ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῶν  ὑψηλῶν τοὺς ἀποκωλύσοντας ὑπὲρ κεφαλὴν ἀναβάντας γίγνεσθαι 
τοὺς πολεμίους. […] τῶν ὄντων μέντοι τοὺς ἀμείνους ἐκλέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς συνοίσοντας 
ἐννοῆσαι φρονίμου. 
A shrewd general who sees that the enemy has many troops when he himself is about to 
engage with fewer, will select, or rather make it his practice to find, localities where he 
may prevent an encircling movement of the enemy, either by arranging his army along the 
bank of a river, or, by choosing a mountainous district, he will use the mountains 
themselves to block off those who wish to outflank him, placing a few men on the summits 
to prevent the enemy from climbing above the heads of the main army. […] To choose the 
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better positions, however, from those at hand, and to know which will be advantageous, is 
the part of the wise general’243 
The second teaches generals how to advance in a crescent and trap their enemies: 
Πολλάκις δὲ εἰώθασιν οἱ μεγάλῃ δυνάμει καὶ πολυάνδρῳ κεχρημένοι μηνοειδὲς σχῆμα 
ποιήσαντες τῆς παρατάξεως ἐπιέναι, νομίζοντες ὅτι προσάγονται τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατ ̓
ἄνδρα βουλομένους συνάπτειν, εἶτα κατὰ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς ὁδὸν κυρτουμένους 
ἐναπολήψονται τῷ περιέχοντι κόλπῳ, τὰς ἰδίας κεραίας ἐπισυνάπτοντες ἀλλήλαις εἰς 
κύκλου σχῆμα. 
It is often the custom of generals who are in command of a powerful and numerous army 
to march to battle in a crescent formation, believing that their opponents also wish the 
battle to come to close quarters and that they will thus induce them to fight; then as their 
opponents are bent back into the road at the points of the crescent, they will intercept 
them with their enveloping folds, joining the extremes of their own wings to form a 
complete circle.244  
Upon closer examination however, despite not referring to them specifically, the two examples 
remind the readers of two very famous Greek and Roman battles, namely Thermopylae and 
Cannae (although, of course, at Cannae it was the Carthaginians who were doing the 
enveloping), where those manoeuvres where used. Interestingly enough, neither the Greeks, 
nor the Romans were on the winning side and the Romans were in fact the ones who fell into 
the trap of Hannibal’s crescent formation. In suffering defeat the Romans learned, just as the 
Greeks learned how to use the mountain pass of Thermopylae to their advantage, so these two 
practices from the Greek and Roman experience are joined together to teach further generals – 
who are Romans of senatorial rank (if Onasander is to be believed at all). Further credence is 
added to this by Onasander’s hidden reference (in the same chapter) to another Greek battle, 
Leuctra, and Epaminondas’ innovative battle formation, which clearly provides a Greek solution 
to the Roman problem at Cannae: 
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οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ λοξῇ πάσῃ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φάλαγγι προσβάλλει κατὰ θάτερον κέρας τῶν 
πολεμίων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς σχήματος κύκλωσιν οὕτως 
ἀντεπιών 
‘However, if he [the general] advances with his whole phalanx obliquely against one wing 
of the enemy, he will make no mistake in attacking in this manner, as far as the encircling 
movement of the crescent formation is concerned’245 
Therefore the suggestion might be that Greek and Roman experiences have to be blended 
together, in a universal kind of wisdom for the new world, as it is no longer relevant to refer to 
them as Greek or Roman.  
At the same time it is equally important that the one who builds this new type of knowledge is 
Onasander himself, marshalling together and ordering Greek and Roman knowledge based on 
his own skill. The possible identification of the practices as Greek or Roman or both and the lack 
of concrete examples means that Onasander himself is the utmost authority because he is the 
one who decides what is worthy of inclusion into this continuum of military knowledge and 
what is not.  
As previously mentioned, Onasander’s text is dedicated to Quintus Veranius, but also more 
generally to the Romans, and what the author also implies is that they are the warriors par 
excellence, because just as manuals about fishing should be addressed to fishermen, and those 
on hunting to huntsmen, a text dealing with warfare has to be dedicated to the Romans: 
Ἱππικῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ κυνηγετικῶν ἢ ἁλιευτικῶν τε αὖ καὶ γεωργικῶν συνταγμάτων 
προσφώνησιν ἡγοῦμαι πρέπειν ἀνθρώποις οἷς πόθος ἔχεσθαι τοιῶνδε ἔργων, στρατηγικῆς 
δὲ περὶ θεωρίας, ὦ Κόϊντε Οὐηράνιε, Ῥωμαίοις καὶ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων τοῖς τὴν συγκλητικὴν 
ἀριστοκρατίαν λελογχόσι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σεβαστοῦ Καίσαρος ἐπιφροσύνην ταῖς τε ὑπάτοις 
καὶ στρατηγικαῖς ἐξουσίαις κοσμουμένοις διά τε παιδείαν, ἧς οὐκ ἐπ̓ ὀλίγον ἔχουσιν 
ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ προγόνων ἀξίωσιν. 
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‘It is fitting, I believe, to dedicate monographs on horsemanship, or hunting or fishing or 
farming to men who are devoted to such pursuits, but a treatise on military science, 
Quintus Veranius, should be dedicated to Romans, and especially to those of the Romans 
who have attained senatorial dignity, and who through the wisdom of Augustus Caesar 
have been raised to the power of consul or general, both by reason of their military 
training (in which they have had no brief experience) and because of the distinction of their 
ancestors.246 
Therefore, not only does Onasander identify his target audience as exclusively ‘Roman’, but 
also, and in this he differs from Arrian and Aelian, as military experts. He is not looking to clarify 
matters for his readers but already expects them to have a good understanding of what will be 
discussed, as seen both above and in the following: 
ἀνέθηκα δὲ πρώτοις σφίσι τόνδε τὸν λόγον οὐχ ὡς ἀπείροις στρατηγίας, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα 
τῇδε θαρρήσας, ᾗ τὸ μὲν ἀμαθὲς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ παῤ ἄλλῳ κατορθούμενον ἠγνόησεν, τὸ 
δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ τῷ καλῶς ἔχοντι προσεμαρτύρησεν. 
‘I have dedicated this treatise primarily to them, not as to men unskilled in generalship, but 
with especial confidence in this fact, that the ignorant soul is unaware even of that in which 
another is successful, but knowledge bears additional witness to that which is well 
done.’247 
Onasander, by being the one who chooses out of all the material available what he considers 
useful, becomes indispensable because only he can construct this unity of knowledge. In virtue 
of this he becomes an expert himself – perhaps not necessarily in military matters, but an 
expert at ordering and ranking the available knowledge – and therefore is an expert addressing 
other experts, presenting his take of what constitutes essential military knowledge. The 
implication is that the reader has to possess this new compilation of knowledge because he is 
supposed to be experienced in all matters of warfare, therefore his ‘universal knowledge’ – and 
Onasander himself by association – becomes indispensable. The fact that the kind of experience 
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presented is based on ‘real life events’ and is superior to other types of ‘book learning’ that 
other authors might present makes Onasander’s ‘universal knowledge’ and implicitly Greek 
knowledge all the more authoritative because it does not derive from abstract principles, but 
was gained in the field. 248 
2. Integration by exempla: Frontinus’ Strategemata 
As before, we will first examine how Frontinus sets up his material and his exempla and how 
they can be considered to take an inclusive approach to knowledge, all the commanders having 
something to teach irrespective of their background or ethnicity. Then, we will move on to look 
at the interconnected relationship that this presentation has with Frontinus’ own authority as 
an expert, and we shall argue that he can only afford to take such an approach due to his very 
real military expertise. 
2.1. Presenting the material: diversity in stratagem  
Frontinus himself states that his project is to hunt down examples of notable deeds and use 
them to illustrate general principles ‘in order to complete the task’ which he had begun with his 
more theoretical work on ‘military science’.249 Much like Onasander, Frontinus’ Strategemata 
makes the case for a ‘combined knowledge’ by giving examples of the deeds of not only Greek 
and Roman generals, but also Carthaginians, Celts and others. 
There are two potential objections against reading the text in such a manner or at least 
considering this a purposeful and conscious strategy. Firstly, the assumption that collections of 
strategemata had existed from the Hellenistic age onwards, so Frontinus was simply writing in a 
specific ‘genre’, hence the scope and style of his work was determined by said ‘genre’ and not 
by the author’s own preference. Secondly, the fact that Frontinus’ text might come as a 
completion of his treatise on the res militaris mentioned in his preface, to illustrate the general 
principles laid out there, so any grouping of examples might just have been arbitrary and 
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intended to provide similar material for each theme. Both objections, however, have been 
addressed at length in the first chapter, so nothing more needs to be said about them here.  
The Strategemata is meant to offer a particular kind of knowledge and the way it does this is by 
discussing the sollertia ducum facta, which will turn out to be the deeds of all generals.250 
While Frontinus does not specifically state or emphasise in any way that he is discussing all 
generals and not just Greek or Roman ones, what he does emphasise is the division of the 
subject matter by themes which are presented in the preface.  
Let us take as an example the chapter on distracting one’s enemies, De distringendis 
hostibus.251 We see here that there is a sense of diversity in the origins of commanders, with 
five being Roman (Manius Curius, Titus Didius, Coriolanus, Fabius Maximus and Scipio), one 
Carthaginian (Hannibal) and three Greek (Antiochus, Dionysius of Syracuse and Agesilaus).252 As 
König notices, each chapter in the Strategemata begins with the name of a commander.  She 
points out that this ‘contributes further to the overall impression of consistency and control, 
making the presentation of each stratagem – like his indices – formulaic, and thus reinforcing 
the sense already established in his preface of systematic organisation’.253 However, I believe it 
also emphasises the diversity of the roster of generals even more. In particular it shows that the 
facultas, the critical ability of a commander to think up and put into practice similar devices, 
which Frontinus is nourishing (consilii quoque et providentiae exemplis succincti duces erunt, 
unde illis excogitandi generandique similia facultas nutriatur/ ‘commanders will be furnished 
with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of 
conceiving and executing like deeds’) can be present in any figure.254 In fact, the first two 
examples of the chapter are essentially the same stratagem applied by a Roman and a 
Carthaginian commander: 
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Coriolanus, cum ignominiam damnationis suae bello ulcisceretur, populationem patriciorum 
agrorum inhibuit, deustis vastatisque plebeiorum, ut discordiam moveret, qua consensus 
Romanorum distringeretur. 
Hannibal Fabium, cui neque virtute neque artibus bellandi par erat, ut infamia distringeret, 
agris eius abstinuit, ceteros populatus. Contra ille, ne suspecta civibus fides esset, 
magnitudine animi effecit, publicatis possessionibus suis. 
‘When Coriolanus was seeking to avenge by war the shame of his own condemnation, he 
prevented the ravaging of the lands of the patricians, while burning and harrying those of 
the plebeians, in order to arouse discord whereby to destroy the harmony of the Romans. 
When Hannibal had proved no match for Fabius, either in character or in generalship, in 
order to besmirch him with dishonour, he spared his lands when he ravaged all others. To 
meet this assault, Fabius transferred the title to his property to the State, thus, by his 
loftiness of character, preventing his honour from falling under the suspicion of his fellow-
citizens.’ 255 
One might also notice that not only the trick is identical, but so is Frontinus’ judgement on both 
commanders, that neither of them had a particularly good character; Hannibal is less virtuous 
and skilled than Fabius Maximus, and Coriolanus tries to wash away the shame of his exile in 
warfare. It is questionable whether Frontinus is interested in the moral characters of the two 
here, and perhaps what comes out more is that the same strategy was used by two men of a 
similar disposition and therefore facultas, so the same stratagem could be used by someone 
else, in the future, who is also similar to the two, just as the preface advertised.256 To further 
emphasise the idea of the importance of the diversity but also of the unity of knowledge, there 
does not even have to be a specific general associated to a stratagem. In the same chapter, 
‘some cities in the Punic Wars’ are the protagonist, thus reinforcing the idea that the stratagem 
itself is part of a communal effort, knowledge and skill:   
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Bello Punico quaedam civitates, quae a Romanis deficere ad Poenos destinaverant, cum 
obsides dedissent, quos recipere, antequam desciscerent, studebant, simulaverunt 
seditionem inter finitimos ortam, quam Romanorum legati dirimere deberent, missosque 
eos velut contraria pignora retinuerunt nec ante reddiderunt, quam ipsi reciperarent suos. 
‘In the Punic War certain cities had resolved to revolt from the Romans to the 
Carthaginians, but wishing, before they revolted, to recover the hostages they had given, 
they pretended that an uprising had broken out among their neighbours which Roman 
commissioners ought to come and suppress. When the Romans sent these envoys, the 
cities detained them as counter-pledges, and refused to restore them until they themselves 
recovered their own hostages.’257  
The ratio of Roman to foreign figures is also not always tipped in favour of the Romans, as we 
saw above, but seems to fluctuate, with chapters which are pretty even (such as De evadendo 
de locis difficillimis/ ‘On escaping from difficult situations’ with thirteen Romans versus 
fourteen foreigners) and those where foreign commanders are clearly in the majority (such as 
De transducendo exercitu per loca hosti infesta/ ‘On leading an army through places infested by 
the enemy’ with three Romans versus fourteen foreigners).258 
Frontinus, does not even draw the line at the traditional enemies of Rome, as we see Hannibal 
appear twice against the Romans just in the chapter discussed above, and being successful 
against them on several occasions, as for instance in the following example where he utterly 
humiliates the Romans: 
Hannibal, ut inquitatem locorum et inopiam instante Fabio Maximo effugeret, noctu boves, 
quibus ad cornua fasciculos alligaverat sarmentorum, subiecto igne dimissit; cumque ipso 
motu adolescente flamma turbaretur pecus, magna discursatione montes, in quos actum 
erat, conlustravit. Romani, qui ad speculandum concurrerant, primo prodigium opinati sunt; 
dein cum certa Fabio renuntiassent, ille insidiarum metu suos castris continuity. Barbari 
obsistente nullo profecti sunt. 
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258 Front. Strat. 1.5 and 1.4. 
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‘Hannibal on one occasion was embarrassed by difficulties of terrain, by lack of supplies 
and by the circumstance that Fabius Maximus was heavy on his heels. Accordingly he tied 
bundles of lighted faggots to the horns of oxen, and turned the animals loose at night. 
When the flames spread, fanned by the motion, the panic-stricken oxen ran wildly hither 
and thither over the mountains to which they had been driven, illuminating the whole 
scene. The Romans, who had gathered to witness the sight, at first thought a prodigy had 
occurred. Then, when scouts reported the facts, Fabius, fearing an ambush kept his men in 
camp. Meanwhile the barbarians marched away, as no one prevented them.’259 
The Celts are also offered as an example worthy of following, as seen in the example of 
Viriathus.260 As König argues, Frontinus’ project and message are not triumphalist and do not 
champion Roman imperialism, and by mixing all type of figures he distorts both the 
chronological and ideological narratives to which the Romans were accustomed.261 
Furthermore, as König points out, in the preface Frontinus relinquishes control over who should 
be in his collection to the reader:262 
At multa et transire mihi ipse permisi. Quod me non sine causa fecisse scient, qui aliorum 
libros eadem promittentium legerint. Verum facile erit sub quaque specie suggerere. 
And so I have purposely allowed myself to skip many things. That I have not done this 
without reason, those will realise who read the books of others treating of the same 
subjects; but it will be easy for the reader to supply those examples under each category. 
This means that whomsoever his readers consider worthy can and should be added to the list of 
stratagem-makers, thus making the possibilities of diversity and inclusion limitless. 
The universality of the duces is quite striking when compared to someone who has been 
identified as a predecessor to Frontinus, namely Valerius Maximus.263 Valerius not only writes 
about the notabilia acknowledged by Frontinus but also has a chapter specifically on 
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263 For example A. König (2017) 159. 
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stratagems.264 Moreover, when we compare the prefaces of Frontinus and Valerius we can see 
there are striking similarities. Both put forth the same kind and apology for not being 
exhaustive because of the vast quantity of material in both Greek and Latin, express the desire 
to be selective, and boast about composing a manual for those for whom brevity is 
paramount.265 The difference is that while both discuss examples of famous men, Valerius 
divides his example between the deeds of Romans and external people (Urbis Romae 
externarumque gentium facta), whilst as we have seen already Frontinus discusses them all 
together. Surely Valerius is more interested in moral qualities, whilst Frontinus perhaps 
somewhat neglects the moral dimension, but this is not what is most important, rather the 
different approach in the division of the subject matter is what counts here.266 In fact Frontinus 
is quite unique when it comes to military writers themselves in his mixture of examples of 
different ethnic origin, with authors usually either deciding for a particular origin of their 
examples or otherwise imposing a clear division. Arrian, for example, discusses the practices of 
Greeks and Macedonians in the first thirty-two chapters whilst he allocates the last twelve 
chapters to the Romans, while Aelian manifests his preference for Alexander the Great and 
Vegetius, as we have seen prefers the deeds of the Romans. This comparison gives further 
credence to the idea that Frontinus’ division is intended to emphasise that military knowledge 
is universal, and it is only the specific topics that matter and not the people accomplishing the 
deeds. 
2.2. Presenting one’s authority: Frontinus, ‘reinvention’, different voices and 
‘real’ authority 
When it comes to how Frontinus articulates his own project contained in both the 
Strategemata and his more theoretical treatise, the preface to book one of the former states: 
Cum ad instruendam rei militaris scientiam unus ex numero studiosorum eius acceserim 
eique destinato, quantum cura nostra valuit, satisfecisse visus sim […] 
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‘Since I alone interested in military science have undertaken to reduce its rules to system, 
and since I seem to have fulfilled that purpose, so far as pains on my part could accomplish 
it […]’267 
Therefore he presents himself as the first to systematise military science (lit. instruo = to draw 
up, to organise), and therefore as a (re-)inventor (of sorts) of the discipline – quite strangely so, 
given Cato’s and Celsus’ previous texts, if we consider the Roman side alone.268 However, his 
position as (re-)inventor is a carefully crafted authorial strategy, as he was well aware of the 
existence of other ‘military manuals’, both Greek and Roman.269 
Alice König has treated the subject of Frontinus’ authority in great detail very recently, and this 
section intends to build on some of her points, but also to discuss the matter more 
contextually, relating Frontinus’ self-presentation as an author to that of Onasander and 
foreshadowing that of Polyaenus and Arrian.270 König makes the point – both in her PhD thesis 
and in her most recent article – that ‘each exemplum in the Strategemata begins with the name 
of the commander whose stratagem is being recorded, reinforcing the sense that it is they who 
are the authorities here, in both a military and didactic sense’. In opposition to this Frontinus 
‘almost never interjects to offer any commentary of his own’ and for all intents and purposes 
remains in the background; in König’s words ‘he departs the arena and leaves it to the 
generals’.271 But this seems to contrast with his assertive way of presenting the stratagems, 
whereby he takes a Greek concept and ‘reinvents’ it from a Roman perspective.272 König’s 
phrasing that ‘he is not merely adopting a Greek model, but besieging and taking it over’ is very 
appropriate.273 So how can the two authorial strategies of Frontinus – as conduit to the 
stratagems of others and as reinventor – be reconciled?  
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I believe the answer lies in Frontinus’ ‘real’ – for lack of a better word – authority, which has 
been pointed out ever since the text has been studied. As we have seen earlier, Frontinus was a 
very accomplished general and most likely helped Trajan in the matter of his succession. König 
emphasises his practical military skill in her analysis of Aelian’s reference to Frontinus, namely 
that it is Frontinus’ actual experience which makes Aelian point to him as an authority.274  
 It is precisely this practical authority which allows Frontinus to position himself as one who can 
‘make order’ in the self-same long tradition of Greek writings that Aelian discusses, because he 
is not only himself an accomplished author – as Vegetius points out much later – and general, 
but a general in the new world of warfare represented by the Romans. Aelian himself refers to 
the old knowledge of the Greeks as compared to the new knowledge invented by the Romans 
and the implication is surely that Frontinus is an exponent of this new knowledge and practice: 
Τῆς δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις περὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο δυνάμεως καὶ ἐμπειρίας οὐκ ἔχων γνῶσιν—δεῖ 
γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν τἀληθῆ—ὄκνῳ κατειχόμην περὶ τὸ συγγράφειν καὶ παραδιδόναι τὸ μάθημα 
τοῦτο, ὡς ἀπημαυρωμένον καὶ τάχα μηδὲν ἔτι χρήσιμον τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐφευρεθεῖσαν 
ὑφ’ ὑμῶν διδασκαλίαν. 
‘But in view of my own ignorance – the truth of which must be admitted – of that form of 
theory and practice current among the Romans, I was prevented by diffidence from 
handing down this knowledge, forgotten and moreover long out of use since the discovery 
of the other system (didaskalia) by your people.’275 
Therefore his expertise is not only practical, but also very relevant and ‘cutting edge’.276 Much 
like Onasander, Frontinus too in virtue of this martial prowess is best fitted to bring the Roman 
disciplina and organisation which we have seen characterised Roman military manuals to 
beacon a Greek topic that he presents as quite scattered and disorganised. He notes that the 
deeds of generals are recorded in ‘some fashion’ (aliquo modo) which not always has 
‘consideration for busy men’ (Sed, ut opinor, occupatis velocitate consuli debet) and that it is 
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tedious ‘to hunt out separate examples scattered over the vast body of history’ (Longum est 
enim, singula et sparsa per immensum corpus historiarum persequi).277 He then uses this 
Roman framework of systematisation and discipline – and there is no coincidence that, as we 
shall see below he dedicates so many chapters to disciplina – to incorporate and explain a 
Greek concept. This is the exact opposite of what Onasander does, who de facto uses a Greek 
framework to organise the ‘Roman experience’ he referred to in his preface and to universalise 
military theory. Perhaps Frontinus was indeed not ignorant of Onasander’s text given the 
debate between using pre-planned tricks versus thinking on the spot, where Frontinus seems to 
challenge Onasander’s more theoretical approach.  
Frontinus’ ‘real’ authority also explains his presentation, his attitude towards the generals in his 
exempla and towards the reader. Frontinus is keen to relinquish his authority and not only 
allow the generals to speak for themselves but allow the reader to provide examples in each 
category because he is confident in his own practical experience and military prowess. His 
‘modesty’ is therefore only apparent and an exercise in self-deprecation that is meant to 
bolster his actual textual authority. He takes a step back and allows the reader to judge the 
examples for himself only because he is confident that he is the best general of the lot, who is 
in possession of all of the experience of these past generals and also of the most recent kind of 
experience. He is able to allow the generals to speak because he is the one who organises the 
categories in which they speak, therefore marshalling and organising all of their experience just 
as a general would use disciplina on the field to organise his real troops. He only allows the 
readers to add examples to the existing categories (verum facile erit sub quaque specie 
suggerere/’it will be easy for the reader to supply examples in each category) but not to invent 
further categories because they simply do not have the practical experience to judge which 
categories would be useful, as he has systematically done (circumspectis enim generibus, 
praeparavi oportuna exemplorum veluti consilia/ ‘for having examined the categories, I have in 
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advance mapped out my campaign, so to speak, for the presentation of illustrative 
examples).278  
We will see Frontinus’ strategy of incorporating Greek strategemata in a Roman framework 
reversed in Arrian’s Ektaxis. Arrian, just like Onasander, again uses a Greek military structure – 
in this case the phalanx – to show how Roman knowledge about war can be organised and 
disciplined in very much the same way as Frontinus does for the strategemata. We shall also 
examine next how Polyaenus too reacts to Frontinus’ kind of authority by constructing his own 
experienced persona and in his case bringing the weight of his generals to give force to his 
creation. But more importantly, we shall see how the construction of authority is linked across 
military genres and employs similar tools, regardless of the precise aims and combination. 
3. Separation by exempla: Polyaenus’ Strategika 
We will again examine in the first section how stratagem is used by Polyaenus to create a 
divisive approach to knowledge with a focus on the ethnic origin of commanders. Then we will 
move on to how this presentation of the exempla shapes his own authority, and how he 
constructs an ‘experienced’ persona but also draws upon the expertise of the generals and of 
Homer to make up for his own lack of ‘real’ experience.  
3.1. Presenting the material: uniformity in stratagem. 
As many scholars have pointed out, the majority of figures discussed in Polyaenus’ Strategika 
are Greek and Macedonian with only a small number of Romans, and they are confined to a 
part of book eight.279 Polyaenus never emphasises explicitly the ethnicity of a particular 
general. He never refers to, for example, ‘The Greek general Iphicrates’, though he does so for 
groups of people – including the ‘Romans’.280 However, we should not take this to mean that 
the Romans are differentiated in a positive way, since the Roman chapter only has three 
subchapters and there are many other chapters in book six named after Greek peoples 
(Aetolians, Chalcedonians, Lampsacenes, Argives, Ambracians, Samians). Some individually 
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have the same number of subchapters as the Romans do such as ‘The Lacedaemonians’, ‘the 
Messenians’ and ‘the Plataeans’, so Rome is effectively equated to a single Greek polis. What is 
more important, however, is that the treatise is organised by individual general not theme, as 
Frontinus did. For example, we have a chapter which is all about Iphicrates and his various 
stratagems, the focus being on the person and expertise of Iphicrates.281  
Also like Frontinus, Polyaenus begins each subchapter, that is each discussion of a stratagem, 
with the name of the commander but this time around this presentation serves to further 
emphasise the figure performing the stratagem. This is done by means of the uniformity the 
repetition of the name produces in conjunction with the chapter heading, which is opposed to 
the way in which each theme in Frontinus was illustrated with the examples of several generals 
and the variety of their names showed their diversity.  This is best illustrated by an example; 
the chapter about Iphicrates is only about him, and we have his name towering over smaller 
versions of the same name which begin the subchapters: 
3.9 ΙΦΙΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 
(1)   Ἰφικράτης ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους προῆγε τὴν φάΛαγγα […] 
(2)   Ἰφικράτης τοὺς πολεμίους ἐς φυγὴν τρεψάμενος εἵπετο σχέδην ἄγων τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ 
παραγγέλλων […] 
(3)   Ἰφικράτης νύκτωρ κατελάβετο πολεμίαν πόλιν […] 
(4)   Ἰφικράτης ἐν Θράκῃ ἐνέβαλλεν.[…] 
3.9 Iphicrates 
(1) Iphicrates was leading the phalanx against the enemy […] 
(2) Iphicrates, after routing the enemy, used to follow by leading his phalanx thoughtfully 
and give these orders […] 
(3) Iphicrates one night captured a hostile city […] 
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(4) Iphicrates invaded Thrace. […] 
This is of course true for all commanders, even Roman ones, but because the ratio is so 
favorable to the Greeks, it only works to build them and their practices up. Even comparisons 
between famous Roman and Greek commanders leaves the former at a disadvantage, as we 
see Scipio’s name mentioned eight times in a row in his chapter, while Iphicrates’ is mentioned 
fifty-four times.282  Also, if we believe that the books were published separately, the impact of 
the prosopographic presentation would have been even greater, as readers would have been 
overwhelmed by an avalanche of Greek names.  
Polyaenus not only has this disparity in the text, but also claims to be exhaustive in his study, 
boasting to the emperors that he has gathered in the book ‘as many stratagems of past 
commanders as came into being’ (ἀλλὰ τῆς στρατηγικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐφόδια ταυτὶ προσφέρω, 
ὅσα τῶν πάλαι γέγονε στρατηγήματα), as opposed to Frontinus who excuses himself for his 
omissions (Huic labori non iniuste veniam paciscar, ne me pro incurioso reprehendat, qui 
praeteritum aliquod a nobis reppererit exemplum).283 This means that the disparity is presented 
as not only a result of Polyaenus’ choice – as he is a great authority on the matter – but also 
reflecting historical reality. Therefore, through this focus on himself as a Macedonian writing 
about warfare and then on his figures, Polyaenus’ message is clear – Greek and Macedonian 
military knowledge must be taken separately from that of the Romans and is ultimately 
superior.  
Just like Frontinus, Polyaenus too has examples of identical stratagems, such as the one 
performed by both Phormio and Iphicrates.284 It involved seizing a bit of land from the enemy 
(the Chalcidians and the Samians, respectively), then pretending to be called back home and 
anchoring somewhere nearby. This would lead the enemy to believe they were in no danger 
and allow the general (Phormio and Iphicrates, respectively) to attack and plunder the 
unexpecting countryside. But, again, due to the focus on Greek figures, most of these 
repetitions simply show that, if there is something of a facultas along Frontinus’ lines, it is 
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shared between Greek generals, or if we are dealing with a certain type of knowledge, it too 
has mostly been passed on among the Greeks. There is a hint that the author wishes to 
emphasise this in his explicit mention in the chapter on Iphicrates that Phormio had performed 
the same stratagem before (τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Φορμίων πρότερος ἐποίησε Χαλκιδεῦσιν/’Phormio did 
the same thing earlier to the Chalcidians’).285  There are also examples of Roman stratagems 
that are identical to others, such as Tarquinius flogging his son and sending him as a deserter to 
the Gabinians which is similar to the mutilation of Siraces.286 However, I believe this is 
connected to the idea of the Roman propensity to imitate, appropriate and perfect the 
practices, skills and artefacts of other cultures, which is explored by many authors such as 
Polybius, Diodorus Siculus and Arrian as well.287 Polyaenus brings this up when discussing how 
Numa convinces the Romans to turn from war to peace by means of rhetoric, commenting: 
δοκεῖν δὲ ἐμοὶ ζηλωτὴς ἐγένετο Μίνω καὶ Λυκούργου· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τοὺς νόμους, ὁ μὲν 
παρὰ Διὸς, ὁ δὲ παρὰ Ἀπόλλωνος μαθόντες ἢ μαθεῖν φάσκοντες ἔπεισαν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, 
ὁ μὲν Κρῆτας, ὁ δὲ Λάκωνας. 
‘In my opinion he became an imitator of Minos and Lycurgus, and in fact the former 
persuaded the Cretans and the latter the Laconians to observe laws, after learning or 
alleging to learn them – the one from Zeus, the other from Apollo’288.  
Normally such praise is positive though it can also be read as negative, and it seems that 
Polyaenus’ tone here is not particularly appreciative of the Romans. So we might think that 
while ‘imitating’ Greeks in stratagems might be a good thing, it can never be more than 
imitation, and the practices of the Greeks will always be superior (again, if not according to 
anything else, then by dint of their superior numbers in Polyaenus’ pages). With all this in mind, 
I believe Polyaenus is at the other end of the spectrum from Frontinus and Onasander, showing 
how Greek and Roman military knowledge are separate and disassociated from each other. 
3.2 Presenting one’s authority: Macedonian Polyaenus and channeling authority 
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Polyaenus’ strategy of constructing authority is radically different from that of Frontinus. From 
the very beginning of his preface we can see how the emphasis is placed quite differently. The 
context of the work is Marcus Aurelius’ and Lucius Verus’ Persian war, and Polyaenus points out 
clearly that he is a Macedonian, accustomed to fight Persians: 
ἐγὼ δὲ Μακεδὼν ἀνὴρ, πάτριον ἔχων τὸ κρατεῖν Περσῶν πολεμούντων δύνασθαι, οὐκ 
ἀσύμβολος ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ γενέσθαι βούλομαι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἤκμαζέ μοι τὸ σῶμα 
καὶ στρατιώτης πρόθυμος ἂν ἐγενόμην Μακεδονικῇ ῥώμῃ χρώμενος. 
‘I, a Macedonian man, who has inherited the ability to conquer the Persians in war, want to 
do my part at the present critical time. If my body were in its prime, I would be an 
enthusiastic soldier using Macedonian strength.’289 
So immediately there is a shift from the deeds of commanders that we saw in Frontinus, to the 
person of the author, which he himself emphasises. Polyaenus then goes on to say that since 
fighting personally is not possible, he will provide the emperors with the knowledge of past 
generals. By setting this up the way he does, it is clear that he means the authority of his text to 
come from his own person, from the fact that he is part of a tradition (which is not Roman) that 
makes him good at warfare. So his presentation diverges from that of Frontinus, who chooses 
to emphasise his ‘literary persona’, asserting – in König’s words – the ‘literary and scholarly 
foundations of his own expertise’, while Polyaenus chooses to assert his potentially very 
practical means of contribuiting to the coming war.290 He is Macedonian and could actually 
physically fight, were he not too old. But surely the image that Polyaenus is trying to project is 
due to a lack of ‘real’ authority – he is not a general but a lawyer (as he himself states) and as 
far as we know had no real experience of war, so what he is in fact trying to do is 
overcompensate by showing how his Macedonian blood is just as valuable as real experience 
because it carries within it the legacy of past commanders. The position of Polyaenus is then a 
reversal from Frontinus’, and while the latter let the figures speak for themselves, the former 
has to choose the figures that fit into this legacy and ‘make’ them speak for him. The authority 
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that flows from Polyaenus will then be only as good as the authority ‘his’ generals bring, 
whereas that of Frontinus supercedes all because of his recent expertise and his implicit 
position as ‘best general’. The fact that Polyaenus selects which commanders are worthy of 
being included in his book and especially the proportion of Roman and foreign commanders, 
greatly contrasts with the freedom of choice that Frontinus wants his readers to have and 
demonstrates his insecure postion as a ‘military authority’. Closely related to that is Polyaenus’ 
statement that his work is exhaustive, discussing ‘all the stratagems of earlier generals’ (ὅσα 
τῶν πάλαι γέγονε στρατηγήματα, lit. ‘as many stratagems of previous [generals] as came into 
being’).291 Unlike Frontinus, he cannot afford to allow his readers to contribute because they 
might bring examples that throw off the balance of Greek and Macedonian figures therefore 
unbalancing his own legacy and authority.  
We see this insistence on the fact that stratagem is Greek and has been practised by Greeks 
since mythical times in order to both bolster his own authority but also to counter Frontinus’ 
claim on and appropriation of stratagem. Polyaenus makes, in bringing Homer, another key 
move in this respect, to prove the point and to channel his authority. So he adds this cultural 
cornerstone to his roster, a Greek figure par excellence. He starts his treatise with Homer, and 
continues to quote him at length in the preface, showing how both he and the poet have the 
same opinion about stratagem: 
ἄριστον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ παρατάξει μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἂν ἡ γνώμη τὸ κρατεῖν 
ἐπισπῷτο προλαβοῦσα τὸ τέλος τῆς μάχης  
‘It is best even during a set battle to contrive, so that intelligence, having anticipated the 
outcome of battle, may induce victory’292 
He then immediately points out: 
δοκεῖ δ’ ἔμοιγε ταῦτα συμβουλεύειν καὶ Ὅμηρος· ὅταν γὰρ πολλάκις ᾄδῃ 
    .... ἢ δόλῳ ἠὲ βίῃφι 
                                                          
291 Polyaen. Pr. 2. 
292 Polyaen. Pr. 3-4. Trans. Wheeler & Krentz. 
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ἄλλως οὐ παραγγέλλει ἢ τέχναις καὶ στρατηγήμασι χρήσασθαι κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων· 
 ‘Homer also seems to me to make this recommendation, for when he says frequently 
“…by trickery or force” 
he encourages nothing other than the use of art and stratagem against the enemy’293 
So, by agreeing with Homer, Polyaenus assumes the mantle of his authority, causing both 
himself and his knowledge to become more worthy to be listened to, but he then also uses 
Homer to begin channelling the authority of Greek figures and generals. He shows the reader 
how the first man to use deception and trickery was a Greek, Sysyphus, and then continues to 
give Greek examples – also from Homer – which parade all the Greeks who continued this 
practice: Hermes, Proteus and of course he culminates with Odysseus who takes up the 
greatest part of the preface.294 It is difficult not to read this against Frontinus’ earlier text and 
think that these figures are just the first in a line of many who contribute to Polyaenus’ 
authority, their number and Greekness building up his aforementioned ‘strength’.  
Not only does Polyaenus ‘borrow’ his authority from Greek figures and from Homer, he also 
borrows it from the emperors to make it unquestionable. In the preface to his fifth book 
Polyaenus states:295  
οὐχ οὕτως ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἡγούμενος ἐπὶ τῷ συγγράφειν, ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τῷ 
σπουδάζειν ἀναγιγνώσκειν τοσαῦτα συγγράμματα τοσαύτης ἀρχῆς προεστηκότας 
‘I think that I do not deserve so much praise for the writing as you do for the diligent 
reading of such large works, rulers as you are of such a large empire’ 
The fact that the emperors are reading his book is clearly a confirmation of his value and of that 
of Greek learning, and the mention of them as rulers of a large empire is also meant to bring 
the same kind of ‘hands-on’ military experience to the treatise. No one could challenge that – at 
                                                          
293 Polyaen. 1. Pr. 4. 
294 Polyaen. 1. pr. 5-13. Also Wheeler&Krentz (1994) xii for the inclusion of Odysseus to appeal to the emperors’ 
Stoicism. 
295 Polyaen. 5. Pr. 3-5 with Wheeler (2010) 11.  
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least in theory – emperors were the supreme commanders and had the best grasp of military 
matters. In fact, this is emphasised by Polyaenus in the preface to book three: 
ὑμεῖς δὲ τὴν αὐτοκράτορα ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες καὶ τῶν ὅλων προεστηκότες ἀεὶ μετὰ 
στρατηγικῆς ἐπιστήμης βουλεύεσθε τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις· 
‘You, who have autocratic power and govern the whole world, always consider with a 
general’s knowledge what is advantageous for your subjects.’296  
It is clear then that the emperors are the ultimate generals because they rule the world and are 
always in a general’s mindset.  
4. A mixed approach to military knowledge: Arrian and Aelian’s Taktika 
We will again begin by discussing issues of presentation of the material, but because of the 
nature of the texts it will also be more fitting to make some comments on authority in these 
sections. Following the previous plan however, there will be shorter sections at the end of the 
discussion of the presentation where I will make more targeted comments about the way in 
which Aelian and Arrian construct their authority. 
I shall argue that the approach which Aelian and Arrian take is one that could be read in two 
ways but is ultimately unitary, in both suggesting the precedence and superiority of Greek 
military knowledge when compared to the Roman, but at the same time showing how the 
Roman incorporates the Greek and that in fact they are essentially part of the same 
superstructure, and equally useful. If we consider that their audience would have been not only 
the emperor – to whom Aelian (and most likely Arrian) dedicates his treatise – but the elites as 
well, who comprised both Romans and Greeks participating in the military sphere together, it 
would have made sense from the point of view of the authors to point out where the ‘art of 
marshalling troops’ came from and thus appeal to the Greek side of the audience, but also 
construct an image of continuity between Greece and Rome, and thus appeal to everyone. 
                                                          
296 Polyaen. 3 pr. 
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4.1.1. Presenting the material: Aelian – Homeric precedence, integration and 
‘empires of knowledge’. 
Much like Onasander, Polyaenus and Frontinus, Aelian too gives a reason for the composition 
of his work, and this reason is mainly Frontinus’ encouragement: 
Τῆς δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις περὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο δυνάμεως καὶ ἐμπειρίας οὐκ ἔχων γνῶσιν—δεῖ 
γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν τἀληθῆ—ὄκνῳ κατειχόμην περὶ τὸ συγγράφειν καὶ παραδιδόναι τὸ μάθημα 
τοῦτο, ὡς ἀπημαυρωμένον καὶ τάχα μηδὲν ἔτι χρήσιμον τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐφευρεθεῖσαν 
ὑφ’ ὑμῶν διδασκαλίαν. 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ πατρός σου Νέρουας παρὰ Φροτίνῳ τῷ ἐπισήμῳ ὑπατικῷ ἐν 
Φορμίαις ἡμέρας τινὰς διέτριψα δόξαν ἀπενεγκαμένῳ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις 
ἐμπειρίαν, συμβαλών τ’ἀνδρὶ εὗρον οὐκ ἐλάττονα σπουδὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς 
Ἕλλησι τεθεωρημένην μάθησιν, ἠρξάμην οὐκέτι περιφρονεῖν τῆς τῶν τακτικῶν 
συγγραφῆς, οὐκ ἂν ἐσπουδάσθαι παρὰ Φροντίνῳ δοκῶν αὐτήν, εἴπερ τι χεῖρον ἐδόκει τῆς 
Ῥωμαϊκῆς διατάξεως περιέχειν. 
‘But in view of my own ignorance – the truth of which must be admitted – of that form of 
theory and practice current among the Romans, I was prevented by diffidence from 
handing down this knowledge, forgotten and moreover long out of use since the discovery 
of the other lesson (didaskalia) by your people.  
After coming to pay my respects to your deified father Nerva, I was able to spend some 
days at Formiae with the distinguished consular Frontinus, a man of great reputation by 
virtue of his experience in war. Discovering in conversation with him that he had no lesser 
regard for Greek theorised knowledge, I began not to despise their tactical writing, thinking 
that it would not be treated with respect by Frontinus if he indeed considered it to be 
worse in any way than Roman tactical disposition’297 
                                                          
297 Ael. Tact. Pr. 2-3, trans. Devine, altered. 
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At first sight it would seem Aelian is somewhat disparaging of Greek military knowledge in 
favour  of the Roman, but the passage is better understood by reminding ourselves of 
Frontinus’ own claims of (re-)invention. It is clear then that, even before setting out to write his 
own work, Aelian had to deal with these claims, compare himself to his Roman friend and 
justify his reason for writing. This explains the line taken, as Aelian goes about legitimising the 
continued usefulness of Greek military science – and his manual – in two ways.  
The first, which we have already seen, was by saying that Frontinus himself – a Roman authority 
on the matter (albeit a self-proclaimed one) – still considered Greek knowledge relevant and 
useful.  Aelian calls the Greek tradition a μάθημα that is ἀπημαυρωμένον, ‘obscured’, ‘faded’ 
and ‘no longer useful in life since the invention of another’ by the Romans (μηδὲν ἔτι χρήσιμον 
τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐφευρεθεῖσαν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν διδασκαλίαν) and only by conversing with Frontinus 
did he gain confidence to write about it and a justification of its relevance.  The ‘invention’ or 
‘introduction’ (however one might want to take ἐφευρεθεῖσαν) of another didaskalia is thus 
the acknowledgement of Frontinus’ own statement of (re)invention. However, upon a closer 
look at Aelian’s statements we can see that he is in fact sidestepping – if not denying 
completely – the issue. Frontinus did not organise the scientia rei militaris altogether as he 
claims, but the Romans came up with their own version of it, with their own set of practices 
different from the ones of the Greeks. So, on the one hand, Aelian is accommodating Roman 
needs of supremacy in terms of military knowledge, but on the other – despite couching it in 
the guise of modesty – he explicitly differentiates between Greek theoria and Roman 
didaskalia, allowing for an interpretation that Frontinus was the one to organise the latter, but 
not the former, nor scientia rei militaris/taktike theoria as a whole. 
This brings us to the second way in which Aelian justifies writing about Greek military practices, 
namely by discussing the true – Greek – origins of the taktike theoria/scientia rei militaris. In 
the very first lines of the preface, in the dedication to the emperor, when looking for the 
beginnings of the taktike theoria he goes beyond the Romans, immediately bypassing any 
claims they and Frontinus might have had. By using a strategy similar to that of Polyaenus, he 
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shows the readers that Greek knowledge on the matter not only precedes the Roman one, but 
can be traced back to the age of Homer: 
Τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ὁμήρου χρόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαν,  
‘Tactical theory among the Greeks goes back as far as the time of Homer’298 
The use of the word theoria – unusual, since techne is preferred by the other military authors – 
is clearly as a counterpart to scientia used in Frontinus’ own preface, thereby meaning that 
what is being put forward in his treatise is on the same level as Frontinus’ teachings. It is also 
significant here that Aelian does not phrase the issue in terms of Greek theoria as opposed to 
Roman scientia. He does not make reference to Ἑλληνικη τακτικὴ θεωρία, but talks about παρὰ 
τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν, so about a unified theoria that first originated with the Greeks, 
while at the same time, as we have seen above, naming the Roman discipline didaskalia. This 
does indeed suggest that Roman practices are more recent, and current, but one cannot ignore 
that in fact the word theoria suggests something that is more carefully considered and 
planned.299 
Not only does the preface start with Homer, but the first chapter of the treatise as well, and 
Aelian takes one further step than Polyaenus in making him the ‘father’ of his discipline. He 
explicitly singles him out as the first to have discovered (ἐπεγνωκέναι) the taktike theoria, a 
statement which would have been in stark contrast to Frontinus’ ad instruendam rei militaris 
scientiam unus ex numero studiosorum eius […]satisfecisse visus sim: 
Πρῶτος μὲν ὧν ἴσμεν δοκεῖ τὴν τακτικὴν θεωρίαν Ὅμηρος ἐπεγνωκέναι θαυμάζειν τε 
τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας αὐτῆς,  
                                                          
298 Ael., Tact. Pr. 1. 
299 While there is significance in the terms used, one cannot push the point too far as several different terms might 
simply be used to avoid repetition. For the concept of theoria see Volpi (2006), for techne/ars see Görgemanns 
(2006), for didaskalia Zimmermann (2006). 
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‘Homer seems to be the first, at least that we know of, who discovered tactical theory and 
admired men imbued with such knowledge’300  
Also, if any credence is to be given to Devine’s contention that the 113 chapter headings in the 
Codex Laurentianus graecus 55.4 were indeed the ones that Aelian refers to in the preface as 
being set up for easy browsing, it is significant that the first lines a reader would have seen – 
before the preface and Aelian’s justifications – were Ὅτι Ὅμηρος πρῶτος περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς 
πολέμοις τακτικῆς θεωρίας ἔγραψεν, ‘That Homer was the first to write about tactical theory in 
war’.301 That there is no mention of a division between Greek or Roman theoria here reinforces 
the idea that the Greek theoria which Homer wrote about is the ‘original’ theoria. 
In an almost perfect symmetry, the manual also ends with Homer, in a chapter about silence, 
which contrasts the noisy advance of the Trojans to the silent one of the Greeks: 
διὸ δεῖ πρὸ πάντων παραγγέλλειν σιωπὴν κελεύσαντα προσέχειν τῷ παραγγελλομένῳ, 
ὅπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἐσημειώσατο· 
‘But above all silence is to be commanded so that attention can be paid to the orders. As 
Homer observed in the strongest words […]’302 
These references to Homer are particularly remarkable because Asclepiodotus – the text 
indicated as one of the two most likely direct sources for Aelian’s manual – does not contain 
anything similar, though it is of course possible that Poseidonius’ Taktika (if it indeed was 
different from Asclepiodotus’ own) did.303  
Aelian is not alone in going back to Homer as the father of his discipline. The same move was 
made by the geographer Strabo in his own preface, following a long tradition which included his 
predecessors: 
                                                          
300 Ael., Tact. 1.1. 
301 Ael. Tact. Pr. 7 and Dain (1946) 53-54; Devine (1989) 34. 
302 Ael. Tact. 41. 
303Cf. Stadter (1978) 122 who thinks that authors of military texts possibly quoted Homer in general, despite the 
lack of any evidence apart from Arrian and Aelian.  
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καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι ὀρθῶς ὑπειλήφαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Ἵππαρχος, 
ἀρχηγέτην εἶναι τῆς γεωγραφικῆς ἐμπειρίας Ὅμηρον, ὃς οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν 
ἀρετῇ πάντας ὑπερβέβληται τοὺς πάλαι καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὸν 
βίον ἐμπειρίᾳ τὸν πολιτικόν 
‘And first, I say that both I and my predecessors, one of whom was Hipparchus himself, are 
right in regarding Homer as the founder of the practice of geography; for Homer has 
surpassed all men, both of ancient and modern times, not only in the excellence of his 
poetry, but also, I might say, in his acquaintance with all that pertains to public life.304 
Strabo elaborates on Homer’s versatility in book one, demonstrating how his poetry was a kind 
of elementary philosophy, and portrays him as the possessor ‘of vast learning’, which includes 
geography, generalship, agriculture and rhetoric.305 So by claiming Homer as the protos 
heuretes of the taktike theoria, a figure thought to be an ancient authority in so many 
disciplines, Aelian not only shows how much older the Greek taktike theoria is than the Roman 
and dwarfs any claims of originality or reinvention – such as we might read in Frontinus – but 
questions Roman claims of superiority in that field, such as expressed by Vergil and Livy (and of 
course much later by Vegetius).306 He pushes this argument further by highlighting that the first 
names on his list of other authors who had written about tactical theory – and Frontinus 
himself was among them – were all still indebted to Homer and made reference to what he 
described (τῆς καθ’ Ὅμηρον τακτικῆς),:  
καὶ περὶ τῆς καθ’ Ὅμηρον τακτικῆς ἐνετύχομεν συγγραφεῦσι Στρατοκλεῖ καὶ Ἑρμείᾳ καὶ 
Φρόντωνι τῷ καθ’ἡμᾶς ἀνδρὶ ὑπατικῷ.  
‘And concerning the subject of tactics in Homer, we have the writings of Stratocles, 
Hermeias and of Frontinus, the consular of our own time.’307 
                                                          
304 Str. 1.1.2. all translations by H.L. Jones, here slightly altered. 
305 Str. 1.2.3; for Homer’s importance to the Stoics in particular see Dueck (2000) 62 and 62-69 for Strabo as a 
Stoic.   
306 Liv. 9.19, will be discussed below. 
307 Ael. Tact. 1.2. Arrian too chooses to end his Greek section of the Taktika with (almost) the same Homer 
quotations in Aelian’s manual. While Stadter (1978) 122 argues that this is because both Arrian and Aelian used 
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If its precedence, going back to Homer, was not enough to show that Greek military knowledge 
was perhaps superior to that of the Romans, Aelian has Frontinus as the only Roman name, lost 
in an avalanche of Greeks.308 We can also see from the language used that many of these 
earlier authors had already done what Frontinus boasted to have done, a long time before him: 
καὶ περὶ τῆς καθ’ Ὅμηρον τακτικῆς ἐνετύχομεν συγγραφεῦσι Στρατοκλεῖ καὶ Ἑρ-μείᾳ καὶ 
Φρόντωνι τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἀνδρὶ ὑπατικῷ. ἐξειργάσαντο δὲ τὴν θεωρίαν Αἰνείας τε διὰ 
πλειόνων ὁ καὶ στρατηγικὰ βιβλία ἱκανὰ συνταξάμενος, ὧν ἐπιτομὴν ὁ Θετταλὸς Κινέας 
ἐποίησε, Πύρρος τε ὁ Ἠπειρώτης τακτικὰ συνέταξε καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ τούτου υἱὸς καὶ 
Κλέαρχος· ἔτι δὲ Παυσανίας Εὐάγγελός τε καὶ Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἀνὴρ 
πολυμαθὴς Σκιπίωνι συγγενόμενος, Εὐπόλεμός τε καὶ Ἰφικράτης· ὁ δὲ στωικὸς 
Ποσειδώνιος καὶ τέχνην τακτικὴν ἔγραψεν 
 ‘And concerning the subject of tactics in Homer, we have the writings of Stratocles, 
Hermeias and of Frontinus, the consular of our own time. And the following perfected 
military theory at length, Aeneas publishing many volumes on warfare that were abridged 
by Cyneas the Thessalian; likewise Pyrrhus the Epirote set forth the art of war in writing, as 
did his son Alexander, as well as Clearchus, Pausanias, Evangelus, Polybius the 
Megalopolitan (a man of great learning and a companion of Scipio), Eupolemus, Iphicrates, 
and Poseidonius the Stoic philosopher.’309 
The sense of ἐξεργάζομαι, ‘to treat fully, at length’ is particularly strong and shows that indeed 
there had been other – Greek! – writers that could be said to have ‘ordered’ the taktike theoria 
and quite successfully, as we see in Aeneas’ publication of many volumes and their digest by 
Cyneas.310  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the same source, we cannot believe Arrian’s composition process came down to mindless copying of the source 
material.  Devine (1993) 320-321 points out the many differences between the two, despite their drawing upon 
the same text(s), so I believe a case could be made for it being a conscious choice on the part of Arrian, which may 
reflect his desire to create a unified approach and make the case for a body of unified Greek knowledge.    
308 Arrian’s preface does not even include any Roman names, but since the beginning of it is now lost us, it is 
impossible to tell if he mentioned any.  
309 Ael.Tact. 1.2. 
310 Also König (2017) 156. 
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But as I hinted before, I do not believe Aelian emphasises Homer and the Greekness of the 
taktike theoria only within a comparative, competitive frame, and a parallel with the preface of 
Celsus’ De medicina will prove useful. Celsus, although Roman, is not afraid to show the origins 
of medicine as Greek, or to indicate that all peoples possess medical skills in some form or 
another:  
Haec nusquam quidem non est siquidem etiam inperitissimae gentes herbas aliaque promta 
in auxilium vulnerum morborumque noverunt. Verum tamen apud Graecos aliquanto magis 
quam in ceteris nationibus exculta est, ac ne apud hos quidem a prima origine, sed paucis 
ante nos saeculis. 
‘Nowhere is this art wanting, for the most uncivilised nations have had knowledge of herbs, 
and other things to hand for the aiding of wounds and diseases. This art, however, has 
been cultivated among the Greeks much more than in other nations — not, however, even 
among them from their first beginnings, but only for a few generations before us.’311 
Surely, here the precedence is important – as Celsus admits that the Greeks beat the Romans to 
medicine merely by a few generations – but the more interesting way of reading this passage is 
as a succession of ‘empires’ of knowledge, with the same medical knowledge being shared 
between Greeks and Romans, and the ‘empire’ of the former giving way to that of the latter.312 
This does not mean that the medicine practised by the Greeks is less important – as we can see 
from the long discussion which ensues – but that the Greeks have passed the torch, and that 
their knowledge is now contained in that of the Romans. If we consider Aelian’s preface again, 
we see that we might interpret his argument in a similar way. The reference back to Homer and 
emphasis on him and on the many Greek authors writing about tactical theory was then 
necessary in order to establish their precedence in a field which the Romans thought they 
dominated, but then the reference to Frontinus and the ‘new theory’ invented by the Romans 
could also be taken to show the self-same succession of the two empires. Therefore, just as the 
Greeks were physically incorporated into the Roman Empire, so too was the Greek techne 
                                                          
311 Celsus, De Medicina, 1. pr; trans. W.G. Spencer. 
312 See Flemming forthcoming.  
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taktike incorporated in the Roman empire of knowledge by Frontinus, with his acceptance of it 
as ‘not inferior to that of the Romans’ (τι χεῖρον ἐδόκει τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς διατάξεως περιέχειν.). 
Consequently, even if we can read Aelian as emphasising Greek theory as older and perhaps 
better, we can also see in his preface the idea that there is no need for competition between 
the two, but integration. In fact when he refers to ‘this teaching’ (τὸ μάθημα) being the most 
important, one can both take it to mean Greek techne taktike – as the reference to Plato would 
suggest Ὅτι μέντοι τὸ μάθημα τοῦτο πάντων ἐστὶ χρειωδέστατον, λάβοι τις ἂν ἐξ ὧν ὁ 
Πλάτων/’Certainly that this science is of all sciences the most useful is comprehended by 
among others Plato’) – but also techne taktike in general, and he is perhaps purposely 
ambiguous about whether it is the Roman or Greek that he means because they are essentially 
continuous.313 Furthermore, he recommends the testing of the Greek precepts expressed in his 
book, and not just their blind application: 
δεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐν πράγμασι περὶ τῶν ὅλων διαφέρουσιν οὐκ ἀπεσχεδιασμένην γενέσθαι τὴν 
παράδοσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς καθημερινοῖς γυμνασίοις ἕκαστον τῶν σχημάτων πολλάκις 
δοκιμάσαντα καὶ τὸ εὐχερέστερον καὶ τὸ ὠφελιμώτερον γνόντα, τότε καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας 
χρήσασθαι.  
‘It is necessary, as in things that differ wholly, not to rely carelessly on the precept, but to 
try out frequently each of the formations in the daily drills, and thus get to know the most 
suitable and useful for actual fighting’314 
If we accept Devine’s translation of ἐν πράγμασι περὶ τῶν ὅλων διαφέρουσιν then the things 
that ‘differ wholly’ can only be the two theoriai/scientiae, the Greek and the Roman, and thus 
Aelian must mean that the two must be combined and fitted together as best as possible, by 
actual experimenting. 
Furthermore, Strabo goes back to Homer to show that the origins of geography are Greek, and, 
like Aelian, continues to discuss the Greeks who helped develop it, such as Anaximander of 
Miletus, Hecataeus, Democritus, Eudoxus, Dicaearchus, Ephorus, Eratosthenes, Polybius and 
                                                          
313 Ael. Tact. 1.7. 
314 Ael. Tact. 21.2. 
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Poseidonius.315 It is also clear that the Romans would have much to gain from using this Greek 
science of geography, especially in military terms, as Strabo sees it as something meant to aid 
the statesman and the general: 
ἐάσας δὲ τὰ παλαιὰ τὴν νῦν Ῥωμαίων στρατείαν ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους ἱκανὸν ἡγοῦμαι τούτων 
τεκμήριον: ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως τὴν ἐπὶ Γερμανοὺς καὶ Κελτούς, ἐν ἕλεσι καὶ δρυμοῖς ἀβάτοις 
ἐρημίαις τε τοπομαχούντων τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ τὰ ἐγγὺς πόρρω ποιούντων τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι 
καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐπικρυπτομένων καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας τροφῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
‘But leaving antiquity, I believe that the modern campaign of the Romans against the 
Parthians is a sufficient proof of what I say, and likewise that against the Germans and the 
Celts, for in the latter case the barbarians carried on a guerilla warfare in swamps, in 
pathless forests, and in deserts; and they made the ignorant Romans believe to be far away 
what was really near at hand, and kept them in ignorance of the roads and of the facilities 
for procuring provisions and other necessities’316 
Although the Romans did not by any means invent geography, as Dueck points out, Strabo 
makes the point that the expansion of their empire has in turn contributed to the advancement 
of geographical knowledge, as had that of Alexander the Great and that of the Parthians:317 
καὶ γὰρ δὴ πολύ τι τοῖς νῦν ἡ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπικράτεια καὶ τῶν Παρθυαίων τῆς τοιαύτης 
ἐμπειρίας προσδέδωκε, καθάπερ τοῖς μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατείαν 
‘The spread of the empires of the Romans and of the Parthians has presented to 
geographers of today a considerable addition to our empirical knowledge of geography, 
just as did the campaign of Alexander to geographers of earlier times.’318 
There is an idea of succession of empires of knowledge here too, with the empire of Alexander 
being succeeded by that of the Romans and pushing the boundaries of geographical knowledge 
further and further. If one turns to Aelian, we can also interpret the transition from the 
                                                          
315 Str. 1.1.1.  
316 Str. 1.1.17. 
317 Dueck (2000) 109-110. 
318 Str. 1.2.1 
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‘original’ Greek theoria to the Roman, as a similar service. The Romans then, although they 
were not the inventors of military science, by their military prowess have furthered it, and as in 
the case of geography in Strabo, the physical empire has furthered the ‘empire of science’. 
If we think of the potential audience of Aelian, one could make the argument that such an 
approach would have been satisfactory for all its members. The overemphasis on the Greek 
origins of tactics (to recapitulate, Homer starts off the treatise in the chapter headings, 
followed almost immediately by Plato, then Homer again leads the introduction, the first 
chapter and also ends the treatise) would have given the Greek members of the elite (and 
Roman army) a tool to contend with Roman claims to be ‘masters of war’, and of integration 
within Roman ‘militarism’, whilst for the ‘Romans’ it would have been seen as proof that the 
relatively recent Greek ‘addition’ did indeed deserve its place in an elite environment – such as 
the equestrian order – where military service was very much a fundamental component. At the 
same time – as we shall see in the case of Arrian – the unifying message of the whole treatise 
would have allowed both Greeks and Romans to identify as important contributors to the 
military sphere.  
Therefore, we have seen how Greek discourse about military science in Aelian is shaped to 
respond to Roman ideas of superiority, by going back to the Homeric origins of Greek taktike 
theoria, discussing Greek ‘tacticians’ alongside Romans and showing how much older and more 
distinguished Greek theoria was. At the same time, we have seen how Aelian integrates the 
self-same Greek science within a framework of continuity with Roman science, suggesting that 
in fact the passing of the torch from one ‘empire’ to the other de facto makes the two one unit 
to be practised and learned together.  
4.1.2. Presenting one’s authority: Aelian, Homer, Greek tactical authorities, 
Alexander and Frontinus 
The authority game that Aelian plays is not that dissimilar from Polyaenus’s approach. As we 
have observed, Aelian too appeals to a long line of Greeks who have written about tactics 
before him to the point where he is perhaps no longer critical about the authenticity of specific 
authors and their works, and simply wants to build this bulk of Greek scholarship, with him as 
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its spearhead. He then becomes part of a long Greek tradition of writing and is self-interested in 
building it up because it helps further himself and his text. 
The difference between him and Polyaenus is that he is interested only in more ‘historical’ 
authors. It is no coincidence perhaps that there are many names of generals amongst the 
writers of Taktika, and no mythological figures, because he wants the expertise he brings to be 
of a practical, ‘real’ nature. The only exception might be considered to be Homer, but we have 
seen that apart from Homer also being considered an expert (not only in warfare but in all 
matters), he is invoked to show the legitimate character of Greek military knowledge.  
Aelian has Homer θαυμάζειν, literally ‘admire’ those with tactical knowledge and then 
appreciates himself those who possess this skill, Frontinus (ἀπενεγκαμένῳ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς 
πολέμοις ἐμπειρίαν/’a man of great reputation in virtue of his experience in war’) and Trajan 
(διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, δι’ ὧν πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς πώποτε γενομένους κατὰ πόλεμον στρατηγοὺς 
ὑπερβάλλεις/‘on account of your experience […] through which you excel all generals who have 
ever been at war’) in particular, but also the Romans and the Greeks in general, and in doing so 
he subtly equates himself with the poet, sharing in his authority.319 
The other two sources of authority on which Aelian bases his own are Frontinus – as we have 
already previously seen – and Alexander. We already discussed the ‘cutting edge’ factor that 
Frontinus brings to the table and we can easily understand how channeling his authority injects 
this type of expertise into one’s own treatise. We can also see upon a closer reading of the 
preface of Aelian that he emphasises that Frontinus does not disparage Greek theoretical 
learning (οὐκ ἐλάττονα σπουδὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τεθεωρημένην μάθησι/’ he 
had no lesser regard for Greek theorised knowledge’) which helps suggest that the lack of 
practical experience of Aelian is unimportant.320 
I believe Alexander’s name shows the same concern with ‘hands-on’ experience as the inclusion 
of Frontinus and the comment on the acceptability of ‘theorised knowledge’. Thus, in the 
preface to his work Aelian states:   
                                                          
319 Ael. Tact. 1.1, Pr. 3; Pr. 4. 
320 Ael. Tact. Pr. 3. 
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ἐὰν δὲ ὡς Ἑλληνικὴν θεωρίαν καὶ γλαφυρὰν ἱστορίαν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦ Μακεδόνος 
Ἀλεξάνδρου τὴν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν ἐπιβολὴν θεωρήσεις, ψυχαγωγίαν παρέξει σοι τὸ 
σύγγραμμα. 
‘If you should think of it as a Greek theoretical work and and a polished dissertation, the 
book will afford you an evocation of the dead, since in it you will observe Alexander the 
Macedonian’s efforts in marshalling his forces’321 
We see that Aelian is concerned that his work will be perceived as impractical and not based on 
any military experience – since he himself admits he possesses none – and it is precisely the 
latter that Alexander brings to the table. Just as Aelian borrowed from Frontinus’ personal 
authority, here too he is borrowing from Alexander, one of the most accomplished warriors, by 
describing his army and how he would recommend that troops should be marshalled. The gap 
in Aelian’s ‘real’ authority is then filled with Alexander’s, which literally ‘comes alive’ in the 
pages of his book. He almost becomes one of Frontinus’ generals who is allowed to speak. In 
this case – as in the case of Polyaenus – Alexander is made to speak for Aelian and the long 
Greek tradtition of ‘real’ tactical writers to which Frontinus is added, to back them both up, 
creating a mixture of ‘book learning’ and ‘hands-on experience’ but also of Greek and Roman 
authority which comes together at the fingertips of Aelian.  
4.2.1 Presenting the material: Arrian – competition, ‘succession of empires’ and 
rehabilitating Greek knowledge. 
Arrian has similar views of the importance of Greek knowledge, and I believe he argues, 
similarly to Aelian, for the continued importance and usefulness of the Greek taktike theoria. 
He does so by integrating it in both a competitive frame and in a ‘succession of empires’ of 
knowledge, but also by showing how some of its aspects that might be criticised are in fact 
most useful. 
Some scholars, such as the historian Brian Bosworth and Philip Stadter, have already argued 
that the latter wrote the Taktika primarily out of practical reasons. They believe that Arrian is 
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interested in filling the lacunae of Aelian’s text, by focusing on the practicalities of and real 
need for training and adapting the source material in order to make Hellenistic practices 
potentially useful to a contemporary commander.322 Bosworth sees the use of Greek material 
as directly linked to this, which in his opinion ‘highlights the exercises of the Roman army and 
places them alongside the Hellenistic military theory as a specifically Roman contribution equal 
in excellence’.323 In other words Greek knowledge is only used to emphasise and praise Roman 
knowledge, and in fact Bosworth thinks Arrian takes a rather belittling approach to the former, 
and only feels obliged to summarise the tradition for those who would want to know about 
it.324 
Such an approach does not fully do justice to the general view which Arrian has of Greek 
knowledge, and while Arrian is indeed arguing for a balance between Greek and Roman 
practices, in his presentation he is using the comparison to highlight both the latter and the 
former. I also consider Bosworth’s stricltly practical view of Arrian’s text misleading, and while 
practicality is significant, so is the more general message about the importance of Greek 
knowledge and the debt that the Romans have to it.  
Appreciation for what Greek learning and Greek tradition have to offer can be seen in all of 
Arrian’s texts and is most obviously expressed in him being named the ‘second Xenophon’ even 
in his own lifetime. He himself played on the equivalence, as we see in his treatise about 
hunting: 325 
ταῦτα λέξω, ὁμώνυμός τε ὢν αὐτῷ καὶ πόλεως τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ ἀμφὶ ταὐτὰ ἀπὸ νέου    
ἐσπουδακώς, κυνηγέσια καὶ στρατηγίαν καὶ σοφίαν· 
                                                          
322 Bosworth (1993) 259; Stadter (1980) 43; cf. Wheeler (1978) 364-365 who sees it aslo as an encomium to Roman 
rule, arguing that Arrian, with the aid of the text, aims to ingratiate himself with the emperor and have his 
command prolonged. 
323 Bosworth (1993) 259. 
324 Bosworth (1993) 258 and esp. footnote 165.  
325 Bosworth (1993) 272-275; Stadter (1980) 1-18 esp. 2 for ‘Xenophon’ as a given name or a nickname; Devine 
(1993) 313.  
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‘I will speak about these things, having the same name as he (i.e. Xenophon) and being of 
the same city, and having shared the same interests from youth – hunting, generalship and 
philosophy’326 
In the whole of the the Kynegetikos we discover Arrian’s more general views of the information 
relayed by Xenophon (and implicitly about past Greek knowledge), namely that he does not 
think his initial treatise obsolete, nor does he view himself as an innovator in the field: 
Ξενοφῶντι τῷ Γρύλλου λέλεκται μὲν ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίων γίγνεται, καὶ 
οἱ παιδευθέντες ὑπὸ Χείρωνι τὴν παίδευσιν ταύτην ὅπως θεοφιλεῖς τε ἦσαν καὶ ἔντιμοι 
ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, λέλεκται δὲ καὶ καθ᾽ ὅ τι ἔοικεν τῇ πολεμικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἡ κυνηγετική, καὶ 
ἥντινα ἡλικίαν ἔχοντα χρὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν γνώμην ὁποῖόν τινα: 
καὶ περὶ ἀρκύων δὲ καὶ δικτύων καὶ ἐνοδίων ὁποῖα χρὴ παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ πάγας 
ὅπως ἱστάναι τοῖς θηρίοις, ὅσα πάγῃ ἁλωτά. […] [4] ὅσα δὲ ἐλλείπειν μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τῷ 
λόγῳ, οὐχὶ ἀμελείᾳ ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ γένους τῶν κυνῶν τοῦ Κελτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν 
ἵππων τοῦ Σκυθικοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ, ταῦτα λέξω 
‘Xenophon, son of Gryllus, has written of the benefits which come to men from hunting, 
and how those educated in this discipline under Chiron were loved by the gods and 
honoured throughout Greece; he also states in what respect hunting is like the science of 
war, and at what age one should approach this activity, and what physique and mental 
attitude the huntsman should have; he also gives instructions on what kind of purse nets, 
gate nets and long nets one must prepare, and how to set up snares for the creatures that 
are to be caught by snares […] 4. What this treatise lacks, as it seems to me, not through 
carelessness, but through ignorance of the Celtic breed of hounds and the Scythian and 
Libyan breeds of horses, I will cover […]’327 
By summarising Xenophon’s work in the preface, Arrian presents his own treatise as a 
commentary and an improvement on Xenophon’s treatise, not a refutation of previous 
                                                          
326 Arr. Cyn. 1.4, all translations from the Kynegetikos are by Phillips and Willcock. 
327 Arr. Cyn. 1.1-4. 
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knowledge, and this attitude is clear in his comment on how Xenophon himself dealt with 
Simon’s work on horsemanship: 
ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος, ἃ Σίμωνι περὶ ἱππικῆς ἐνδεῶς λελεγμένα ἦν, ᾠήθη δεῖν 
ἀναγράψαι, οὐχὶ ἔριδι τῇ πρὸς Σίμωνα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ὠφέλιμα ἐς ἀνθρώπους ἐγίγνωσκεν.  
‘for he himself did the same, thinking he ought to write up what was lacking in the writing 
of Simon about horsemanship, not through competitiveness with Simon, but because he 
saw that it would be helpful to readers.’328 
This desire to keep using past knowledge makes Arrian emphasise that he agrees with and 
merely complements Xenophon even when it is clear that their overall views are different, as is 
the case in the matter of which types of hounds are best for hunting.329 He also repeatedly 
reminds his audience that the advice which he gives is also that of Xenophon, with Xenophon’s 
personal exploits featuring as well.330 
While this might be taken to mean only reverence for Xenophon and not for Greek knowledge 
in general, in his Periplus, Greek myth and knowledge are ever present, making the ‘new’ 
eastern Roman world almost seem frozen in time.331 The circumnavigation of the Black Sea is 
made ever richer by information from the Greek world which provides guidance and familiarity. 
Thus Arrian and his men make port in a place called Athens in the Black Sea, which takes its 
name from a sanctuary of the goddess which existed there.332 We find out how the territory of 
Apsaros was once called Apsyritos, because that was where the latter was killed by Medea and 
his tomb stood testimony, and similarly he talks about how Tyana, was named Thoana after 
                                                          
328 Arr. Cyn. 1.4-5. 
329 See Phillips and Willcock (1999) 181 for Arrian disagreeing with Xenophon, especially in 4; 16.6-7 is the only 
example where Arrian openly disagrees with Xenophon, insisting that the hare should not be killed, but he quickly 
excuses Xenophon by blaming different circumstances and the unavailability of fast running dogs, which would 
have made the catching of the hare more difficult and thus more spectacular. 
330 Arr. Cyn. 3.5, 25.4 and 30. For Xenophon’s expoits see Arr. Cyn. 24.2. 
331 For the – now unquestioned – authenticity of the entirety of Arrian’s Periplus see Silberman (1995) xvii-xxiv and 
(1993) 287-290, as well as Bosworth (1993) 243. As far as I am concerned, the structure of the texts fits in perfectly 
with Arrian’s style, and while other periploi (such as Periplus Mari Erithrei) only give very practical information, he 
intersperses myth and anecdotes in the Indika as well (which is not quite a periplus but still the description of a sea 
voyage, with moorings and places one could find water), the authenticity of which is not contested.  
332 Arr. Peripl.M.Eux. 4-5. 
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Thoas, the king who, in pursuing Orestes and Pylades died, in that place, of disease.333 We also 
find out about the people whose territories Arrian had traversed, and by comparison with 
Xenophon we discover that the most bellicose people in the region are the same Drilles, but 
which are in Arrian’s time called Sannoi – so the Romans can know what to expect – and they 
are still very hostile to the Trapezontins.334 The difference, however, is that they now pay 
tribute to the Romans!335 Going farther Xenophon again warns about the wild beasts in the 
forests near Kalpe and mentions the Bithynian Thracians, who inhabit the territories bordering 
the Parthenios river and are the most bellicose of Asia, having given the Greek army much 
trouble.336 The Romans are again mentioned and we learn that the river Halys, which once ran 
between the kingdoms of Croesus and the Persians, now flows under Roman sovereignty.337 
Almost at the end of the trip, Xenophon again gives valuable advice on the dangers of 
navigating the waters around Salmydessos because of the lack of a good harbour.338  
From all these examples it is clear how the world which Arrian describes is much better 
understood by making an appeal to Greek knowledge, as it is essentially a Greek world over 
which Roman authority has been superimposed – and is indeed very faintly present. Arrian is 
almost suggesting that the masters have changed but the world has stayed the same, so the 
Romans can learn much about it from the Greek past. Not least about their potential enemies 
and troublemakers, as seen in the Sannes/Driloi and Bithynian Thracians examples. 
This reverent attitude towards Greek knowledge is useful in understanding the Taktika, not as a 
text which in any way disparages of or discounts the importance of Greek military science, but 
as a part of the Xenophontic model combining philosophy, hunting, generalship and also of a 
general framework of usefulness of Greek knowledge.  
In this respect, if we set aside Bosworth’s argument that Arrian is trying to flesh out snippets of 
useful information from a dated Hellenistic tradition, we can see in fact how Arrian is keen on 
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336 Arr. Peripl.M.Eux. 12.5, 13.6. 
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emphasising how (at least some) Roman practices actually derive from Greek ones and are 
therefore indebted to them, just like in the Periplus the Romans were inbedted to the Greeks 
for having explored the Black Sea.339 Thus he discusses the disposition of the phalanx by depth 
and length at Leuctra and Mantinea, but in these historical examples the present creeps in by 
the juxtaposition of what one should do when fighting the Sarmatians, in a very apparent 
symmetry of phrase: 
καθάπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἔν τε Λεύκτροις αὐτοὺς Θηβαίους ἔταξε καὶ πρὸς Μαντινείας 
τοὺς πάντας Βοιωτούς ὥσπερ ἔμβολον ποιήσας καὶ ἐπάγων τῇ τάξει τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων 
‘as Epaminondas arrayed the Thebans themselves at Leuctra and the Boetians at 
Mantineia, as he was creating a wedge and leading his troops against the array of the 
Lacedaemonians’ 
which is mirrored by:  
καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς Σαυρομάτας τε καὶ τοὺς Σκύθας, χρὴ τάσσειν 
‘as it is necessary to draw up your troops against the Sauromatai and Scyths’340 
More than just putting forth a situation from the past that could be adapted to the present, by 
the use of the historical examples Arrian is trying to show how practices of his present are 
indeed possible due to Epaminondas’ innovations in the past. This is even clearer in the 
discussion of the synaspismos and the Roman testudo in the same chapter. The latter is both 
presented as the next logical step (and hence a matter of praise for the Romans) but at the 
same time it is made clear that it would not be possible without the former: καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ 
συνασπισμοῦ τὴν χελώνην Ῥωμαῖοι ποιοῦντα ‘and from this the Romans make a tortoise’. 
While it is apparent that this also refers to the mechanics of the manoeuvre, namely that you 
have to lock shields, then go into the testudo, the ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ συνασπισμοῦ in the genitive 
strongly suggests origin, and indicates that it was the synaspismos that allowed the Romans to 
develop their manoeuvre.  
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340 Arr. Tact. 11.2. 
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Surely Bosworth is right in seeing these passages as attempts by Arrian to show the continued 
usefulness of Hellenistic tactics, but I believe he is missing the big picture that it is not only 
these particular few examples that could still be of use, but Greek ‘military science’ in general. 
This emphasis that Greek techne taktike is just as important (if not more) as Roman scientia 
could also be seen in the division of the subject matter. Just like Polyaenus, Arrian’s section 
dealing with Greek practices is larger than that dealing with the Roman cavalry, namely thirty-
two Greek chapters as opposed to twelve Roman ones. While this again could be attributed to 
the source material and Arrian’s wish to summarise everything, it has been pointed out that he 
chooses to leave out a significant amount of available information.341 That everything he 
includes, he believes to be absolutely important and unknown to the reader is clear from his 
opinions on repetition in the Indika and his reluctance to include facts that are γνώριμα: 
ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι αὐτός τε πολλοὺς ὀπώπεα καὶ ἄλλους ἐπισταμένους ᾔδεα τὸν ὄρνιθα, οὐδὲν ὡς 
ὑπὲρ ἀτόπου δῆθεν ἀπηγήσομαι: οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν πιθήκων τοῦ μεγάθεος, ἢ ὅτι καλοὶ παρ᾽ 
Ἰνδοῖσι πίθηκοί εἰσιν, οὐδὲ ὅκως θηρέονται ἐρέω. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα γνώριμα ἐρέω, πλήν γε 
δὴ ὅτι καλοί κου πίθηκοί εἰσι. 
‘But I having seen several, and knowing others acquainted with this bird, shall not dilate on 
them as anything remarkable; nor yet upon the size of the apes, nor the beauty of some 
Indian apes, and the method of their capture. For I would only say what everyone knows, 
except perhaps that the apes are anywhere beautiful.’342 
Furthermore, his emphasis on the importance of the Greek techne taktike is also seen in the 
sentence concluding the Greek section: 
τάδε μέν, ὥσπερ ἐν τέχνῃ, δι᾽ ὀλίγων ἐδήλωσα ἱκανὰ ὑπέρ γε τῶν πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ 
Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων, ὅστις μηδὲ τούτων ἀπείρως ἐθέλοι ἔχειν: 
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342 Arr. Ind. 15.9. trans. P.A. Brunt. 
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‘These things about Greek and Macedonian formations of old, as in the techne, I have 
explained sufficiently in a few words, for whomever would not want to be ignorant of such 
things either.’343 
Bosworth picks up on the μηδὲ thinking it pejorative, and that Arrian is in fact dismissing the 
Greek techne, but in fact I believe he is being modest, just as Aelian is in his proemion, and the 
δι᾽ ὀλίγων is even ironic given the already discussed Greek to Roman ratio.344 Surely Stadter is 
right in reading this statement in connection to the beginning of chapter 33, which is an 
excursus on Roman borrowing, that explains how the Romans took so much from others, 
including, weapons, laws, customs and gods.345 Thus the σφίσιν ἐποιήσαντο reminds of the 
ὅστις μηδὲ τούτων ἀπείρως ἐθέλοι ἔχειν and the reader is indeed encouraged to follow the 
Roman pattern of embracing (or keeping using) Greek knowledge as well, in keeping with 
Roman tradition, and the reference to Greek law and Greek customs, as things the Romans 
have also picked up, comes to strengthen this message.  
But while chapter 33 can be read as praise for the Romans, there does seem to be an 
opposition between the clearly defined ‘formations of Greeks and Macedonians of old’ (γε τῶν 
πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων) and Roman ones. Arrian expresses difficulty in 
explaining the names of Roman taxeis because they had borrowed so much from others: 
καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνοῶ χαλεπὴν ἐσομένην τὴν δήλωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἑκάστων, ὅτι οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς 
Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πολλὰ τῆς πατρίου φωνῆς ἔχεται ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἃ τῆς Ἰβήρων ἢ Κελτῶν, ἐπεὶ τὰ 
πράγματα αὐτὰ Κελτικὰ ὄντα προσέλαβον, εὐδοκιμήσαντος αὐτοῖς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις τοῦ 
Κελτῶν ἱππικοῦ 
‘And yet I am not unaware that the revealing of each name will be difficult, because, in the 
case of the Romans themselves, many of them are not in their native language. Rather they 
are in that of the Iberians or the Celts, since they took practices which were Celtic 
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themselves because it seemed to them that the Celtic cavalry was remarkable in 
combat.’346 
The distinction is made clear by the use of the ἐδήλωσα ἱκανὰ ὑπέρ γε τῶν πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε 
καὶ Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων and καίτοι οὐκ ἀγνοῶ χαλεπὴν ἐσομένην τὴν δήλωσιν τῶν 
ὀνομάτων ἑκάστων, and therefore one might read that what is Roman is more ambiguous and 
harder to define, as it is at the same time Celtic or Iberic. While this could also be interpreted as 
an attempt to say that what is considered ‘Greek’ is and has to be part of what is ‘Roman’ – just 
as we saw above in the case of Aelian – the aforementioned opposition perhaps sets the Greeks 
apart as having a more unified, clear and coherent tradition than the Romans. Those wanting to 
argue against the latter would of course bring up the numerous authors praising Roman 
borrowing in just this way. However, while borrowing is presented as positive in the majority of 
examples, we have seen its negative connotations in Polyaenus’ text and Cicero suggests as well 
that it can be more ambiguous. In his Respublica, he makes Manlius rejoice that Romans have 
been made eruditi not by ‘foreign arts’ but through their own virtues: 347 
Ac tamen facile patior non esse nos transmarinis nec inportatis artibus eruditos, sed 
genuinis domesticisque virtutibus. 
‘Yet I am not sorry that we Romans got our culture, not from arts imported from overseas, 
but from the native excellence of our own people.’348 
Surely enough Scipio corrects him, showing how the Romans have indeed taken things from 
others, but Manlius’ voice is sufficient to show that some at least may have thought it better to 
succeed through their own means rather than by taking from others and the much later 
Aurelius Victor expresses the same idea, perhaps in a more hostile tone: 
Ac mihi quidem audienti multa legentique plane compertum urbem Romam externorum 
virtute atque insitivis artibus praecipue crevisse 
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‘And to me at least, from the many things I have heard and read, it is perfectly clear that 
the city of Rome grew great in particular through the qualities of outsiders and imported 
talents’349 
At the same time however, while perhaps marking this difference, Arrian tries to bring the 
Greeks closer to Roman practice, showing the communal elements between them and thus the 
need for the study of both technai. One of the ways in which this is done is by discussing the 
case of Jason of Pheirai, who, according to Arrian, did not actually invent the cavalry wedge but 
simply made it famous after borrowing it from someone else, just as the Romans borrowed – 
commendably – so many things: 
τῇ μὲν δὴ ῥομβοειδεῖ τάξει τὸ πολὺ Θεσσαλοὶ ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ Ἰάσων, ὡς λόγος, ὁ 
Θεσσαλὸς τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτο πρῶτος ἐξεῦρεν, ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖν, προεξευρημένῳ πολλῷ 
χρησάμενος ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ηὐδοκίμησεν. 
‘Thessalians mostly use the rhomboid formation and Jason the Thessalian, as it is said, first 
invented this shape, but it seems to me that, making use of something discovered much 
earlier he became famous from it.’350 
So in mentioning borrowing he both raises the question of its value and emphasises Greek 
military tradition as more coherent than the Roman, but also brings the Greeks closer to the 
Romans by saying some Greeks also took manoeuvres from others  in a very Roman fashion. 
The idea that both Greeks and Romans borrowed practices from others is on the one hand 
similar to Frontinus’ inclusion of the same stratagem being performed by commanders of 
different ethnicitites which was meant to present a unified front of knowledge. But on the 
other hand, in Jason’s example, the fact that the Greeks borrow from most likely other Greeks, 
reminds of Polyaenus’ repetition of stratagems by different Greek commanders which 
highlighted the idea that it is the latter who are the masters of trickery, and demonstrates how 
Arrian migh have played with different possible ways of interpretation. 
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Therefore, as in the case of Aelian, Arrian’s message is not one-dimensional and the usage of 
past practices in the present – such as Epaminondas’ manoeuvres and the synaspismos – can 
also be seen within the same framework of passing the torch to a new ‘empire of knowledge’, 
with the Romans perfecting practices which they had inherited from the Greeks (and this is 
made even more explicit than in Aelian by the actual mentioning of Roman borrowing). 
Therefore, alongside arguing for the continued importance of Greek knowledge and Roman 
indebtedness to it, Arrian is also making the point that Romans have taken Greek practices even 
further than their inventors had intended. Epaminondas invented the wedge formation against 
infantry – the Romans took it further by using it against cavalry as well. The Greeks invented the 
locking of shields to create a united battlefront – the Romans had developed it into a near 
impenetrable shell. The Thessalians borrowed techniques from other Greeks – the Romans took 
everything that was good about the military practices of others and incorporated it into their 
own. This type of message can be found in Diodorus Siculus as well, who recounts how the 
Romans borrowed several things from the Etruscans, such as the lictors, the sella curulis and 
the toga with a purple band and then improved them (καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον αὐξήσαντες), but 
also closer to our own interests, how they learned siege tactics from the Greeks and perfected 
them to such a degree that they managed to use them against the former and defeat them (τὰς 
πόλεις τῶν διδαξάντων ἠνάγκασανποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον).351 
Therefore my intention is not argue that Arrian is disparaging the Romans – nor could he have 
done so, being Roman himself – but rather to show that by comparing and contrasting the two 
technai he is reasserting the value of the Greek military tradition, but also presenting Greek and 
Roman technai as integrated parts of a succession of ‘empires of knowledge’. This type of dual 
approach can be explained in the same way as in the case of Aelian, if we consider that their 
audiences were indeed similar. If we accept that Arrian too is writing for the Greco-Roman 
elites, and that at least some were engaging in military activities, then we can see how he is 
simply more explicitly including Greek – particularly Alexander’s/Hellenistic – military theory 
alongside contemporary Roman theory in order to appeal to men like Quadratus Bassus for 
example, who was a highly successful commander from an old Greek royal family who would 
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have valued the traditions of that world as well as the achievements of the Romans. At the 
same time, not only would ideas of Romans incorporating Greek practices have appealed to 
Greek elements in the elites, but their improvement under Roman rule would have appealed to 
the Roman members of the same elite.  
However, I believe Arrian also discusses and redeems alleged negative Greek elements of 
military practice, aiming to refute criticism of them and of the elites more generaly. If one looks 
at the Panegyricus of Pliny the Younger, the speech given in 100 A.D. in honour of the emperor 
Trajan, we see the current elites being criticised for allowing themselves to be corrupted by 
Greek mores, and losing their own valour in the process: 
Hac mihi admiratione dignus imperator <uix> uideretur, si inter Fabricios et Scipiones et 
Camillos talis esset; tunc enim illum imitationis ardor semperque melior aliquis accenderet. 
Postquam uero studium armorum a manibus ad oculos, ad uoluptatem a labore translatum 
est, postquam exercitationibus nostris non ueteranorum aliquis cui decus muralis aut 
ciuica, sed Graeculus magister adsistit.  
‘Such were the great generals of the past, bred in the homes of Fabricius, Scipio and 
Camillus; if they have a lesser claim upon my admiration it is because in their day a man 
could be inspired by a keen rivalry with his betters. But now that interest in arms is 
displayed in a spectacle instead of personal skill, and has become an amusement instead of 
a discipline, when exercises are no longer directed by a veteran crowned by the mural 
crown but by some petty Greek trainer.’ 352 
Greek influence then transformed Roman virtues into exercises geared towards pleasure – and 
the ad oculos, ad voluptatem reminds one of the artes mentioned by Vergil – thus causing 
Roman discipline to be lost in the process. This idea is of course more famously expressed by 
Horace, who describes the loss of Roman ferocity to the Greek artes: Graecia capta ferum 
victorem cepit et artes/ intulit agresti Latio (‘Captive Greece captured its fierce victor and 
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brought the arts to wild Latium).353 This kind of idea might have been considered unpleasant to 
both Greek elements in the elites – especially seasoned commanders in the mould of 
Quadratus Bassus and Ti. Julius Alexander – who would have resented the trope of Greek 
practices as encouraging moral laxness, but also to the Romans more generally, for assuming 
they have been corrupted in such a way.  As a Greek member of the Roman elite and military 
commander Arrian would have interested in presenting such conceptions in a more nuanced 
way.  
Keeping this in mind, it is quite peculiar that the Roman cavalry drills described in the second 
part of Arrian’s text would fit Pliny’s ad oculos, ad voluptatem category quite easily. As such, 
visual pleasure is accentuated in several places: the appearance of the standards (ταῦτα τὰ 
σημεῖα οὐ τῇ ὄψει μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ ἔκπληξιν παρέχει/‘these standards not only bring pleasure 
and consternation to the eye’), the colour and beauty of the standards and the manoeuvres  
(καὶ οὕτω ποικίλαι μὲν αἱ ἐπιστροφαί, πολυειδεῖς δὲ οἱ ἐξελιγμοί, πολύτροποι/‘thus the 
colorful wheelings about, the multiform folding back again, and the versatile charges here and 
there’), the beauty of the turn (τὸ δὲ κάλλος τοῦ δρωμένου ἐν τῷδε ἐστίν), the posture of the 
rider (ἥ τε καθέδρα ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἱππέως ἀεὶ εὐσχήμων καὶ ὀρθὴ/‘the posture of 
the rider is always elegant and straight’) which enables the ‘weapons’ brilliance, the horses 
swiftness and the good curvings in the turn’ (τῶν ὅπλων ἡ λαμπρότης καὶ τῶν ἵππων ἡ ὠκύτης 
τε καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστροφαῖς εὐκαμπές), to be seen, the rider being graceful at (εὐσχημόνως), 
and the rider’s blow being astounding and the countermarch appearing graceful (ἐκπληκτικός, 
καὶ ὁ ἐξελιγμὸς ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε εὐσχήμων φαίνεται).354  
This emphasis on beauty contrasts the functional, dry description of the phalanx in the first part 
(1-32), which shows that the Greeks ‘of old’ were just as disciplined (if not more) than the 
Romans which Pliny mentioned. This contrast is most evident when the Macedonian phalanx is 
described as ‘fearsome’ also by its appearance, τοι καὶ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ φάλαγξ φοβερὰ τοῖς 
πολεμίοις οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄψει ἐφαίνετο, as opposed to the standards of 
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the Roman cavalry which bring ‘pleasure to the sight’ (τῇ ὄψει [...] ἡδονὴν).355 Also, if Wheeler 
is right in believing Arrian is in fact describing the ‘sporting exercises’ called ludi castrenses, 
which were performed on festive occasions, then the antithesis is even stronger between 
function and pleasure and Arrian’s choice for the latter more interesting. 356 Surely the 
explanation for it is partly Arrian’s pride and enthusiasm for the cavalry of which he was himself 
commander,  but by opposing the functional description of the Greek phalanx and cavalry (1-
32) to the visual pleasure invoked by the Roman cavalry (34-44), Arrian shows that the 
emphasis on beauty was not necessarily brought about by a ‘Greek corruption’ as Pliny 
suggested, and might have existed independent of that.357 Furthermore, as a Greek himself, he 
makes a point out of saying he does not appreciate performance for performance’s sake, and 
he praises the man who can perform his task properly rather than him who tries to attract the 
viewers’ attention: 
ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπαινῶ τὸ ἐννόμως δρώμενον ἤπερ τὸ ἐς ἔκπληξιν τῶν ὁρώντων 
σοφιζόμενον. 
‘But I rather praise the one who does things properly rather than one who devises things 
cleverly for the amazement of the viewers.’358 
 At the same time he defends not only himself and the Greeks in the elite, but the elites 
altogether, by showing that visual splendour is not necessarily a sign of moral corruption in the 
example of the colourful banners of the cavalry, which are both beautiful but also vital in 
allowing the riders to maintain unit cohesion: 
καὶ ταῦτα τὰ σημεῖα οὐ τῇ ὄψει μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ ἔκπληξιν παρέχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς διάκρισιν 
τῆς ἐπελάσεως καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμπίπτειν ἀλλήλαις τὰς τάξεις ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. 
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‘And these standards not only furnish pleasure and amazement to sight, but become useful 
even for distinguishing the parts of the charge and so that the formations do not collide 
into each other.’359 
Therefore, in combining and contrasting beauty and functionality Arrian accomplishes two 
things at the same time: he dissociates himself and the Greeks from the practices mentioned by 
Pliny, and also defends the elites criticised by him altogether and the self-same practices by 
showing how visual pleasure, even if introduced by the Greeks, is not to be seen as a sign of 
moral decline but as a useful element in the evolution of warfare.   
To conclude, I have shown how Arrian’s text can both be seen as re-asserting the importance of 
the Greek techne by showing how it influenced Roman scientia and how it was perhaps in some 
ways superior, but also how he – similarly to Aelian, but in a more explicit way – integrates the 
two by making the argument for a succession of knowledge, from the Greeks to the Romans, 
thus rendering the need for competition pointless.  Just like Aelian, he is mindful of the mixed 
Greco-Roman elite he is addressing and refutes the supposed negative attributes which come 
with Greek practices, thus defending it against accusations of moral corruption.     
4.2.2. Presenting one’s authority: Arrian, Xenophon, Greek scholarship and 
personal authority  
The authority that Arrian constructs is somewhere between that of Frontinus and Aelian. Like 
the latter, he too discusses previous authors who had written taktika before him and positions 
himself as part of this very literary tradition. However, just from looking at the presentation of 
these figures we see that ‘real’ authority, that which contains military experience, is very 
important to him. Among the writers we see two who sound very familiar to us: 
<Πύρρος τε ὁ Ἠπειρώτης τακτικὰ συνέταξε καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος> ὁ Πύρρου παῖς καὶ Κλέαρχος, 
οὐχ ὁ τῶν μυρίων Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ βασιλέα ἡγησάμενος, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος οὗτος Κλέαρχος. 
[…]συγγέγραπται ἄττα ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ Εὐπολέμῳ καὶ Ἰφικράτει, οὐ τῷ Ἀθηναίων 
στρατηγῷ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ τούτῳ. 
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Pyrrhus of Epirus composed a taktika, Alexander, Pyrrhus’ son and Clearchus, not the 
leader of the ten thousand Greeks against the king but this other Clearchus. […] And some 
things were written about this by Eupolemos and Iphicrates, not the Athenian general but 
this other one.360 
Iphicrates and Clearchus are famous generals but Arrian is quick to explain that these are 
actually not the generals that we know – who would bring their own experience and therefore 
authority to the texts – but other authors with the same name, who implicitly do not possess 
this kind of authority.  So Arrian, although part of this tradition, is also superior to it because he 
does possess the military experience that the majority of them do not. He is also quick to 
emphasise this, as we have seen, in the second part of his treatise where he describes the 
cavalry drills with the precision of an eye witness but, just like Frontinus, does not directly 
emphasise the fact that he has ‘real’ experience because he does not need to. As we have also 
seen Arrian is equated to Xenophon and is therefore in a unique position. He actively draws 
upon the authority of this historical general and builds upon it, as we have seen in the Periplus 
and Kynegetikos, and is himself a general, therefore so much better fitted to bring the latter’s 
experience to life in the pages of his manual – unlike Aelian who can only ‘invoke the dead’. 
Conclusion 
I believe I have sufficiently proven here that there are some authors who take an integrative 
and others that take an exclusive approach to military knowledge. However certain issues might 
raise the question whether these approaches are ever going to be so clear cut – or if we can 
read them as such. Onasander’s rejection of the use of any examples in conjunction with the 
claim to draw upon the Roman tradition, which placed great value on them, and then his use of 
a majority of identifiable Greek practices might also be read as ironic and indicative of his view 
of the superiority of these latter practices. His example of the wedge formation (of which the 
most famous was Epaminondas’) right after the description of an encirclement manoeuvre 
(arguably to Onasander’s day the most crushing Roman defeat at Cannae) might also serve to 
prove the superiority of Greek military science. In turn, Polyaenus’ repetition of stratagems 
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across ‘ethnic’ boundaries might also be an argument in favour of universal knowledge, and 
Frontinus’ claim to be the first to systematise military science one in favour of Roman 
superiority in the field.  
I have also shown how Aelian and Arrian write against a specific background and with a specific 
audience in mind, with Roman ideas of superiority in the field of warfare as the background, as 
well as with Frontinus’ writings in view which seem to claim originality and the reinvention of 
military science. Therefore, in answering the implicit question of ‘What would the Greeks have 
to teach the Romans about warfare?’ the authors construct an answer which focuses both on 
proving the precedence and perhaps superiority of the Greek techne tactike but also on 
integrating it within a framework of succession of ‘empires of knowledge’ in which the Roman 
empire (both physical and symbolic) takes over from that of the Greeks and becomes the 
guardian of said knowledge. Aelian makes a point out of emphasising the Greekness of ‘military 
science’ by appealing to Homer as its inventor, and to other Greeks who had tackled it, while 
Arrian more explicitly parallels the two sciences, but nevertheless the message in both is that 
Greek knowledge is to be used alongside the Roman in a complementary not a competitive 
way, despite perhaps the superiority of the former.  
All the treatises and their respective approaches are also better understood if one considers 
that their audience would have been made up of both Greeks and Romans, in the general elite 
sphere and also more specifically in the military sphere. Views which emphasised the Greekness 
of tactics and the historical role of the Greeks in warfare (such as we see in Arrian) would then 
have appealed to Greek members of the elites, who, as relative newcomers to the Empire, had 
to compete with men who considered the res militaris their exclusive domain. But the very 
same views would have helped the latter Romans gain a new perspective on the Greeks and 
help in viewing them as an integral – and fitting – part of the imperial elite.   
We have also seen how the presentation of the material and the construction of authority in 
each author constitute a circle, with one reflecting and influencing the other. We have seen 
how all the authors construct their authority in different ways, by downplaying existing 
practical experience which they possess (as in the case of Frontinus) or by augmenting certain 
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innate traits they have to make up for it (such as Macedonian descent, in the case of 
Polyaenus), by drawing upon the authority of the past or on that of other experts. However, we 
have also seen how all the authors seem to be interested in having practical experience on their 
side in one form or another. Onasander draws upon that of the Romans, Aelian on that of 
Alexander, Arrian and Frontinus on themselves, while Polyaenus brings in his persona and the 
experience of the emperors. 
III. Tactics, Identity and ‘Roman’ Greece 
 
In this chapter I will use Arrian’s Taktika and Ektaxis, a text which is usually dismissed as a 
simple description of Arrian’s operations in Cappadocia, to develop the themes set out in the 
previous two chapters.361 The two texts will constitute a case study for the exploration in 
greater depth of how ‘military manuals’ approach empire, power and authority, but also how 
they deal with, shape and use the past in the ‘Second Sophistic’. As will have already become 
clear, more varied pasts are put to more varied uses than suggested in Ewan Bowie’s classic 
article, Greeks and their past in the Second Sophistic. 
In what follows I will examine the two texts as tools of creating identity, both for Arrian and for 
the Roman Empire as a whole.  I will explore Arrian’s self-presentation in the Ectaxis and argue 
that he is constructing his identity in a similar way to the performers of ‘sophistic’ historical 
meletai, where the speaker assumes the persona of a famous figure from the past. I will then 
read this against Antony Spawforth’s analysis of Augustus’ and Hadrian’s interactions with 
Athens and argue that the goal of Arrian’s self-presentation is to become part of an accepted 
Roman view of Greekness (just as Spawforth argues that his move to Athens constitutes such 
an attempt), but also that he is using the prestige of the Classical period to augment his own 
reputation.362  Then, by looking at both the Taktika and the Ektaxis I will explore how they play 
a part in constructing the identity of the Roman Empire, fitting into a picture of unity in 
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diversity which the Romans themselves – including Hadrian – are trying to promote. I then will 
look at how Arrian’s Taktika contributes to Hadrian’s self-presentation as a commander and 
helps him build up his reputation as a general, but also at how Arrian’s and Aelian’s Taktika 
choose a particular subject matter that also conforms to a Roman view of Greek identity, and 
how this subject matter is meant to advertise Greek knowledge to the emperors by using the 
same means of integration and competition seen in the previous chapter.  
1. Ektaxis – rhetoric and impersonation  
In terms of its form, the Ektaxis is essentially a series of orders expressed in the third person 
imperative and infinitive meant to explain Arrian’s battle array against the Alans who attacked 
the borders of Cappadocia after they had plundered Albania and Media Atropatene at the 
behest of king Phrasmanes of Iberia (in the southern Caucasus).363 Because the text breaks off 
in mid-sentence, the question has been raised as to whether this was an individual piece or part 
of the Alanike - another monograph of Arrian which Stadter assumes would have been ‘a 
geographical and ethnographical work similar to the Indike’.364 Stadter rejects the latter 
hypothesis and argues for the Ektaxis as an independent text in close relation to the Taktika (as 
hinted in the introduction), stating that he could not imagine a work of history which would 
have contained this piece, because of the strange style in which it is written.365 Bosworth, 
however, compares it with Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, where Xenophon gives the Persian king a 
long homily when Cyrus marches to deliver Gadates from Assyrian attack, and composes this 
mainly of third person imperatives, with particular attention given to the names of the 
commanders.366 Despite suggesting that the Cyropaedia could have been Arrian’s model, 
Bosworth, unlike Wheeler, also thinks that the Ektaxis ‘is hardly likely to be an extract from a 
formal history’ mainly because, just like the passage in Xenophon, it would have to be part of a 
harangue, but it is already longer than any direct speech in Arrian’s only extant historical work, 
the Anabasis, and would also make for a distinct lack of balance in any other longer historical 
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work.367 Furthermore, according to Bosworth, the very existence of an Alanike is questionable, 
and only based on a reference in Photius and a ‘suspect attestation in John the Lydian’.368  
Stadter’s contention as to the position of the work in the Laurentianus 55.4 manuscript also 
makes it more likely that it is a stand-alone piece. He suggests that, since pages were removed 
from the manuscript for their blank parchment, and the work which followed the text in the 
manuscript – Onasander’s treatise on generalship – began at the top of the verso of the same 
missing folio, it is likely that the recto containing the end of the Ektaxis had a blank space, 
which is why the folio was torn out.369 This would mean that, since a folio of the manuscript 
contained about forty Teubner lines, no more than twenty lines would be missing.370  
For our purposes the debate does not make much difference. However, if this is a stand-alone 
work, the reasons for its publication become even more interesting, because we are presented 
with a whole piece where Arrian is advertising his own achievements in the Roman army and 
his position within the empire. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Arrian was compared 
to Xenophon even in his lifetime, but I believe his portrayal in the Ektaxis goes beyond just 
likening himself to Alexander and Xenophon, as Bosworth argues, and that he is deliberately 
assuming the persona of Xenophon and, in the context of the work, becoming Xenophon. 371 
This is an interesting mix, therefore, of classical Greek and Roman themes. 
Arrian’s portrayal is – not unintentionally – very similar to the way in which ‘sophists’ perform 
historical declamation. As Berry and Heath point out, the composition of hypothetical or 
imitation speeches was a Greek invention which ‘probably provided the earliest vehicle for the 
transmission of rhetorical theory’, Antiphon’s Tetralogies and the Helen and Palamedes of 
Gorgias being notable instances from the classical period.372 Ancient historians of rhetoric 
believed the practice originated in the late fourth or early third century B.C., but by the first 
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century B.C. it had already reached Rome and we see that many of the hypothetical cases in 
Cicero’s De Inventione and the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium become themes later on.373 
Declamation became particularly popular in the second and third centuries A.D., as we can see 
from Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, and Schmitz makes the point that historical 
declamations were ‘by far the most important class of meletai’ and that in them  ‘the speaker 
impersonated a well-known figure of classical Greek history’.374 This too is illustrated by 
Philostratus with plenty of examples, such as Hippodromus of Thessaly (holder of the chair of 
rhetoric at Athens in 209-213 A.D. and Philostratus’ master) declaiming as Demades against 
revolting from Alexander, Apollonius of Athens speaking as Callias against the burning of the 
Athenian dead, and Alexander of Seleucia (born c. A.D. 115) impersonating Pericles and urging 
the Athenians to keep up the war.375  
Philostratus’ quotations from some famous speeches show exactly how the impersonation 
worked. So Alexander of Seleucia addresses Xerxes directly as if he were his contemporary: “Let 
the Danube of the Scythians flow beneath your feet, and if he gives your army a smooth 
crossing, do him the honour of drinking his waters’ ( ὑπορρείτω σοι ὁ Σκυθῶν Ἴστρος, κἂν 
εὔρους τὴν στρατιὰν διαγάγῃ, τίμησον αὐτὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιών).376 Again, Marcus of Byzantium 
(possibly a rhetoric teacher of Marcus Aurelius) takes on the persona of a Spartan citizen 
advising the Lacedaemonians not to receive the men who had returned from Sphacteria 
without their weapons: ‘As a Lacedaemonian who has kept his shield till old age, I would gladly 
have slain these men who have lost theirs’ (ἀνὴρ Λακεδαιμόνιος μέχρι γήρως φυλάξας τὴν 
ἀσπίδα ἡδέως μὲν ἂν τοὺς γυμνοὺς τούτους ἀπέκτεινα).377 Furthermore the ‘sophists’ who 
impersonate a certain character also pretend they are an integral part – for the duration of the 
speech – of the same circumstances as the original speaker, and we see this in Alexander’s 
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impersonation of Pericles for example, who speaks in front of a fictional Athenian assembly 
made up of his very real current audience.378 
The case of Lollianus of Ephesus may be the most interesting and relevant here, as I believe that 
through his self-presentation he – just like Arrian – is trying to achieve two goals: first, to 
become part of what might be called a Roman-sanctioned (particularly Hadrianic) view of 
Greekness and second to use this Roman-sanctioned Greek past to augment his prestige. Most 
of the information we have about Lollianus again comes from Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, 
but several inscriptions confirm his historicity. Philostratus tells us that he was not only 
appointed to the chair of rhetoric at Athens but ‘also governed the Athenian people, since he 
held the office of hoplite general in that city’ (προὔστη δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου 
στρατηγήσας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων), and we know from an inscription that by 142/43 A.D. 
he was also a priest there.379 Philostratus continues to explain how the responsibilities of the 
hoplite general ‘were formerly to levy troops and lead them to war, but now he has charge of 
the food supplies and the provision market’(ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὕτη πάλαι μὲν κατέλεγέ τε καὶ  ἐξῆγεν 
ἐς τὰ πολέμια, νυνὶ δὲ τροφῶν ἐπιμελεῖται καὶ σίτου ἀγορᾶς) and then also tells us that when a 
cargo of grain came from Thessaly and there was no money in the public treasury to pay for it, 
he bade his pupils to contribute and paid for it himself.380 This is interesting because, in one of 
the declamatory speeches, Lollianus, speaking as Demosthenes, denounced Leptines on 
account of his law, because the supply of grain had failed to reach the Athenians from the 
Pontus.381 Lollianus, as Schmitz argues, is not merely saying what Demosthenes would have 
said, but, for all intents and purposes, at the moment of the speech, is Demosthenes.382 So we 
have someone in charge of the city grain supply who had actively provided for it and saved it on 
one occasion, speaking as Demosthenes, a major political figure of the fourth century B.C., who 
                                                          
378 Philostr. VS. 2.5.575 and Schmitz (1999) 78.  
379 Philostr. VS. 1.23.526.; Bowie (2006); we also see how one of the inscriptions on the statues which Philostratus 
tells us were dedicated to him has survived – EpGr 877, praising his declamation and forensic speeches.  
380 Philostr. VS. 1.23.526. 
381 Philostr. VS. 1.23.527. 
382 Schmitz (1999) 78 ‘in their declamations they actually embodied the great figures of the past; at least for the 
duration of their speeches, they turned into these classical authorities.[…] It is important to note that in these 
speeches, the personality of the sophist would completely disappear behind the figure he was embodying; when 
he said ‘I’ this pronoun referred to, say, Demosthenes not to himself’. 
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also spoke for Athens and tried to ensure its grain supply.383 Furthermore, an inscription from 
one of the bases of the two statues dedicated to Lollianus which Philostratus mentions has 
survived, and we see how it praises the ‘sophist’ for both his meletai and his actions in the law-
courts.384 Lollianus is certainly not the only one of Philostratus’ ‘sophists’ to have dabbled in the 
actual judicial process, but if this is taken together with his political role at Athens and his 
speech ‘as’ Demosthenes, one could infer that he actively associated himself with the fourth-
century orator. The reasons for this have to do mainly with an attitude towards Greece in 
general and Athens in particular which, Spawforth argues, starts with Augustus and is continued 
by Hadrian.385  
Spawforth contends that Augustus’ focus on Athens with his building programme and especially 
with the Agrippeum in the Agora deliberately promoted an image of Greece that conformed to 
Roman values.386 To summarise his argument, he explains how the position of the new Odeon 
at Athens commissioned by Augustus linked it closely to the newly established temple of Ares. 
Ares was a deity not traditionally worshipped in Athens, but his Roman counter-part, Mars, was 
obviously an important part of Roman identity, so that anyone who used the Agrippeum/Odeon 
would have been encouraged to think about the martial glory days of Classical Athens. Thus 
Augustus was re-creating an Athens that was in line with Roman moral values, of martial virility 
and victory; in Spawforth’s own words: ‘The Atticising décor, the statues of Greek/Athenian 
warriors and the newly arrived cult of Ares: this use of analogy signaled the donor’s [i.e. 
Agrippa’s] stylistic preference for the Attic muse and his ethical linkage of the style with the 
virtus and bellica laus of Classical Greece.’387 Furthermore, the only recorded purpose of the 
Agrippeum was to stage declamatory performances and, by setting it up in the Agora, Augustus 
wanted to indicate both that the rhetorical tradition of Athens was being recognised and also 
that there was a correct, non-subversive way of using it.  Spawforth points out that in the late 
                                                          
383 As Wright (1952) 100 points out, this fictitious speech is based on Demosthenes, Leptines 30 (but also see 31-
34), delivered by the orator in 355, where Demosthenes emphasises that, if Leptines’ law was in force then Athens 
would be left without grain from the Bosporus.  
384EpGr 877. 
385 Spawforth (2012) 60-80. 
386 Spawforth (2012) 62.  
387 Spawforth (2012) 70. 
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republic Greek politicians had used ‘Asian’-style (as opposed to Attic) oratory ‘to inflame 
opinion at civic assemblies against the Roman interest’, most notably when the philosopher 
Athenion persuaded the Athenians to join Mithridates of Pontus in an alliance against the 
Romans.388 The setting of the Agrippeum and encouragement of oratory in the Attic style 
signalled the imperial regime’s ‘low esteem for crowd-pleasing political oratory in the prevailing 
“Asian” manner’ and its ‘preference for […] the fictional themes delivered in the decorous 
speech-register of Classical Athens’.389 
Hadrian too gave special place to Athens when it came to Greekness, as seen in his attention to 
the physical shape of the city but also to Athens’ place in relation to the Greek world in 
general.390 The latter is most obvious in Hadrian’s creation of the Panhellenion, a cultural 
league of cities which had Athens as its leader and whose membership was granted based on 
Greekness.391 However, as Spawforth argues, Hellenism was ranked by Hadrian using a very 
particular conception of the place of Greece, with places that were in mainland Greece or 
colonies of such states being considered more ‘Greek’ than others (Athens and Sparta being in 
the centre). This view also favoured Greekness by birth and descent to ‘cultural Greekness’, 
meaning that some cities and communities – particularly in Asia Minor and the Roman near 
east – which did not have a strong connection to mainland Greece and had adopted the Greek 
‘way of life’ and paideia were considered less ‘Greek’.392 While there were cities such as 
Pergamum, Ephesus and Smyrna who were ostensibly not part of the Panhellenion, and 
individuals who were very proud to be from Asia Minor and rejected ‘Atticism’ (most notably 
Plutarch), there are also many examples of people seeking to align themselves to this Hadrianic 
view of ‘true Greece’.393 Spawforth points out that there was a rush of Greeks from Asia to 
mainland Greece, such as the Roman senators A. Claudius Charax of Pergamum and C. Claudius 
Titianus Demostratus of Ephesus who were both patronomoi at Sparta, M. Iulius Apellas of 
Carian Mylasa who was archon of the Eumolpidae, an anonymous citizen of Smyrna who held 
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390 Geagan (1979) 392-393; 398; Shear (1981) 374-377; Thompson (1987) 9-15. 
391 Boatwright (2000) 148-150; Jones (1996); Spawforth (1985) and (1999). 
392 Spawforth (2012) 253-254; Romeo (2002). 
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priestly office at Plataea, and Arrian himself who moved to Athens.394 But a willingness to be 
associated with the ‘true Greece’ can also be seen in the case of entire cities struggling to 
demonstrate a ‘true’ Greek descent, such as Aezani in Phrygia, accepted into the Panhellenion 
only because they proved that they were founded by Arcadians.395 
It is against this background that we should examine Lollianus’ and Arrian’s techniques of 
presentation. Since Lollianus was from Ephesus, his interest in declamation, his political activity 
in Athens and his intention of being associated with Demosthenes will all have served to align 
him to this self-same – to use Spawforth’s terms – vera Graecia. But, as I hinted before, I 
believe Lollianus is also using the prestige of Demosthenes to augment his own prestige as the 
words and actions of the two blend together in a blur of past and present – which at the 
moment of the declamation were both in the mind of audiences, as Webb argued.396 I would 
dare push her argument even further, and suggest that the audience judged not only the 
sophistic performance but also the sophist himself, and thus by his choice of theme and 
comparison to Demosthenes, Lollianus is encouraging them to think of him also in the context 
of current Athenian civic life, suggesting that his actions rivalled those of the great orator and 
deserved similar credit.  
While in Lollianus’ case we can only suspect his desire to be associated with Demosthenes, in 
Arrian we have a clearer example, in a text which is in some ways similar to a ‘sophistic’ speech, 
of him actually impersonating Xenophon for similar reasons. 
Firstly all the commentators have noticed that Arrian, as he does before in the Kynegetikos, 
calls himself Xenophon in the Ektaxis: 
ὁ δὲ ἡγεμὼν τῆς πάσης στρατιᾶς Ξενοφῶν  τὸ πολὺ μὲν πρὸ τῶν σημείων τῶν πεζικῶν 
ἡγείσθω 
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‘And let the leader of the entire army, Xenophon, mostly command in front of the infantry 
standards.’397 
In all other texts Xenophon is identified as a figure distinct from Arrian, either implicitly or 
explicitly. For example, in the beginning of the Periplus Arrian calls him ‘that Xenophon’ (ὁ 
Ξενοφῶν ἐκεῖνος) and later on he is named ‘Xenophon the elder’ (Ξενοφῶντι τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ; 
Ξενοφῶν ὁ πρεσβύτερος).398 In the Taktika he is not named ‘the other’ but it is clear that he is a 
different person from Arrian in a passage is about other authors (‘some […] others […]’/ οἳ μὲν 
[…]οἳ δὲ), while in a different passage he is called Xenophon son of Gryllos, just like in the 
preface to the Kynegetikos.399 There, Arrian also explains that he and Xenophon have the same 
name, but makes it very clear that they are two different people.400  
In the Ektaxis, however, the ‘old Xenophon’ does not appear; perhaps the reader is left 
purposely wondering which Xenophon this is – the old or the new?  Or are they here the same 
person? The issue would be clearer if Xenophon were Arrian’s actual given name, as perhaps 
there would not be that much room for interpretation. This is what Stadter argues, thinking it 
does not appear in inscriptions because there he uses his official Roman name, and also 
thinking it must be a given name because Arrian says it is.401 But, as Bosworth notes, the 
epigraphic evidence does not support this and I must add that, in the case of other individuals 
named Xenophon, such as Claudius’ physician, C. Stertinius Xenophon, the Greek name does 
appear in official epigraphic contexts, thus weakening Stadter’s argument.402 Furthermore 
Stadter’s parallel with Plutarch’s Roman name – Maestrius – which we only know from an 
inscription at Delphi, does not quite work, because in that inscription his Greek and Roman 
names appear together, just as in the case of Stertinius.403  
                                                          
397 Arr. Ektax.10. 
398 Arr. Peripl.M.Eux. 1; 12; 25. 
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As for the argument that it must be his real name because Arrian himself calls himself that, it 
would seem that the question of identity is slightly more complicated if considered against the 
earlier issue of Lollianus and what I took to be a desire to avoid being associated with Asia 
Minor through his activities at Athens.  Arrian also claims to be from Athens, although we know 
he was originally from Nicomedia and only became a citizen of Athens when he retired there 
after his imperial career. However, what he chooses to highlight is different because, as 
Spawforth argues, he wants to be associated with ‘true’ Greece.404  We also see the same play 
with identity in Polyaenus’ case. He is also from Nicomedia but chooses to highlight his 
Macedonian descent (whence his family might have come originally) to give authority to his 
text, as Macedonian blood counted a lot towards expertise in warfare (or so he believed).405 So, 
in the end, the fact that Arrian says he has the same name as Xenophon does not count for 
much, as he could easily have chosen to highlight it after having appropriated it. I therefore 
agree with Bosworth, who states that Arrian’s reference to himself as Xenophon in the Ektaxis 
‘is a part of the literary affectation whereby Arrian represented himself as the New Xenophon, 
and it is hardly likely that he would have kept up the affectation in an official document."’406 
Arrian not only encouraged the thought that in some sense he was Xenophon, he also adopted 
Xenophon’s language. This was not merely a matter of using the correct Attic vocabulary, in the 
way that declaimers do, but a matter of adopting a vocabulary of battle which was out-of date 
and archaising. One aspect of this has been pointed out by Bosworth and Stadter – the use of 
phalanx for legion, but there is more.407  
First, there is the indication as to how the legionaries should raise the warcry: πελαζόντων δὲ 
ἤδη ὡς μέγιστον καὶ φοβερώτατον ἀλαλάζειν σύμπαντας τῷ Ἐνυαλίῳ/‘and let all approach and 
raise a cry to Enialios as loudly and terrifyingly as possible’.408 By its mention of Ares’ epithet 
Enyalios, the passage reminds one of hoplite battle, as described by Xenophon himself: καὶ ἅμα 
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ἐφθέγξαντο πάντες οἷον τῷ Ἐνυαλίῳ ἐλελίζουσι/‘at the same moment they all set up the sort 
of war-cry which they raise to Enyalios, and all alike began running.’409  
Second, we have the description of Arrian’s entourage:  οἱ δὲ ἐπίλεκτοι ἱππῆς ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν 
Ξενοφῶντα ἔστων, καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος πεζῶν/’And let chosen men from the cavalry 
surround Xenophon and from the infantry of the phalanx’. This closely resembles Xenophon’s 
use of picked troops and his own entourage, as seen twice in the Anabasis: συνέπεσθαι δ᾽ 
ἐκέλευσεν αὐτῷ καὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους οὓς αὐτὸς εἶχε τῶν ἐπιλέκτων ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ 
πλαισίου /‘he also ordered the three hundred picked men under his own command at the front 
of the square to join Xenophon's force’ and ὁ δὲ Ξενοφῶν ἔχων τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ τὸ 
ὄρος ἀνωτάτω κώμῃ/‘while Xenophon with his picked men took quarters in the uppermost 
village below the summit’.410 
This is not to say that Arrian’s epilektoi were not real troops (which goes for all the troops in the 
text, as we shall see below) - surely Bosworth must be right in seeing the Roman equites 
singulares in the οἱ δὲ ἐπίλεκτοι ἱππῆς and Polybius, earlier on, uses the term to refer to the 
Roman extraordinarii.411 However, by very subtly describing himself as operating in a way 
similar to Xenophon, surrounded by picked men which can be seen as both the Roman equites 
singulares and Xenophon’s epilektoi, he is bringing together Greek and Roman practices and 
makes the connection between his army and Xenophon’s. Furthermore, by choosing to 
describe the entire army and himself in an archaising way which reminds the audience of the 
fourth-century Xenophon and his troops, but without at any moment giving the impression that 
what he is describing is anything but a Roman provincial army, Arrian is at the same time 
explaining his actions in his present but also re-creating a Classical past. Just as we saw Lollianus 
of Ephesus as an Athenian official, pretending to be Demosthenes in an Athenian law-court 
whilst in front of an audience in the theatre at Athens, Arrian is also at the same time Flavius 
Arrianus the Roman governor leading his provincial army and Xenophon son of Gryllos, the 
general from Athens.  
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As in the case of Lollianus, the reasons for Arrian’s impersonation of Xenophon are twofold. The 
first simply takes Spawforth’s point about him trying to fit into the Roman idea of ‘true’ Greece 
further. Not only, as Spawforth argues, does he move to Athens in his old age and become 
archon there, but before this, as serving Roman official, he is trying to construct an identity 
which is – from a Roman imperial point of view – incontestably Greek, using techniques similar 
to declamation, which is in itself a Roman-sanctioned practice.    
But second, just as in the previous chapter, we can perhaps see in this attempt at integration 
within the empire also a competition, this time between himself and the Greek past 
represented by Xenophon, and – again perhaps like Lollianus – an attempt to use this 
competition both to augment his own achievements and to put them into perspective. So, can 
we think that, as in Lollianus’ case, Arrian would have wanted to boost his reputation? If so, for 
what reasons? Cassius Dio’s account of the war with the Alani makes it clear that it was not a 
particularly dangerous affair (as Arrian’s preparations would have us believe), and it appears 
that there was no actual battle. Dio tells us that the Alani were simply frightened and turned 
away by the governor’s forces (τὰ δὲ καὶ Φλάουιον Ἀρριανὸν τὸν τῆς Καππαδοκίας ἄρχοντα 
φοβηθέντων/‘but were also frightened by Flavius Arrianus, the governor of Cappadocia’).412 
Bosworth is perhaps right in believing there was only a skirmish, and states that ‘it is 
questionable whether the Alani ever posed a serious frontier problem for the Romans. Their 
previous history, in so far as it is known, suggests that their depredations in general served the 
interests of Rome.’413 
No doubt repelling them was essential, but given that they had been on a booty expedition 
doing so could not have been hard and the threat to Cappadocia was minimal.  Therefore, 
Arrian would perhaps have wanted to augment his success by blending past and present and 
presenting himself in the persona of a successful general such as Xenophon, and associating his 
prestige with Xenophon’s to create a stronger impact in regard to an otherwise minimal threat. 
However, in terms of overall competition with Xenophon it could not have escaped Arrian that 
the fourth-century general fought as a mercenary for a Persian (and not even legitimate) ruler, 
                                                          
412 D.C. 69.15. 
413 Bosworth (1977) 220. 
142 
 
Cyrus the Younger, and then for the Spartans at the battle of Coronea in 394 B.C. against his 
own city of Athens, for which he was exiled. In comparison, Arrian not only served Athens in his 
old age as archon, but defended the borders of the Roman Empire from however little a 
danger, so the comparison between him and Xenophon need not only place him in a positive 
light by virtue of Xenophon’s prestige. In other words, it shows how Arrian had the heritage and 
skills of a Xenophon but also was more successful than him, both in a Roman moral framework 
and in a Roman-approved Greek one, by serving both his patriae - the Roman Empire and 
Athens – successfully, unlike Xenophon. But, in talking about Xenophon and himself, Arrian is 
also talking more broadly about Greeks and Romans and ideas of empire and this is what we 
will turn to now. 
2. The Ektaxis and the geography of the army  
‘Why would you “publish” the Ektaxis?’ This seems to me to be one of the fundamental 
questions in understanding the text and the bigger issues behind it. This is clearly not meant to 
be a ‘manual’ or ‘handbook’ in the same sense in which one might read the Taktika because the 
situation described is too specific to allow any generalisation. At best this could be read as a 
case-study following Stadter’s line, but the idea that it demonstrates how the principles 
described in the Taktika can be applied cannot be dissociated from the personal advertising of 
Arrian as the man doing the applying. If we then start thinking about ‘publication’ as a form of 
advertising – and we have clearly seen how Arrian ‘advertises’ himself as Xenophon – we might 
wonder what else apart from the author might be advertised. I believe the answer to this 
question is ‘the Roman Empire’, for if one examines the troops described in the Ektaxis and 
Arrian’s position in the middle of this all, one gets the idea that it presents a microcosm of 
empire with its particular geography, but also with great emphasis on diversity. 
First of all, it must be said that there is no reason to doubt that the troops mentioned in the 
Ektaxis are real. The units of troops deployed have now long been identified by Grotefend and 
more definitively by Ritterling, and if Arrian’s agenda was to make a greater point about the 
Roman Empire, it would have made sense to use existing units, even if the description of his 
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battle array was highly literary.414 Having said this, the very fact that scholars have needed to go 
to so much trouble to figure out the exact units to which Arrian is referring makes it quite clear 
that he is not primarily interested in enabling real-life troops to be identified. Unlike in the 
Taktika, where, as Busetto shows, he goes to great pains to translate into Greek the exact terms 
used by the Roman army (sometimes having to resort to periphrases), in the Ektaxis Arrian uses 
various ways of referring to the units – not just the one which would make it easiest for a 
reader simply interested in military facts to understand, namely giving the name and number of 
the troop in question.415 Arrian uses this latter technique only twice, in paragraph one, to 
differentiate between the two Rhaetian cohorts: οἱ τῆς σπείρας τῆς τετάρτης τῶν Ῥαιτῶν, 
identified by Ritterling as the riders of the cohors IIII Rhaetorum equitata shown as stationed in 
Analiba in the Notitia dignitatum, and the οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης Ῥαιτικῆς, that Ritterling assumes 
are the horsemen of a cohors I Rhaetorum equitata, but which is not in the Notitia nor can be 
identified with certainty.416 Unit numbers – without their full designation – appear concerning 
only two more bodies of troops, the legions: ἡ πεζικὴ φάλαγξ ἡ πεντεκαιδεκάτη  identified as 
the XV Apollinaris, and the τὸ σημεῖον τῆς δωδεκάτης φάλαγγος, ‘standard of the twelfth 
phalanx’ which according to Ritterling is the XII fulminata.417 Arrian’s preferred way of referring 
to troops is by their ‘ethnic’ names (but also names which relate to their status, such as the οἱ 
ἀπὸ τῆς ἴλης ᾗ ὄνομα Κολῶνες/’those from the ala whose name is Coloni’) sometimes in 
conjunction with the type of unit, e.g. ἡ ἴλη τῶν Γετῶν, but most of the time just simply as the 
‘Celtic horsemen’, οἱ Κελτοὶ ἱππῆς or simply ‘the Italians and Cyrenians’ οἵ τε Ἰταλοὶ καὶ 
Κυρηναίων.418 Ritterling makes the point that, when it comes to the cavalry, when Arrian uses 
just the ‘ethnic’ names he is referring to the horsemen of a cohors, rather than an ala, which he 
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always names.419 While this may be true, the terminology used throughout the treatise is much 
too inconsistent to be considered as a well thought-out system – at least in the sense of precise 
identification. 
The insistence on ‘ethnic’ epithets emphasises the diversity of peoples present in the Roman 
army. Thus we see the Aurianoi and Rhaetians being led by a Corinthian named Daphnes (ἐπὶ δὲ 
τούτοις ἐπιτετάχθων οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴλης ᾗτινι Αὐριανοὶ ὄνομα. συντετάχθων δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ τῆς 
σπείρας τῆς τετάρτης τῶν Ῥαιτῶν, ἧς ἄρχων Δάφνης Κορίνθιος).420 Following them are the 
Iturians and Cyrenaeans (συντετάχθων δὲ αὐτοῖς Ἰτουραῖοι καὶ Κυρηναῖοι)421, also led by 
someone with a Greek name – Demetrius – and after these are deployed the Celts (ἐπὶ τούτοις 
δὲ οἱ Κελτοὶ ἱππῆς), who are preceded by the infantry which is made up of Italians and 
Cyrenians, under the leadership of an Italian, Pulcher (οἵ τε Ἰταλοὶ καὶ Κυρηναίων οἱ παρόντες. 
πάντων δὲ ἡγείσθω Πούλχερ, ὅσπερ ἄρχει τοῖς Ἰταλοῖς).422 All of these are all real troops, but 
the way in which Arrian presents them, by using their ‘ethnic’ names first and foremost, but 
also in the case of Daphnes emphasising their commander’s origin, gives a very strong sense of 
the unique geographical diversity of the empire. A reader who understands that all these 
different peoples, although so diverse, had come together to fight for the empire under Arrian’s 
command, comes to see Arrian’s army as representative of the Roman Empire as a whole, with 
Arrian being a surrogate for the emperor/commander. 
 This recognition of the diversity but also the unity within the empire is further augmented by 
this very way in which Arrian refers to them, not only by using the dry name and number 
designation – of which he is clearly aware – but by emphasising that these are real people in 
the empire: Celts, Italians, Cyrenians, Corinthians. By presenting different ways in which one 
can describe troops, Arrian is also revealing the way in which the empire recognises their 
uniqueness and individual existence outside of the units; so the Rhaetians are part of the fourth 
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speira but they are still Rhaetians, and a legitimate way of referring to them would be just ‘the 
Rhaetian infantry’ or the ‘Rhaetian cavalry’ just as Arrian refers to the πεζοὶ[…] Ἰταλοὶ, the 
Βοσπορανοὶ […]πεζοὶ or the Κελτοὶ ἱππῆς. Along the same lines, in using periphrases such as οἱ 
ἀπὸ τῆς ἴλης ᾗ ὄνομα Κολῶνες, ‘those from the ala whose name is Coloni’, Arrian is perhaps 
also emphasising that not all of the members of the ala are coloni, since new members may 
have been recruited from different areas due to casualties, and so the make-up of the unit may 
have been more diverse than its name implies, and one needed to recognise that.423  
Unity in diversity of the Roman Empire is also emphasised by targeting the army in particular in 
Hadrian’s coinage. In the EXERCITUS series we see the provincial armies being honoured locally, 
with the name of the province (Britannia, Cappadocia, Dacia, Dalmatia, Germania, Hispania, 
Mauretania, Moesia, Noricum, Rhaetia, Syria and Thracia) but without any iconographic 
particularities. So, ‘although honoured under local names, the armies remain Roman 
throughout’.424 The idea that Arrian is supporting the emperor’s policy of ‘unity in diversity’ is 
also apparent at the end of his Taktika, where Hadrian is commended for incorporating 
‘barbarian’ tactics in his army but most importantly because he allowed the ‘ethnic’ contingents 
to fight in the ways in which they were accustomed, preserving even their shouts in their own 
language: 
ὁ βασιλεὺς δὲ προσεξεῦρεν καὶ τὰ βαρβαρικὰ ἐκμελετᾶν αὐτούς, ὅσα τε Παρθυαίων ἢ 
Ἀρμενίων ἱπποτοξόται ἐπασκοῦσι, καὶ ὅσας οἱ Σαυροματῶν ἢ Κελτῶν κοντοφόροι 
ἐπιστροφάς τε καὶ ἀποστροφὰς τῶν ἵππων ἐν μέρει ἐπελαυνόντων, καὶ ἀκροβολισμοὺς ἐν 
τούτῳ πολυειδεῖς καὶ πολυτρόπους καὶ ἀλαλαγμοὺς πατρίους ἑκάστῳ γένει, Κελτικοὺς 
μὲν τοῖς Κελτοῖς ἱππεῦσι, Γετικοὺς δὲ τοῖς Γέταις, Ῥαιτικοὺς δὲ ὅσοι ἐκ Ῥαιτῶν. 
                                                          
423 Gilliver (2007) 193 ‘Auxiliary units were initially raised from Rome’s provinces and were identified by their tribal 
or geographic origin, but gradually local recruitment where the units were stationed diluted much of their ethnic 
identity and in the second century A.D. citizens were serving in the auxiliary units as well as legions’. However, I do 
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the Koloni were not a people nor were the Aurianoi in line 6 of chapter 1, whose unit is presented in the same way.  
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‘but the king devised besides that they should also train in the ways of the barbarians, such 
as the Parthian and Armenian mounted archers practice, and the wheeling around and 
turning back manoeuvres which the Sarmatians and Celts engage in, driving their horses 
upon one another, and that they should also include in their training the skirmishing of 
many forms and many turns, and the shouts which are native to each race, the Celtic 
ones for the Celtic horsemen, the Getic ones for the Getae, and the Rhaetians for the 
Rhaetians.’425 
These traditions are therefore placed – by Hadrian – on the same level as τοῖς Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῦσι 
τὰ συνήθη τε καὶ ἐκ παλαιοῦ ἀσκούμενα, the ‘customary exercises of the Romans and their 
practices of old’, and the Roman Empire’s recognition and appreciation for ‘foreign’ imports, as 
discussed earlier in the Taktika complements this image. 426 But the emphasis there was mostly 
on the past and on how in the early days of Rome this was common practice, whilst in the 
discussion above Arrian is demonstrating how Hadrian is in fact upholding this fine Roman 
tradition in his present day. Therefore, while in the Ektaxis this idea of unity in diversity is 
perhaps suggested, it is more clearly expressed in the Taktika.  
However, allowing for diversity is not restricted merely to Hadrian’s ‘programme’, but is part of 
a more general Roman ‘imperial programme’.  After all, as has been pointed out many times, 
Roman identity – down to its core in Rome’s foundation myth – is inclusive, and Greg Woolf has 
shown, with respect to Greeks and Romans in the empire, that in their rule the latter were 
interested only in upholding a certain set of morals and practices and did not try radically to 
alter the identity of those being ruled. In his own words: ‘Greeks remained Greeks, at least in 
part, because Romans allowed them to. By valuing the Greek past and permitting the Greek 
language to operate as an official one throughout the early empire, Romans made no assault on 
the central defining characteristics of Hellenism.’427 The same argument could be made about 
Arrian’s presentation of Hadrian’s ‘reforms’ and the army mentioned above: the Romans 
organised their troops to fight in specific units (such as alae, cohorts, numeri), each 
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commanded by a Roman (citizen), but they were perfectly happy to allow them to preserve the 
particularities of their fighting styles which made them very efficient and useful to the empire 
in the first place.428  
In keeping with the theme of past and present, the geography of the empire in the Ektaxis also 
comprises the past, further augmenting the feeling of diversity in the Roman empire and 
stressing its permanence, because it spans over so many peoples and over so much time. This is 
evident in the self-same archaising which Bosworth talked about, namely in the incorporation 
of the tactics of the Greek phalanx in the Roman legion: 
τετάχθων δὲ ἐπὶ ὀκτώ, καὶ πυκνὴ αὐτοῖς ἔστω ἡ σύγκλεισις. καὶ αἱ μὲν πρῶται τέσσαρες 
τάξεις ἔστων κοντοφόρων, ὧν δὴ τοῖς κοντοῖς μακρὰ καὶ ἐπίλεπτα τὰ σιδήρια προῆκται. 
καὶ τούτους οἱ μὲν πρωτοστάται ἐς προβολὴν ἐχόντων, ὡς εἰ πελάζοιεν αὐτοῖς οἱ πολέμιοι, 
κατὰ τὰ στήθη μάλιστα τῶν ἵππων τίθεσθαι τῶν κοντῶν τὸν σίδηρον 
‘Let the ranks form eight deep and in close order; Let the first four ranks be made up of 
those who have kontoi (long pikes), and whose kontoi have long and light iron tips 
attached. And these the men in their first ranks should have projecting forward, so that if 
the enemies approach them, the iron of the spears will be driven into the horses chests.’429 
This is perhaps more than just a way in which the formations described in the Taktika can work 
in real life, but it is recognition of the importance of the traditions of the Greeks and a 
demonstration of how the Empire still acknowledges and keeps them alive, just as in the case of 
the Celts, Getae and Rhaetians. But the Greek phalanx also becomes a tool, showing how Greek 
knowledge can still help order the Roman Empire more generally, and the Roman army more 
specifically, with Arrian being both possessor of said knowledge and the one who orders it. 
This recognition of diversity in the Roman Empire comes into sharp contrast with the view we 
get of Alexander’s ‘empire’ in the Anabasis, when Arrian discusses the latter’s military reforms. 
In this case too we see Persians incorporated in the structures of the Macedonian army (καὶ 
                                                          
428 For auxiliary units being commanded by Roman officers see Goldsworthy (2003) 64; for numeri Gilliver (2007) 
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πέμπτη ἐπὶ τούτοις ἱππαρχία προσγενομένη, οὐ βαρβαρικὴ ἡ πᾶσα, ἀλλὰ ἐπαυξηθέντος γὰρ 
τοῦ παντὸς ἱππικοῦ κατελέγησαν ἐς αὐτὸ τῶν βαρβάρων/‘Furthermore, a fifth hipparchy had 
been created: it was not entirely barbarian, but when the whole cavalry was increased in size, 
barbarians were enrolled in it’) but instead of their fighting styles being welcomed, they were in 
fact forced to accept those of the Macedonians, most evident in the replacement of their 
‘barbarian javelins’ with ‘Macedonian spears’ (καὶ τούτοις δόρατα Μακεδονικὰ ἀντὶ τῶν 
βαρβαρικῶν μεσαγκύλων δοθέντα).430 It is almost certain that Arrian wrote the Anabasis after 
the Taktika, but I believe that his portrayal of Alexander’s empire may have been influenced by 
his image of the one he was living in and serving under, and vice-versa, and thus felt the need 
to emphasise the ‘correct’ ways in which some things were being done by the Romans.   
But along this line, it is interesting that in the same way in which Hadrian focuses on Athens as 
a symbol for the whole of Greece, therefore creating a certain view of Greekness, so too Arrian 
and Aelian focus on the phalanx in reconstructing its military tradition, and this is what we shall 
address next. 
3. The Taktika, Alexander, Greek phalanxes and the emperors’ military image 
In the previous section we have briefly considered Hadrian’s attention to the incorporation of 
‘foreign’ military practices into the Roman army, as emphasised by Arrian in his Taktika. In what 
follows I will try to show how the Taktika of Arrian fits into an image of the perfect commander 
which Hadrian was clearly trying to create, showing how he has mastered Roman practices but 
also implying that he either is or should be the possessor of Greek knowledge. Then, by looking 
more closely at their subject matter, I will demonstrate why Arrian and Aelian chose to write 
taktika and how they are trying to advertise them as texts which are worthy of being read by 
the emperors, as they could give them an edge when it came to military knowledge.   
3.1. Arrian’s Taktika and Hadrian ‘the commander’ 
After Trajan’s expansion of the empire, Hadrian had to deal with rebellions in the newly 
conquered provinces, which led to the evacuation of many of them, such as Mesopotamia, 
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Greater Armenia, Assyria and to the abandoning of Trajan’s bridge over the Danube.431 Opper 
believes that this ‘must have come as a profound shock, breeding instant resentment in some 
of the senators and the Roman public at large’.432 Indeed the Historia Augusta informs us that 
‘Hadrian abandoned many provinces won by Trajan, and also destroyed, contrary to the 
entreaties of all, the theatre which Trajan had built in the Campus Martius. These measures, 
unpopular enough in themselves, were still more displeasing because of his pretense that all 
acts which he thought would be offensive had been secretly enjoined upon him by Trajan (Inter 
haec tamen et multas provincias a Traiano adquisitas reliquit et theatrum, quod ille in Campo 
Martio posuerat, contra omnium vota destruxit. et haec quidem eo tristiora videbantur, quod 
omnia, quae displicere vidisset Hadrianus, mandata sibi ut faceret secreto a Traiano esse 
simulabat.)’433  
Even allowing for the unreliable nature of the Historia Augusta and for Opper’s exaggeration, 
given his recent succession and military setbacks, it is understandable that Hadrian would have 
wanted to cultivate a strong military image of a successful and experienced commander, in 
order to support his policy of consolidating the empire’s boundaries rather than expanding 
them.434 As Opper points out, this was done in part through iconography, with statues 
representing the emperor as Mars (such as the one in the Capitoline Museum at Rome) or 
depicting him in a military cuirass and with his foot on a defeated barbarian (the colossal statue 
from Hierapytna), and partly through his engagement with the troops.435  One of the places 
where we find the latter demonstrated is the Historia Augusta, which depicts Hadrian with the 
common trope of the good commander, sharing the burdens of service with the soldiers just 
like figures from the Roman past: 
                                                          
431 Birley (1997) 78-79; Opper (2008) 66-67. 
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pacisque magis quam belli cupidus militem, quasi bellum immineret, exercuit tolerantiae 
documentis eum imbuens, ipse quoque inter manipula vitam militarem magistrans, cibis 
etiam castrensibus in propatulo libenter utens, hoc est larido caseo et posca, exemplo 
Scipionis Aemiliani et Metelli et auctoris sui Traiani, multos praemiis nonnullos honoribus 
donans, ut ferre possent ea quae asperius iubebat. si quidem ipse post Caesarem 
Octavianum labantem disciplinam incuria superiorum principum retinuit. 
‘Though more desirous of peace than of war, he kept the soldiers in training just as if war 
were imminent, inspired them by proofs of his own powers of endurance, actually led a 
soldier’s life among the maniples, and after the example of Scipio Aemilianus, Metellus, 
and his own adoptive father Trajan, cheerfully ate out of doors such camp-fare as bacon, 
cheese and vinegar. And that he troops might submit more willingly to the increased 
harshness of his orders, he bestowed gifts on many and honours on a few. For he re-
established the discipline of the camp, which since the time of Octavian had been growing 
slack through the laxity of his predecessors.’436 
But by far the most important evidence for Hadrian’s portrayal of himself as an experienced 
commander is the Lambaesis inscriptions, the perfect demonstration that Hadrian wanted not 
only to have a close relationship with the troops but also for this to be recorded for future 
reference.437 This was set up as part of a monument outside a legionary fort in North Africa, in 
the province of Numidia, and records Hadrian’s speeches to the troops he inspected in 128 
A.D.438 Although the text is very fragmentary, we can still see that, just like Arrian’s Ektaxis, it 
constitutes a means of self-presentation and advertising for Hadrian, and in it we notice the 
same relationship between the emperor and his troops as emphasised in the later Historia 
Augusta: 
[Catullinu]s leg(atus) meus pro causa ves[tra a]cer est, ve[rum, quae argu]-  
[e]nda vobis aput me fuissent omnia mihi pro vobis ipse di[xit, quod] 
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cohors abest, quod omnibus annis per vices in officium pro[con]= 
sulis mittitur, quod ante annum tertium cohortem et qui [nos] 
ex centuris in supplementum comparum tertianorum dedis- 
tis, quod multae, quod diversae stationes vos distinent, quod 
nostra memoria bis tantutm mutastis castra sed et nova fecis- 
tis. Ob haec excusatos vos habe[rem si q]uid in exercitatione cessas- 
set. Sed nihil aut cessavis[se videtur aut est ulla causa cur] 
vobis excusatione [aput me opus esset - - - ca. 26 - - -] 
retis val[ - - - ca. 48 - - -] 
‘Catullinus, my legate, is keen in your support; indeed, everything that you might have had 
to put to me he has himself told me on your behalf; that a cohort is away because, taking 
turns, one is sent every year to the staff of the Proconsul; that two years ago you gave a 
cohort and five men from each centuria to the fellow third legion, that many and far-flung 
outposts keep you scattered, that twice within our memory you have not only changed 
fortresses but built new ones. For this I would have forgiven you if something had come to 
a halt in your training. But nothing seems to have halted, nor is there any reason why you 
should need my forgiving’439 
But Hadrian also insists on his ability to evaluate and correct in his address to the cohors II 
Hamiorum, chiding the riders for not being careful in maintaining formation (tarde iunxistis […] 
erumpetis veh[ementius]/‘You were  slow to close ranks - - you will break out more briskly’).440 
He also displays detailed understanding of the minutiae of cavalry warfare in commending the 
ala I Pannoniorum for their complex manoeuvres: Omnia per ordinem egistis. Campum 
de[cu]rsionibus complestis, iaculati estis non ineleganter, has[tis usi q]uamquam brevibus et 
duris/ You did everything according to the book. You filled the training ground with your 
wheelings, you threw spears not ungracefully, though with short and stiff shafts.’441 It is clear 
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that the emperor wanted emphasise his military knowledge and his skills as a general and I 
believe the Taktika is trying to help Hadrian to do so and perhaps reconcile it with his more 
philhellene interests.  
Connections between the Lambaesis inscriptions and Arrian’s Taktika have already been 
pointed out by Busetto, although I would not go as far as her in saying that the latter is simply a 
literary transposition of the former. In looking at the two we could argue not only that Arrian 
actively paid attention to the language preferred by the emperor to present himself as a good 
commander, but that he chooses to give the same – albeit commonsensical –  advice as him 
concerning cavalry matters, thus emphasising Hadrian’s correct knowledge in this respect.442 
This is most apparent in their agreement that the best military exercises are the ones that best 
simulate the realities of combat, and we see Hadrian making this point to the riders of the same 
cohors II Hamiorum – laudo quod convertuit vos ad hanc exercitat[ionem…quae verae 
di]micationis imaginem accepit et sic exercet [vos - - - ca. 12 - - - ut lau]dare vos possim./’I 
praise him for having brought you over to this manoeuvre that has taken on the looks of true 
fighting, and for training you so well - - - that I can praise you’ and also Arrian in the Taktika  καὶ 
ἥτις ἐπέλασις τοὺς πλείστους παράσχοιτο τῶν λογχῶν τῇ βολῇ διαπρέποντας, ταύτην ἐγὼ 
μᾶλλον ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἐπῄνεσα, ὡς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔργων ἠσκημένην./’and this 
charge would reveal the most eminent of the spearmen when it comes to throwing, and I 
praised it above any other, as an exercise similar to the real ways of warfare’.443  
Moreover, it seems that in the Taktika the emperor’s point of view is given a prominent role in 
the evaluation of the drills performed by the troops. The basileus is mentioned in chapter 42 
and his clear role as assessor means he possesses the necessary skills to be able to critique even 
the most specific manoeuvres. This is emphasised by his mention three times in the text: he is 
the one in front of whom the customary manoeuvres are performed (τὰ ἔννομα καὶ πρὸς τοῦ 
βασιλέως τεταγμένα), then we see how he added to these latter manoeuvres by commanding a 
third target to be set up which the horsemen must hit (ἐς τὸν ἄλλον σκοπόν, ὃν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δὴ 
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τούτῳ κατὰ πρόσταξιν τοῦ βασιλέως ἐς ἐκδοχὴν τῆς τρίτης λόγχης ἱστᾶσιν.), and finally how 
the emperor’s contribution pushed the troops into being faster and wanting to perform better 
(ἤδη δέ τις ὑπὸ ὀξύτητός τε καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ τέσσαρας λόγχας ὀρθῷ τῷ ἵππῳ ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον 
σκοπὸν ἐξακοντίσαι ἤνυσεν, ἢ τὰς τρεῖς μὲν ὀρθῷ τῷ ἵππῳ, τὴν τετάρτην δὲ ἐπιστρέφοντι, ὡς ὁ 
βασιλεὺς ἔταξεν/’Indeed, someone driven by sharpness and ambition managed to throw four 
spears at the first target with his horse going straight, and the fourth as it was wheeling about, 
as the king ordered’).444  
Although Hadrian is not mentioned by name here, it is safe to assume that Arrian is thinking 
about him, since the end of the treatise concludes with a praise of Hadrian’s military 
innovations.445  This image of the emperor observing and evaluating his troops is strikingly 
similar to the Lambaesis inscription, so one might safely conclude that Arrian is very keen to 
contribute to Hadrian’s depiction of himself as a very skilled commander. If we accept this, then 
the first thirty-two chapters containing Greek military practice come as a completion to this 
depiction, and one could argue that by their inclusion Arrian is either trying to present Hadrian 
as possessing this Greek military knowledge as well, or to suggest that incorporating it into his 
already vast knowledge of warfare would make him an even more complete commander. 
Aelian too dedicates his treatise to the reigning emperor, and as we have seen before this is 
most likely Trajan. However, in order to both contribute to Hadrian’s creation of an image of a 
successful military commander and in order to offer a work containing military advice to Trajan, 
an already accomplished commander, one would have to choose the subject matter of the 
work very carefully. In the case of Arrian, it would have to be something that is clearly set up as 
not only an addition to the Roman practices described in the second part of the manual, but 
also a worthy rival of them. In the case of Aelian, who chooses to discuss only Greek practices, 
it would have to be something worthy to be read by an emperor who had seen first-hand the 
efficiency of the Roman army. It is precisely to what this topic had to be that we will turn now. 
3.2 The Greek phalanx: advertising Greek military achievements and building up 
the emperors’ military knowledge 
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We have seen before how Augustus created an image of ‘true Greece’ and how warfare and 
victory was a very important part of this image. This is very clear in Spawforth’s example of the 
Augustan choice to highlight a militarily victorious Classical Athens which would correspond to 
an even more victorious Rome. Lamberton argues that Plutarch also contributes greatly to 
constructing this image and to the building up of Athens as a rival even for imperial Rome, an 
image that hails both as leaders of empires, but with Rome being a larger, more successful 
version.446  
Arrian’s Taktika emphasises Athens and its influences, and we can see in it how the Romans 
borrowed one of the defining elements of romanitas – their laws – from the Athenians (καὶ μὴν 
τῶν νόμων, οὓς ἐν ταῖς δώδεκα δέλτοις τὰ πρῶτα ἐγράψαντο, τοὺς πολλοὺς εὕροις ἂν παρ᾽ 
Ἀθηναίων λαβόντας).447 I believe that with their choice of subject matter, Arrian and Aelian 
push further the parallelism of military achievement of the Romans and the Greeks more 
generally, by the same means of integration and competition which we have seen in the 
previous chapter.  
This parallelism in the military sphere, whether at a macro scale when comparing the military 
achievements of Athens and Rome, or at a micro scale when discussing whether Greek or 
Roman practices were better, was problematic. Unlike geography and medicine, which were 
considered Greek disciplines, the Romans having only a later claim to them, the primacy of 
Greek military science was contested by the Romans. So, as we have already seen, any author 
who wanted to emphasise Greek military achievements would not only have to contend with 
Roman claims of superiority, but would have to point out a great military accomplishment of 
the Greeks. The way to do this was by choosing something as a topic of focus which could both 
stand as a token for all Greek military achievements, but also relate to the Romans on the same 
kind of personal level as the Athenian laws, in that it could be considered both foreign and part 
of their Roman culture. It had to be something which, like Athenian laws and like Greek 
medicine, the Romans had adopted and perfected, and that was the phalanx. 
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It is clear, then, that while both Arrian and Aelian include information about cavalry and light 
infantry, the centrepiece of both works is the phalanx. In Arrian’s Taktika, chapters five to eight, 
part of nine, ten to twelve, all deal in some way with it. Chapter thirteen discusses the light 
troops but in relation to the phalanx, which the other troops are meant to support. Chapters 
twenty to twenty-six tackle manoeuvres, but again with the phalanx as the main focus. Aelian’s 
topics are similar, with even less discussion of other troops. Three to fifteen refer only to the 
phalanx, the numbers it should have in its files and its officers. Twenty-four to thirty-four again 
discuss the manoeuvres of the phalanx (after briefly tackling the cavalry and light infantry in 
sixteen to twenty-one). Thirty-six to thirty-nine talk about the order of march, again with the 
phalanx at the forefront, and even the commands in chapter forty are written with the phalanx 
primarily in mind. What is perhaps even more interesting is that the authors have a particular 
type of phalanx in mind. Thus, while Arrian offers some classical examples, the battle array 
which he is discussing is clearly a Hellenistic phalanx, meaning an improved version of a 
Macedonian one (ταύτῃ τοι καὶ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ φάλαγξ φοβερὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις/’thus, the 
Macedonian phalanx seemed fearsome to its enemies’; τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τῶν σαρισῶν πόδας 
ἐπεῖχεν ἑκκαίδεκα/ the length of the sarisae was of sixteen feet).448 Aelian not only describes 
the Macedonian phalanx, but that of Alexander the Great, as he explicitly states (ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦ 
Μακεδόνος Ἀλεξάνδρου τὴν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν ἐπιβολὴν θεωρήσεις/‘in which you will 
observe Alexander the Macedonian’s approach in marshalling his men’).449 
On the one hand, this could be seen as a departure from the ‘Classical Greek past’ and 
Greekness as well, and one might question how ‘Greek’ were the Macedonians anyway. But 
Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire was one of the prevalent and recurring historical 
themes in the ‘Second Sophistic’, and while he could be seen as a tyrannical figure, he was also 
represented as ‘an icon of Hellenism’, depending on the context and the author referring to 
him.450 Unlike Aelian, who lumps Alexander together with Greek theory, Arrian, in the 
conclusion of his first section of the treatise does explain that he has ‘revealed enough about 
the Greek and Macedonian formations of old’ (ἱκανὰ ὑπέρ γε τῶν πάλαι Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ 
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Μακεδονικῶν τάξεων), and therefore refers to both traditions.451 So the phalanx, although a 
Greek invention was perfected by the Macedonians, and by none to such extent as Alexander – 
and this is what Aelian choses to highlight.  
We could also read this discussion of a joint Greco-Macedonian token battle array as a way to 
refer to the same ‘true’ image of ‘Greece’ as martially victorious which we saw Augustus try to 
construct. The Macedonians would then be included because they fit into the Roman ideal of 
martial virility. It is clear that ever since the Middle Republic, the Macedonians were considered 
worthy of being compared to the Romans, especially because they had perfected the phalanx. 
Polybius compares the phalanx and the legion in an attempt to find the reasons for the success 
of the Romans in battle, examining how ‘the Roman and Macedonian equipment and 
formation/ […] differ for the better or worse’ (τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Μακεδόνων, 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῆς ἑκατέρων, τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τί 
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον).452 He advertises the Macedonian phalanx as an invincible force and (under 
ideal circumstances) superior to the Roman because one Roman soldier faces an impenetrable 
wall of pikes which is very difficult to attack.453 The reason the phalanx cannot always win is, 
according to Polybius, because it cannot always adapt to all the circumstances and terrain 
dictated by battle.454 The comparison between Roman maniples and phalanx reaches its climax 
when we see the reasons why the Romans are able to win, which can be attributed to their 
flexibility – precisely what the phalanx lacked:  
ἡ δὲ Ῥωμαίων εὔχρηστος: πᾶς γὰρ Ῥωμαῖος, ὅταν ἅπαξ καθοπλισθεὶς ὁρμήσῃ πρὸς τὴν 
χρείαν, ὁμοίως ἥρμοσται πρὸς πάντα τόπον καὶ καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιφάνειαν. καὶ 
μὴν ἕτοιμός ἐστι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει διάθεσιν, ἄν τε μετὰ πάντων δέῃ κινδυνεύειν ἄν τε 
μετὰ μέρους ἄν τε κατὰ σημαίαν ἄν τε καὶ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα. διὸ καὶ παρὰ πολὺ τῆς κατὰ μέρος 
εὐχρηστίας διαφερούσης, παρὰ πολὺ καὶ τὰ τέλη συνεξακολουθεῖ ταῖς Ῥωμαίων 
προθέσεσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων. 
                                                          
451 Arr. Tact. 32.2. 
452 Plb. 18.28 ff, all translations by E.S. Shuckburgh and W. Patton; see also Walbank (1967) 585-592. 
453 Plb. 18.32.9-10. 
454 Plb. 18.31. 
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‘The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the 
field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, 
moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the 
main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the 
individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also 
much more often attended by success than those of others.’455 
Despite that, the phalanx remains more than a worthy challenger to the Roman battle array, 
and Polybius’ description of its charge as nearly invincible is striking:  
ἐξ ὧν εὐκατανόητον ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε μεῖναι κατὰ πρόσωπον τὴν τῆς φάλαγγος ἔφοδον 
οὐδέν, διατηρούσης τὴν αὑτῆς ἰδιότητα καὶ δύναμιν, ὡς ἐν ἀρχαῖς εἶπα. 
‘Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, nothing can withstand the 
charge of the phalanx as long as it preserves is characteristic formation and force’.456  
But already in Polybius it seems that the phalanx is becoming obsolete and that the Roman 
legion is what the phalanx once used to be – just like one might say about Athens being a 
smaller version of what Rome was to become. After all the Roman constitution – including its 
military organisation – is Polybius’ explanation for why the Romans managed to conquer so 
much of the known world.457  
However, as briefly hinted before, picking the phalanx as a symbol provided the advantage of 
inclusion and common ground. Just as the Roman tradition claimed that they had taken their 
laws from the Athenians, it also asserted that, at the beginning of their history, they borrowed 
their phalanx style of fighting from the Greeks. Indeed, the equipment which Livy says the 
Romans used after Servius Tullius’ reforms was strikingly similar to that of Classical Greek 
hoplite soldiers: 
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arma his imperata galea, clipeum, ocreae, lorica, omnia ex aere, haec, ut tegumenta 
corporis essent. tela in hostem hastaque et gladius. 
‘The armour which these men were required to provide consisted of helmet, round shield, 
greaves, and breast-plate, all of bronze, for the protection of their bodies; their offensive 
weapons were a spear and a sword.’458 
Then, in a later passage, he more explicitly mentions the Macedonian phalanx: 
Clipeis antea Romani usi sunt, dein, postquam stipendiarii facti sunt, scuta pro clipeis 
fecere; et quod antea phalanx similis Macedonicis, hoc postea manipulatim structa acies 
coepit esse. 
‘Before, the Romans used round shields but after they started to receive pay they replaced 
the round shields with oblong ones, and what was before a phalanx similar to the 
Macedonian ones, afterwards became a battle line organised in maniples.’459  
It is true that the equipment described by Livy in the first passage would have made sense for 
both the Classical Greek and the Macedonian phalanx, while in the second passage he might 
have chosen to talk about the Macedonian phalanx simply because it was better known to his 
readers. Alternatively, he might be ambiguous in terms of the equipment because he 
considered both Macedonian and Greek versions of the battle array suitable for inclusion within 
the Roman tradition, and it made no difference which one the Romans used as long as it 
belonged to suitably warlike people. So, in this incorporation of the phalanx we could also see 
the same idea of ‘succession of empires’ and perhaps Livy chooses to highlight both Greek and 
Macedonian versions of it in order to suggest this. The Greeks invented the phalanx, the 
Macedonians took it further but it was the Romans who led it to perfection and ultimately 
surpassed it, and we see this exact idea being expressed by Diodorus with respect to all things 
                                                          
458 Liv. 1.43.2-3 with Ogilvie (1965) 166-171. 
459 Liv. 8.8 with Oakley (1998) 451-476.  
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pertaining to warfare which the Romans borrowed and then perfected, including the phalanx, 
the manipular array, siege weapons and Carthaginian ships.460   
The phalanx then would have been part of Romanness itself, just like Athenian law, but also 
represented an important competitor in Roman history as seen in Polybius. Most importantly 
however, this ‘succession of empires’ culminates with Hadrian and we have seen how Arrian 
shows how the phalanx is kept alive within his Roman army, both symbolically, by naming the 
legions phalanxes (after all they were seen as its ‘descendants’) and also more practically by 
acting it out against the Alans. But also we see how in the end of the Taktika it is the age of 
Hadrian that is praised as that described by Terpandros ‘where the spears of young men thrive’ 
(ὥστε ἐς τήνδε τὴν παροῦσαν βασιλείαν, ἣν Ἀδριανὸς εἰκοστὸν τοῦτ᾽ ἔτος βασιλεύει, πολὺ 
μᾶλλον συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ τὰ ἔπη ταῦτα ἤπερ ἔς τὴν πάλαι Λακεδαίμονα ῾ἔνθ᾽ αἰχμά τε 
νέων θάλλει καὶ μῶσα λίγεια, καὶ δίκα εὐρυάγυια καλῶν ἐπιτάρροθος ἔργων.᾿) and not that of 
the Lacedaemonians.461 In light of the fact that chapter forty-four is concerned with tradition, 
as seen above, we could easily see how Hadrian is the one who enables the preservation of this 
tradition of the phalanx but also how this Greek knowledge of warfare represented by it 
completes him as a commander.  
As for why Alexander’s phalanx is being highlighted by Aelian, the answer again has to do with 
integration and competition. Alexander and his army also presented an interesting 
counterbalance to the Romans, and Livy indeed addresses this issue in book nine of his history. 
The discussion is part of a larger exercise in imagination on which Livy embarks when talking 
about L. Papirius Cursor, namely what would have happened had Alexander met the Romans in 
battle.462 While the essential factors in the clash would have been, according to Livy, the valor 
and number of the soldiers, the abilities of the commanders and Fortune, the two actual battle 
arrays constitute an important term of comparison as well, and we see how Livy is picking up on 
Polybius’ earlier parallel: 
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statarius uterque miles, ordines seruans; sed illa phalanx immobilis et unius generis, 
Romana acies distinctior, ex pluribus partibus constans, facilis partienti, quacumque opus 
esset, facilis iungenti. 
‘Both armies were formed of heavy troops, keeping to their ranks; but their phalanx was 
immobile and consisted of soldiers of a single type; the Roman line was opener and 
comprised more separate units; it was easy to divide, wherever necessary, and easy to 
unite.’ 463 
It is interesting that emphasis is placed on the fact that both armies would have been made up 
of many statarius miles, servans ordines, so the focus in the analysis is again on heavy infantry, 
not cavalry or any other branch – which is central to both our Taktika. Unlike Polybius’ analysis 
though, Livy is clear on the fact that the Romans would have won, and makes no mention of the 
phalanx being formidable on level ground. He instead insists – as one would expect him to – on 
the moral superiority of the Romans, yet again we have a situation where the phalanx (along 
with its ‘technical specifications’) is worth mentioning as an adversary of the Romans and would 
constitute an important part of the fight. But what is more interesting is that we get the 
impression that the face-off between Alexander and the Romans is picking up a topic that was 
debated, with some Greeks naturally claiming that the former would have come out victorious: 
id vero periculum erat, quod levissimi ex Graecis, qui Parthorum quoque contra nomen 
Romanum gloriae favent, dictitare solent, ne maiestatem nominis Alexandri, quem ne fama 
quidem illis notum arbitror fuisse  sustinere non potuerit populus Romanus. 
‘but there was indeed the danger —as the silliest of the Greeks, who exalt the reputation 
even of the Parthians against the Romans, are fond of alleging —that the Roman People 
would have been unable to withstand the majesty of Alexander's name, though I think that 
they had not so much as heard of him.’464 
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Despite Livy acknowledging Alexander as a great commander (haud equidem abnuo egregium 
ducem fuisse Alexandrum), the Romans would ultimately have possessed more of the technical 
qualities of warfare which would have allowed them to win:465 
 id vero erat periculum, ne sollertius quam quilibet unus ex iis, quos nominavi, castris locum 
caperet, commeatus expediret, ab insidiis praecaveret, tempus pugnae deligeret, aciem 
instrueret, subsidiis firmaret. 
‘and I suppose there was the danger that Alexander would display more skill than any of 
these whom I have named, in selecting a place for a camp, in organising his service of 
supply, in guarding against ambuscades, in choosing a time for battle, in [marshalling his 
troops, in providing strong reserves!’466  
The prominence of Alexander as a great figure who might have opposed the Romans can also 
be seen in two of Plutarch’s dialogues as well, On the Fortune of the Romans and On the 
Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander.467 Briefly, the first one argues that Fortuna aided and guided 
the Romans in acquiring their empire and obtaining their position as masters of the world. The 
latter does just the opposite, showing how Alexander succeeded through his own qualities, 
even when Fortuna was against him. Jones and Hamilton point out the rhetorical purpose of 
these speeches, and that Plutarch did not actually see Alexander as perfect or was trying to set 
him up as a paragon of Greek virtue (as evidenced by his treatment in the Lives). 468 They also 
emphasise that Plutarch was not trying to say that Alexander won by virtue while the Romans 
triumphed by sheer luck, and while I do agree with both points I do not agree with Hamilton in 
thinking that the speeches have no value whatsoever because they do not represent Plutarch’s 
views.469 I rather think Plutarch is picking up on themes which were debated by Greeks and 
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Romans alike – as evidenced by Livy’s earlier text as well – which he leaves open for more 
debate by emphasising the comparison.  
This is true in particular for the end of the On the Fortune of the Romans where Plutarch – 
again, like Livy before him - also wonders what would have happened had the Romans and 
Alexander fought.  Even though he leaves the question unanswered, differently from Livy this 
time, he suggests that Alexander would have won or at least that the Roman state would have 
had a very difficult time, as we can parallel the Fortuna that takes Alexander’s  life (ἐγὼ δὲ 
<ταύτης> [i.e. τῆς Τύχης in the previous sentence] τίθεμαι καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτήν/‘And 
to Tyche I ascribe also the death of Alexander) to the Fortuna that saves the Romans from 
destruction at the hand of the Gauls, for example (Τί δέ; οὐχὶ καὶ περὶ τὰς μεγίστας συμφορὰς 
ὤρθου τὴν πόλιν ἡ Τύχη; Κελτῶν μὲν περὶ τὸ Καπετώλιον στρατοπεδευόντων καὶ 
πολιορκούντων τὴν ἀκρόπολιν/‘And why not admit that Tyche also retrieved the city in times 
of the greatest disaster? When the Gauls were encamped round about the Capitol and were 
besieging the citadel’).470 
Alexander is then another peril against which Fortune defends the Romans, and in any case 
Plutarch sets him up as a viable contender for supremacy: 
‘οὐ γὰρ ἀναιμωτί γε διακρινθήμεναι οἴω,’ (Od. 6.149)  
 συμπεσόντων ὅπλοις ἀνικήτοις φρονημάτων ἀδουλώτων. 
‘”Not without spilling of blood could this matter, I deem”, have been settled had the great 
aspirations of these two unconquered peoples with their invincible arms clashed with 
each other.’471 
Therefore even if we do not take Plutarch seriously when it comes to the general message of 
the speeches, it would be difficult to disagree with Whitmarsh in seeing Alexander as a hyper-
Greek figure and with Spencer who argues for a resurgence of the figure of Alexander especially 
in the second century A.D. Spencer also emphasises that Alexander ‘could stand for the cultural 
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supremacy of Greece, and Greek military prowess, and his fame could demonstrate the lasting 
greatness of Greece over Rome’.472 So, when put together, Alexander and his phalanx 
constitute one very powerful token of Greco-Macedonian military achievements.   
Coming back to Aelian’s dedication of his treatise to Trajan, if Cassius Dio is to be believed 
Trajan envied Alexander and wanted to portray himself to the senate as having surpassed him: 
κἀντεῦθεν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ὠκεανὸν ἐλθών, τήν τε φύσιν αὐτοῦ καταμαθὼν καὶ πλοῖόν τι ἐς 
Ἰνδίαν πλέον ἰδών, εἶπεν ὅτι “πάντως ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἰνδούς, εἰ νέος ἔτι ἦν, ἐπεραιώθην”. 
Ἰνδούς τε γὰρ ἐνενόει, καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων πράγματα ἐπολυπραγμόνει, τόν τε Ἀλέξανδρον 
ἐμακάριζε. καίτοι ἔλεγε καὶ ἐκείνου περαιτέρω προκεχωρηκέναι, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τῇ βουλῇ 
ἐπέστειλε, μὴ δυνηθεὶς μηδὲ ἃ ἐκεχείρωτο σῶσαι. 
‘Then he came to the ocean itself, and when he had learned its nature and had seen a ship 
sailing to India, he said: ‘I should certainly have crossed over to the Indi, too, if I were still 
young.’ For he began to think about the Indi and was curious about their affairs, and he 
counted Alexander a lucky man. Yet he would declare that he himself had advanced farther 
than Alexander, and would so write to the senate, although he was unable to preserve 
even the territory that he had subdued.’473 
If then Trajan was indeed worried about surpassing Alexander, how could one better aid him in 
doing it than to offer him all of Alexander’s military knowledge.  Aelian should be seen as trying 
to help the emperor by dedicating to him a text which would not only give Trajan a description 
of Alexander’s phalanx, the ‘code’ of Alexander’s success, but also the key to breaking it, 
namely Aelian’s clarifications.474 In reading Aelian’s very detailed analysis, with technical points 
that matched those in the debates found in Livy and Polybius, the emperor would be able to 
analyse and appreciate all the strengths and weaknesses of the phalanx. Gaining an 
understanding of Alexander and his army, which, as we have seen, were considered worthy 
contenders to the Romans and their legions, would have enabled Trajan himself to become a 
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master of the most important aspect of Greek military knowledge, just as Arrian intended for 
Hadrian. The choice of writing Taktika, then, was precisely to present two emperors who were 
very concerned with generalship with the best example of Greek military knowledge, proving its 
overall use and value, improving their generalship. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, we have seen how ‘military manuals’ approach identity, both the identity of their 
authors, in the case of Arrian’s Ektaxis, but that of the Roman empire more broadly. We have 
seen that, similarly to sophists, Arrian adopts the identity of a figure from the past, namely 
Xenophon. He uses this figure and engages with the past in order to augment his own 
reputation, and to create a positive comparison between Xenophon and himself.  
The Ektaxis and the Taktika also talk about identity more generally, celebrating the diversity of 
the Roman army and of the troops that make it up, effectively praising the Roman Empire 
because it encourages the preservation of tradition and incorporates the practices of all its 
peoples. Arrian’s Taktika also approaches the question of the identity of Hadrian and portrays 
him as a knowledgeable commander in the same way as the Lambaesis inscription, showing his 
intimate acquaintance with drills and training practices. But the same Taktika suggests, by 
incorporating Greek knowledge in the first half, that Hadrian needs to be well-versed in Greek 
practices.  
These practices are advertised by both Arrian and Aelian decision to write taktika which portray 
the most significant military achievement of the Greeks, the phalanx, as a symbol for all Greek 
knowledge. This choice is made because of the status of the phalanx as both part of the Roman 
military tradition and as a redoutable adversary to the Roman legions, and both of those 
aspects make it worthy of discussion. Furthermore, Aelian chooses to advertise Alexander’s 
phalanx, thus combining his status as a hyper-Greek figure and commander with the prestige of 
the phalanx into one token showing the prestige of Greek military knowledge. Arrian and Aelian 
do this to advertise the importance and relevance of Greek practices to Hadrian and Trajan, 
both emperors interested in generalship and concerned with their military image.  
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The ways in which these texts use the past is not unlike other texts of the period, focusing here 
specifically on figures from ‘Classical Greece’ – such as Xenophon – but also on Alexander, 
another popular character in the ‘Second Sophistic’. To obsess over why one should chose 
Alexander over any other, more ‘Classical’ example, or the other way around, only reveals the 
sometimes pedantic nature of modern scholarship on these themes. It is likely that authors of 
‘military manuals’ such as Arrian and Aelian were more concerned with highlighting important 
figures in the tradition of Greek warfare, as witnessed by the generals they refer to in their 
prefaces. These are both ‘Classical’ and ‘Hellenistic’, and what connects them is military 
prowess, so it is safe to say that fame, skill, and Greekness would have been more important in 
the choice of examples by different authors – each with their own specific preferences – than 
the period in which they operated.  
 
IV.Ethics and Moral Qualities in ‘Military Manuals’ 
 
In previous chapters we analysed how ‘military manuals’ engage with the Greek and Roman 
tradition about warfare and how they present and often reimagine this tradition. For a range of 
purposes in this chapter we examine whether and in what ways, they engage with Greek and 
Roman ideas about ‘correct ethical’ behaviour in warfare, which are both part of this tradition 
and to some extent stand above it. We will do so in dedicated discussions which take general 
principles of morality, the general principles which should govern human behaviour, as their 
starting point.  
There are two main issues I wish to tackle. First, whether our authors include any ‘moral’ 
qualities which would be necessary or even indispensable for individuals in warfare. Second, 
whether they prescribe or proscribe actions for the general and his troops on moral or ethical 
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grounds. In the modern world issues of military ethics are treated as of universal applicability, 
and the question of whether in the ancient world there was any equivalent is worth asking.475 
I shall argue that while our authors’ approaches might differ somewhat, the majority of texts 
engage with aspects of what might be called an ‘ethical code’ for Greek and Roman warfare. 
While none of the authors makes any programmatic statements or comment upon it directly, 
our texts describe both behaviour that can be considered to have ethical components which are 
driven by moral determinates, discussing the virtues necessary in warfare, and also examples 
which diverge from the ‘rules of warfare’ as treated by other authors. We shall also see that 
there is nothing to indicate that one type of behaviour should exclude the other, and what 
seems to be implicit is that the correct course of action depends both on the situation faced 
and on the individual making the decisions. What the texts always seem to highlight implicitly is 
that success is the ultimate goal, and of the course of action followed is of less importance.  
This kind of ‘instrumental ethics’ in which the right action is determined by the right results ties 
in with an important theme in much of ancient ethics, especially Stoic ethics, but also shared 
more widely, sometimes described as a form of moral relativism or ‘situational flexibility’.476 
Actions have to be adapted to the circumstances, principles are guides to be actively engaged 
with by the moral subject, not unbreakable rules which have any kind of value in and of 
themselves. Though specific philosophical, even Stoic, influence on the military manuals is 
unlikely, the general classical approach to ethics can be seen in them; and, of course, these 
texts are all about successful generalship, success in military matters, a goal which is inherently 
in tension with what one would be expected to do, what might be deemed the most virtuous 
conduct in a certain situation in warfare. War is a complex activity, in which many moral and 
pragmatic factors were involved, as ancient authors were well aware. 
There will be some reference to religion in this discussion, but this chapter does not set out to 
explore in any way the complex relationship between ethics and the gods in general. However, 
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the breaking of promises and oaths – of which the gods are guarantors – and the treatment of 
people/prisoners under the protection of a divinity (for example those taking refuge in a 
sanctuary) or of sacred places in war involves religious considerations, amongst others, and 
these topics will be considered. 
Since I will be discussing the inclusion of ‘moral qualities’ and exempla, I must address the 
question of whether the authors are interested in the morality of actions, the link between 
moral attributes and historical figures or both? In other words is the emphasis placed on the 
individuals in the exempla or on their actions? We shall see that the answer is not necessarily 
the same for all our authors, with genre and the magnitude of the project also being important. 
For example, we have already seen that Polyaenus chooses to focus on historical figures – 
rather than categories of action – so we might expect emphasis on the personnel not the 
specific actions described. Moreover, since Polyaenus’ project seems to be so broad, claiming 
to encompass all stratagems in history, we might wonder whether he is really in a position to be 
selective about his ‘ethical’ agenda, or whether he has to include examples which are 
apparently contradictory. Frontinus takes a different approach, with great emphasis on order in 
his structure and on different themes, promising to provide guidance on what to do before, 
during and after battle. Onasander addresses the Roman aristocracy, and his text aims to 
discuss all that makes a good general, ranging from the moral to the practical aspects.  
Keeping all this in mind, the following discussion will be divided into three sections. In the first, I 
shall briefly summarise what might be called the ancient ‘military ethical code of conduct’ with 
particular reference to the most important recent scholarship.477 In the second, I shall address 
the relationship between our texts and the first major ‘component’ of the code, namely 
fairness. I will also discuss the special cases of oaths, tyrants and just warfare in relation to 
fairness. In the final section I shall discuss how the remaining ideas identified in the first section 
are approached – namely treatment of the enemy and especially prisoners – and the part that 
moral virtues play in this approach.  
1. A Greek and Roman ‘ethical code of conduct’ in war? 
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Modern scholars have previously addressed the issue of ethics in ancient warfare. Some, such 
as the historian Doyne Dawson, have done so in a broad manner, focusing mainly on inter-state 
relationships and imperialism, but since ‘military manuals’ tend to address only what could be 
considered the minutiae of warfare, such aspects – although important – will not figure in this 
discussion.478 Gilliver in her key article  ‘The Roman Army and Morality in War’ promises ‘a brief 
survey of the rules that governed the actual waging of war in antiquity, the conduct of the 
Romans in war and, when they can be ascertained, the reasons behind their conduct.’479 Since 
these aims are much closer to what this chapter sets out to investigate, I shall use her claims as 
a starting point for the discussion. As for the Greek side, as far as I am aware, there has been no 
detailed treatment of ‘battlefield ethics’ corresponding to Gilliver’s, but related issues are 
raised in Kendrick Pritchett’s The Greek State at War, Coleman Phillipson’s perhaps now dated 
The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (written from a lawyer’s 
perspective) and, most usefully, Pierre Ducrey’s ‘Traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la 
Grèce antique: des origines à la conquête romaine’.480 
Gilliver starts off her article by stating that ‘there was no international law concerning the 
waging of war such as we have today but there were some rules’.481 She proceeds to emphasise 
that the Romans had the ius fetiale which was concerned with the declaration and conduct of 
war and that there was ‘also a series of conventions and unwritten laws covering warfare’, 
which were referred to as the mores belli by Cicero and the ius belli by Sallust, that is a distinct, 
collective entity.482 The ancient sources used by Gilliver to discuss this framework are mostly 
Cicero’s On duties and Polybius’ Histories, which will therefore also be my main points of focus. 
The agendas of these two works and of our ‘military manuals’ are different and perhaps 
conflicting. Cicero’s De officiis has been described as a practical morality guidebook very much 
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in the fashion of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius (Cicero himself often says that he is following 
Panaetius). 483 It is hardly surprising – not least because of the chronological gap –that this 
project differs from Polybius’, who is interested in presenting the Roman ‘way of warfare’ in a 
particular way, with special emphasis on Roman fairness and the transfer of this fairness from 
the Greeks to the Romans as part of an explanation of why the latter managed to conquer all of 
the known world, an argument he would make not least because of his proximity to Scipio 
Aemilianus and his Roman circle.   
 Gilliver also references the ‘military manuals’, Onasander’s Strategikos and Frontinus’ 
Strategemata, in establishing what this Roman ethical code was, and argues that they present 
an alternative perspective. This is problematic, as will be discussed below, and there are 
obvious issues of circularity in terms of whether texts are considered to be laying down rules, 
demonstrating practice or both.484 In addition, we also quickly understand that there is no 
‘official document’ containing all these ‘rules’ and that what one chooses to include in any sort 
of ‘code’ will always be – to a certain degree – a matter of interpretation. It is apparent, 
however, that there are certain points in respect to the rules of war that seem to be common 
to both Greeks and Romans, across a range of authors in a range of times and places, and are 
also reflected in modern concerns about what one should and should not be able to do in 
warfare.  These can be roughly divided into two categories: those that concern general 
‘fairness’ on the one hand, and those that concern the treatment of the enemy, in particular of 
prisoners and those who surrender, on the other.  
This idea of fairness is certainly one of the cornerstones of the Roman ius fetiale, part of which 
was a ritual performed by priests called fetiales, who both formally demanded redress from a 
wrongdoer and declared war overtly and officially.485 Livy also shows admiration for a fair way 
of fighting, where the best may win without any trickery, and he projects this onto a ‘golden 
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age’, when the older senators reprimanded the ‘tricking’ of Perseus, who was persuaded by 
guile to give the Romans a respite in which to better prepare for war, saying that the Romans of 
old did not fight using ambushes and at night, but declared war openly.486 Polybius also 
emphasises that the external perception (albeit not unanimous) of the Romans was that they 
were ‘a civilised people, and that their peculiar merit on which they prided themselves was that 
they conducted their wars in a simple and noble manner, employing neither night attacks nor 
ambushes, disapproving of every kind of deceit and fraud and considering that nothing but 
direct and open attacks were legitimate for them’ (ἕτεροι δὲ καθόλου μὲν πολιτικὸν εἶναι τὸ 
Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἔθνος ἔφασαν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἴδιον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σεμνύνεσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐπὶ 
τῷ καὶ τοὺς πολέμους ἁπλῶς καὶ γενναίως πολεμεῖν, μὴ νυκτεριναῖς ἐπιθέσεσι χρωμένους 
μηδ᾽ ἐνέδραις, πᾶν δὲ τὸ δι᾽ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου γινόμενον ἀποδοκιμάζοντας, μόνους δὲ τοὺς ἐκ 
προδήλου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον κινδύνους ὑπολαμβάνοντας αὑτοῖς καθήκειν).487 He too praises 
this type of open warfare that the ‘ancients’ practised and points out how the Romans are now 
the ‘moral descendants’ of the ἀρχαῖοι and of this ‘golden age’ of warfare, still preserving some 
of this fairness: 
βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαίας αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά: καὶ 
γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ 
χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ συστάδην.  
‘Some slight trace, indeed, of the old principles of warfare still lingers among the Romans; 
for they do proclaim their wars, and make sparing use of ambuscades, and fight their 
battles hand to hand and foot to foot.’488  
But perhaps more importantly this idea of fairness in battle is, in Cicero and in Polybius, as 
Walbank has pointed out, part of a wider discussion about justice, as in fact the main concept 
behind the ius fetiale is that a war needs to have a just cause.489 This is significant because it 
reveals that for Cicero, at least, there is no separate ethical code for warfare; ethical rules that 
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should normally be followed apply in warfare as well, hence justice on the battlefield is merely 
an extension of the justice which any principled man must manifest in his life. Thus in the De 
Officiis he makes the point that conflict and justice are closely intertwined:  
Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessiturus iniuria. 
‘The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked 
by wrong’490  
Then he goes on to talk about how injustice arises, making specific reference to warfare:  
Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida, sed malitiosa iuris 
interpretatione. […] ut ille, qui, cum triginta dierum essent cum hoste indutiae factae, noctu 
populabatur agros, quod dierum essent pactae, non noctium indutiae. 
‘Injustice often arises also through chicanery, that is, through an over-subtle and ever 
fraudulent construction of law […]like the man who, when a truce has been made with the 
enemy for thirty days, ravaged their fields by night, because, he said, the truce stipulated 
‘days’ not nights.’491 
We see here the same kind of noua sapientia as in the earlier Perseus example and how even 
this kind of trickery involving manipulation of words is considered unjust. In fact earlier on, 
Cicero explains how ‘the foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith – that is truth and 
fidelity to promises and agreements’, so fairness in deeds as well as in words.492 Certainly 
keeping one’s word applies to the enemy as well: 
Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides 
conservanda 
                                                          
490 Cic. Off. 1.19; all translations from the De officiis are W. Miller’s, unless otherwise specified. 
491 Cic. Off. 1.33. 
492 Cic. Off. 1.23: Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.  
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‘Again, if under stress of circumstances individuals have made any promise to the enemy, 
they are bound to keep their word even then’493 
This is made explicit in the example of Regulus who, in the first Punic war, keeps his word and 
returns to the Carthaginians after going to Rome to negotiate a hostage exchange.494 This 
‘fairness in words’ dictated by justice is immediately followed in the text by fairness in action, 
as Cicero himself comments: 
Maximum autem exemplum est iustitiae in hostem a maioribus nostris constitutum, cum a 
Pyrrho perfuga senatui est pollicitus se venenum regi daturum et cum necaturum, senatus 
et C. Fabricius perfugam Pyrrho dedidit. Ita ne hostis quidem et potentis et bellum ultro 
inferentis interitum cum scelere approbavit. 
‘Our forefathers have given us another striking example of justice toward an enemy: when 
a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate to administer poison to the king and thus 
work his death, the senate and Gaius Fabricius delivered the deserter up to Pyrrhus. Thus 
they stamped with their disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy who was at 
once powerful, unprovoked, aggressive and successful’.495  
He also insists on having a peace without guile which further emphasises the idea that justice 
dictates fairness in all dealings with the enemy, and points out that ‘no one has attained to true 
glory who has gained a reputation of courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks 
justice can be morally right.’496 
In Cicero the discussion of justice encompasses more than just the idea of fairness. It 
encompasses all aspects of warfare, especially those to do with conduct towards the defeated, 
where justice recommends restraint and moderation:  
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Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, turn ii, qui armis positis ad imperatorum 
fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud 
nostros iustitia culta est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem 
recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum. 
‘Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by force of 
arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down their arms and throw 
themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even though the battering ram has hammered 
at their walls. And among our countrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in 
this direction, that those who have given promise of protection to states or nations 
subdued in war become, after the custom of our forefathers, the patrons of those 
states.’497  
So, as mentioned before, for Cicero there is no particular distinction between what constitutes 
ethical behaviour in warfare and in life in general, as the same guiding elements should rule 
everything, and justice, as well as the moderation that is shown here towards enemies, are two 
of them.498 Gilliver points out that Cicero also recommends that a general should control his 
troops strictly and not let them plunder for his personal gain and show mercy to those who 
surrender.499 He also underscores that protection must be granted (from Roman soldiers) to 
those who surrendered and that nothing should be done without good cause or from cruelty in 
the destruction and plundering of cities, the general’s duty  being to punish the guilty and spare 
the rest.500  
The same ideas of justice and temperance underlie the whole discussion, as even before 
tackling issues of prisoners and the defeated, he is keen to make it clear that one must only go 
to war in extremis, in order to settle a dispute, since war the use of physical force is 
characteristic of brutes. 501 We are reminded that war is only a means of achieving peace, and 
that by nature one should not behave carelessly towards others, ergo moderation should be as 
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much of a key component of warfare as it is of our daily lives.502 Gilliver compares Cicero’s 
advice to Polybius’ emphasis on the importance of showing generosity to the defeated, and 
self-restraint when plundering cities, which as Walbank points out is also based on notions of 
justice, while Ducrey also highlights how Polybius condemns the massacre at Mantinea of the 
non-aggressive Achaeans by referring to a tradition which prohibited such actions and later 
comments that the killing of an ambassador was a contravention of ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων 
δικαίων, ‘what has been defined as just for men’ – all advice that is very similar to Cicero’s 
views.503  
Ducrey also argues that, for the Greeks, the principles regulating war were doubled by a 
veritable religious and moral code referred to by Greek authors as ‘the laws of the Greeks’, and 
that these laws include respect for sanctuaries and those who look for asylum. There was also a 
provision that even the defeated had to be allowed to collect their dead, and van Wees 
emphasises that war was banned during sacred periods as well. 504 As an example of the 
importance of religious places, Ducrey brings up the occupation of the sanctuary at Delion by 
Athenian soldiers in 424 B.C., which angered the Boeotians to such an extent that they did not 
allow the Athenians to collect their dead.505 He also comments on the stories of Xenophon 
admiring Agesilaus for letting 80 Theban soldiers go who had taken refuge in a temple and of 
Dionysius of Syracuse who urged men women and children to take refuge in sanctuaries to 
escape death, both showing that at least in theory those who took refuge in a sacred precinct 
were supposed to be spared.  The killing of supplicating prisoners was also considered an 
atrocity, as Ducrey points out again with an example from Thucydides where Plataean prisoners 
are supplicating the Spartans.506 Despite the added religious component, the principles remain 
the same as before, with fair treatment of prisoners and reverence for certain locations such as 
temples. 
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We have seen that ideas about fairness in warfare and behaviour towards one’s enemy share a 
common trait among authors such as Polybius and Cicero, namely their link to a general notion 
of justice and moderation which should be practised in daily life as well. Such a consistency in 
approach suggests that these ideas were widely shared. However Gilliver argues that military 
manuals present an alternative to this ‘code’, observing that Frontinus recommends terrorising 
one’s enemy into submission, and she goes on to show that combinations of clemency and 
brutality were not uncommon in Roman practice.507 She comments: ‘the reality lies with both 
[i.e. clemency and brutality]  […] Onasander advises the general to show mercy to the enemy 
but goes on to suggest that this quality should be used along with brutality when necessary. 
Frontinus provides examples of the use of both methods to achieve objectives’.508 However 
here Gilliver seems to abandon the distinction that she made at the beginning of the article 
between ‘rules’ and actual ‘conduct’, by including practical experiences in a theoretical 
framework. For example, Agricola’s very practical use of clemency and violence in Britain and 
Corbulo’s in Armenia seem to be personal choices that are fitting for a certain situation rather 
than prescriptions on what how one should act.509 As for Frontinus and Onasander, as we shall 
see, there is clearly a difference in ‘genre’ but also in approach from Polybius, Cicero and 
Livy.510 Gilliver herself admits that ‘Cicero’s admonishments tend to be rather abstract and 
sometimes of a purely moralistic nature’ while ‘those of Onasander […] include suggestions for 
their application’.511 So the question arises whether it is really productive to consider that they 
are both part of the same theoretical framework. It is more likely that there is one category of 
texts, represented by Cicero’s De Officiis, which are concerned with the ‘best case scenario’ and 
behaviour that can perhaps exist only in an ideal situation, and another containing the 
‘manuals’ of Onasander and Frontinus, which are actually concerned with the realities of 
warfare and how to navigate between ideal and efficient practice.  
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There is also an alternative way to understanding the link between texts such as Cicero’s, on 
the one hand, and Onasander’s and Frontinus’ on the other, and this has mainly to do with the 
way in which Greek and Roman codes of ethics work. Looking at the ethical norms of Cicero’s 
De officiis, we notice that they are not strict prescriptions of the ‘thou-shalt-not’ type, but are 
instead closer to guidelines. This means that their breach does not entail any sort of concrete 
punishment – divine or earthly – but simply the personal realisation that one has strayed from 
the right course of action. For instance, Cicero makes the point that a person who breaks an 
oath is not to fear punishment from the gods but the loss of his inner balance, having strayed 
away from the guidance of justice (Iam enim non ad iram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad 
iustitiam et ad fidem pertinent/ ‘For the question no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for 
there is no such thing) but the obligations of justice and good faith’).512  
Therefore, the breach of any existing customs in warfare, which would be perceived along the 
same lines as Cicero’s prescriptions, would not attract any sort of ‘real’ punishment. Hence one 
might understand why generals might be able to take some liberties in practice, but also that 
Onasander and Frontinus had more leeway when elaborating their precepts.  
Furthermore, if we look again at Cicero’s text and his prescriptions we see that – just as in the 
case of Stoic ethics (and Cicero states that he is following Panaetius) – there is a certain degree 
of relativity. Simply put, what one is supposed to do varies greatly depending on the situation 
one is in and on one’s own character. For example, Cicero explains that a promise should not be 
upheld if doing so would harm the one to whom it was made: 
Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea, quae sint iis, quibus promiseris, inutilia, nec, si plus 
tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint, cui promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori 
‘Promises are, therefore, not to be kept if the keeping of them is to prove harmful to those 
to whom you have made them; and, if the fulfilment of a promise should do more harm to 
                                                          
512 Cic. Off.3.104. 
177 
 
you than good to him to whom you have made it, it is no violation of moral duty to give the 
greater good precedence over the lesser good’513 
Similarly, a certain course of action – such as suicide – may be the right one for a one individual, 
say Marcus Cato, while for another it might be completely the opposite, and Cicero 
recommends that one always keep in mind one’s character and endowments when making 
choices, and not witlessly imitate anyone:  
Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores, primum illud exceptum sit, ne 
vitia sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut quaedam imitari posit. 
‘But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to follow in the steps of our fathers, let me 
make the following exceptions: first, we need not imitate their faults; second, we need not 
imitate certain other things, if our nature does not permit such imitation’.514  
Referring more specifically to warfare, Cicero uses his earlier argument about the greater good, 
and how one’s actions should always bear that in mind, to explain the destruction of Carthage 
and Numantia.515 It was done for reasons that had to do with the future welfare of the Roman 
state, and so in this case it was acceptable to break the rule of moderation: 
at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid 
secutos, opportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse 
adhortari.  
‘but they razed Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they had not destroyed 
Corinth; but I believe they had some special reason for what they did – its convenient 
situation, probably – and feared that its very location might someday furnish a temptation 
to renew the war’.516  
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Therefore, the type of justification given about breaking promises is actually embedded within 
the discourse on the ethics of warfare. Cicero says that Numantia and Carthage were destroyed 
to prevent any future war, and this is similar to breaking a promise that would actually cause 
more injury to both parties than do good. In the latter case, there is a greater sense of justice if 
one breaks said promise, which becomes irrelevant in the grand scheme of things, and so does 
the preservation of a city in this case. 
Moreover, when it comes to oaths in warfare, Cicero says they must be generally obeyed: ‘for 
an oath sworn with the clear understanding in one’s mind that it should be performed must be 
kept’. However, ‘if there is no such understanding, it does not count as perjury if one does not 
perform the vow.’517 He then explains how if one does not keep one’s word when ransoming 
someone from pirates one is not actually breaking it, because pirates are not considered lawful 
enemies.518 However, if Regulus had broken his word, it would have been perjury: 
Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa 
sunt iura communia  
‘For the war was being carried on with a legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our 
dealings with such and enemy, we have our whole fetial code as well as many other laws 
that are binding in common between nations’519  
Cicero also explains that there are different types of warfare and one should behave according 
to what he is trying to achieve; if the war is fought for supremacy one has to be more moderate 
than if one is fighting for actual survival.520 
Therefore, it seems that Cicero is suggesting a multi-layered approach. There is a standard 
‘correct’ set of actions, generated by basic principles, but their validity might differ when 
certain complications arise, or depending on certain situations and perpetrators of these 
actions. If we then consider that the authors of our ‘manuals’ are operating within similar 
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parameters to those dictating ethical behaviour in Cicero, we might argue that there is no real 
contradiction between their recommendations and the latter’s – or between ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’ – but merely that the theory is more situational and adaptive than some have 
suggested. 
Despite a shared situational flexibility, we should not retroject the views expressed by Cicero on 
earlier periods, nor assume that all authors of military manuals embraced similar ideals. In fact, 
we have evidence that ancient authors were themselves aware that the principles of warfare 
had changed over time. What we could perhaps come back to with more certitude is the 
difference between theory and practice, and the realisation that what constitutes ‘correct’ 
behaviour does not always yield the best results. Consequently, what texts particularly 
interested in warfare would recommend might be more focused on success than in following 
conventional rules.  Polybius himself makes this point, claiming that the fairness which the 
ancients abided by was not considered productive in his own age: 
νῦν δὲ καὶ φαύλου φασὶν εἶναι στρατηγοῦ τὸ προφανῶς τι πράττειν τῶν πολεμικῶν.’ 
‘But nowadays people say that it is the mark of an inferior general to perform any 
operation of war openly.’521 
As Gilliver points out, Sallust also feels the need to justify the killing of the inhabitants of the 
town of Capsa, despite its surrender ‘because the place was of great advantage to Jugurtha, 
and difficult of access to us [i.e. the Romans]/ quia locus Iugurthae opportunus, nobis aditu 
difficilis.522 This highlights the same difference between practice and theory, but also that the 
theory is important enough for such actions to be justified. It demonstrates that Roman 
generals had at least an informal ‘ethical code of war’ that would normally influence their 
decisions to some extent, even if in practice it would not have been what mattered most in a 
situation.   
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To conclude, it is clear that both the Greeks and the Romans had the same key concerns, and 
we can distinguish some ideas that make up a kind of ‘code of battlefield ethics’ which shows 
an aspiration towards a model of fairness in warfare. However, it is also clear that this is 
different from the realities of combat. In theory this ‘code of conduct’ should guide actions in 
war, in practice it does not always do so; the ways in which it does so are flexible, and its 
breach does not entail any ‘real’ punishment.  Ducrey’s conclusion perhaps best expresses this: 
‘Mais l’important n’est-il pas que ces usages aient éxisté et que le droit ait cherché, vainement 
parfois, à prendre place à la force? Plus que des balbutiements juridiques, c’est l’esquisse d’un 
véritable code des lois de la guerre qui se profile derrière le déchaînement des violences. Que 
ces lois, que ces progrès aient sans cesse été effaces ne doit pas faire omettre leur réalité.’523 
2. Fairness and ‘military manuals’. 
In the following section I shall examine how Frontinus, Onasander and Polyaenus deal with the 
ideal of fairness which we have found to be a guiding thread through all the texts that address 
the question of ‘correct behaviour’ in warfare. I shall look at the difference between trickery 
and stratagem, but also at the interplay between moral virtues and fairness. I shall argue that 
our authors take a situational approach to fairness, in particular the circumstances and the 
perpetrator of an action are extremely important. Though not explicitly stated, fairness and the 
moral qualities linked to it seem to appear only in contexts where they lead to success, and it 
does not seem that they are a goal in themselves.  
While there are many ways in which the discussion can be organised, I will first look at the 
relationship between the ideal of fairness discussed in the previous section and stratagem, 
something which might be conceived of as intrinsically unfair, but which could also be 
considered one of the staples of good generalship. The discussion will be centred on Frontinus, 
who decided to write about stratagems, thus posing himself a particular challenge in respect to 
the ideal of fairness. In the second part of the discussion I will examine the importance of more 
particular aspects of fairness such as just warfare, the interplay between fairness and tyranny, 
and how oaths and promises – and especially their breach – go together with fairness. Each 
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problem will also be connected to a specific author who is either the only one to deal with it – 
as is the case of Onasander and just warfare – or who allocates more space to it than others do 
– such as Polyaenus in the case of oaths and tyrants.  
2.1 Fairness, stratagem and trickery: the case of Frontinus’ Strategemata. 
As we have seen, the Roman concept of bellum iustum is based on a certain notion of openness 
and fairness to the enemy, and Cicero’s statement that ‘if under stress of circumstances 
individuals have made any promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then’ 
perhaps best captures its spirit.524 But we have also seen that there is a certain tension 
between fairness and efficient practice, a tension at its highest when discussing military 
practices which involve some form of trickery.  
Still, Polybius commented that the Romans were the heirs and guardians of a certain model of 
fairness, using ambushes sparingly (βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαίας 
αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά: καὶ γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως 
χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ συστάδην), and Livy chastised the use of 
trickery, saying of the Romans:525 
non per insidias et nocturna proelia nec simulatam fugam inprovisosque ad incautum 
hostem reditus nec ut astu magis quam vera virtute gloriarentur. 
‘not by ambushes and battles by night nor by pretended flight and unexpected return to an 
enemy off his guard, nor in such a way as to boast of cunning rather than real bravery, did 
our ancestors wage war.’526  
Therefore, there can be no question that trickery in warfare was poorly regarded. But is 
stratagem the same as trickery? The question is not so easily answered. Cicero in his De officiis, 
despite recommending fairness in all dealings with the enemy, praises Hannibal and Fabius 
Maximus for using stratagem:  
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Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile 
celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. 
‘We read that Hannibal among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among 
our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, 
disguising their movements, lying in ambush, forestalling the enemy’s designs.527  
However, these qualities are praised only when it comes to these two men, and the broader 
discussion is again about how one has to make the best use of the attributes that he possesses. 
In fact, Cicero goes on to say: 
Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis 
agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, 
cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. 
‘Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think 
that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, 
haters of fraud. There are other still who would stoop to anything, be submissive to 
anybody if only they may gain their ends. Such we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus.’528  
It all comes down, then, to how virtues and vices are perceived, at least according to Cicero, 
and then ultimately it is left to the readers to discern and make their own choice. As such a 
judgement hinges upon the situation and the person’s character, being liable to both 
interpretations. Cicero emphasises this:  
Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen 
vituperandorum. 
‘Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least 
to be criticised’529 
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Then he adds: 
Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius 
decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam 
naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi 
sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur. 
‘Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they 
are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, 
may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of 
human nature, but while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular 
nature’.530  
Therefore, stratagems might be acceptable, but only for some men. Valerius Maximus holds a 
similar line. As Clive Skidmore argues in his monograph on Valerius Maximus (arguing against 
Martin Bloomer), Valerius has a well-constructed moral universe of virtues, which are rewarded 
by public recognition (laus), and vices, which are subject to reprimand (reprehensio).531 
However strategemata do not fit the categories of virtue and vice, but lie somewhere in 
between; whilst stratagem is not a vice, Skidmore rightly emphasises that Valerius ‘does not 
lavish upon it the elaborate praise in the treatment of other virtues’ and this can be seen as ‘a 
residual element of moral doubt’ which marks ‘the lesser importance of these chapters’.532 
Indeed, although Valerius tries to present stratagem as something more positive than actual 
trickery, describing it as ‘a laudable part of cunning far removed from all censure’, generally 
there is still some wariness about it.533 For instance, in his account of Hannibal’s ambush at 
Cannae, ambush is still presented as an ambivalent procedure, Valerius’ comment being 
essentially in favour of overt courage:  
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quae nunc certissima circumventae virtutis nostrae excusatio est, quoniam decepti magis 
quam victi sumus 
‘That is now the surest excuse for our hoodwinked valour, since we were deceived rather 
than vanquished.’534 
We also see that Jupiter allows stratagem, even though courage was preferable, and it is 
Roman prudentia and virtus that eventually aid Claudius Nero and Livius Salinator in 
vanquishing Hannibal and Hasdrubal, despite the use of a stratagem by which they tricked the 
Carthaginians into thinking they would only fight a single army.535  
No text raises the issue of the ethics of trickery more than Frontinus’ Strategemata.  Given that, 
as we have seen, Valerius Maximus explicitly presents stratagems as something ambivalent, 
when Frontinus decided to put together his collection he must have been aware that some of 
the stratagems presented might conflict with Roman ideas about fairness in warfare. However, 
he rarely comments on what he relates explicitly. More often than not, the reader has nothing 
more to go on than the chapter heading and the juxtaposition of Roman and foreign figures 
performing similar deeds that fit a certain category, and there is no ‘moral guidance’ which 
reprimands or praises generals. What Frontinus does highlight is that he is discussing exempla:  
Ita enim consilii quoque et providentiae exemplis succinti duces erunt, unde illis excogitandi 
generandique similia facultas nutriatur. 
‘For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom/planning and 
foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like 
deeds.’536   
Examples of the deeds of famous men traditionally have a deep and complex moral charge, as 
we can see best in Valerius’ work, and while equating strategemata with exempla might 
constitute a problem, for Frontinus it is also a solution. By highlighting the equivalence, he is in 
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fact arguing that strategemata should be considered as legitimate and acceptable as any other 
exempla. It is important that the commanders shall not only be provided with examples of the 
remarkable deeds of other famous commanders, but with examples of consilium – planning or 
wisdom – and providentia – foresight. Thus the sollertia ducum facta i.e. the strategemata to 
which he refers, are simply an expression of these abstract qualities of generals, a 
manifestation of their consilium et providentia, and are to be actively judged by readers. 
Consilium and providentia are precisely the moral qualities appreciated by Valerius Maximus in 
his own chapter about stratagems. Thus, in describing the ruse of the Romans who threw bread 
from the Capitol when besieged by the Gauls to make them think they had enough supplies, he 
underscores the excellent planning of the ancestors:  
Illud quoque maioribus et consilio prudenter et exitu feliciter prouisum 
‘The following measure too of our ancestors was shrewd in the planning and fortunate in 
the result.’537  
In his next exemplum consilium and providentia are emphasised together: 
 hinc Claudii Neronis uegetum consilium, illinc Liui Salinatoris inclita prouidentia effect 
‘On the one hand the vigorous planning of Claudius Nero, on the other the celebrated 
foresight of Livius Salinator achieved this’  
and then Jupiter’s approval of the planning of the consuls:  
Iuppiter postea praestantissimorum ducum nostrorum sagacibus consiliis propitius 
aspiravit 
‘Jupiter later propitiously favoured the sagacious plans of our foremost generals.’538 
I suggest that Frontinus focuses on planning and foresight in order to give his stratagems 
grounding in admirable moral qualities (as seen in Valerius) and at the same time in order not 
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to get bogged down in any debates about what is ‘ethical’ on the battlefield and what is not, or 
whether stratagems are ‘fair’ or not. It is almost as if the existence of these underlying qualities 
justifies any advice that might follow. Having said that, Frontinus’ position on fairness also 
seems to be situational and what seems to be implicitly emphasised are the results of a certain 
action. His recommendations often suggest working within the rules without actually breaking 
them, but also disregarding fairness when necessary. His example of Philip changing the terms 
of the peace during a negotiation in order to get the upper hand, while not exactly what Cicero 
had in mind by being fair to the enemy, is ‘breaking no word’ per se, but treads a very fine line: 
Tractaque per magnum tempus postulatione, cum de industria subinde aliquid in 
condicionibus retexeret, classem per id tempus praeparavit eaque in angustias freti 
imparato hoste subitus evasit. 
‘While the negotiations dragged on for some time and Philip purposely kept changing the 
details of the terms, in the interval he got ready a fleet, and eluding the enemy while they 
were off their guard, he suddenly sailed into the straits’.539  
Similarly Hasdrubal by dragging on negotiations manages to escape a dangerous position and 
when Sulla takes advantage of a truce to escape the enemy it is not clear whether he could be 
said to be ‘breaking’ that truce.540 The best example of a challenge to the rules of ‘fairness’ is 
Frontinus’ subchapter on ambushes.541 Ambushes are perhaps the most negative component of 
stratagem due to their clear breach of the ideal of direct, face-to-face combat. Pritchett points 
out that on several occasions Polybius comments on their rarity among the Greeks and Romans 
and characterises the enedra – one of the two Greek words used for ambush – as ‘a violation of 
the ancient sense of military honour.’542 Polybius goes on to say that the Cretans are irresistible 
in ambushes ‘and all petty operations which require fraud, but they are cowardly and down-
hearted in the massed face-to-face charge of an open battle’ (καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ 
κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγγηδὸν 
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ἔφοδον ἀγεννεῖς καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς).543 Whilst Polybius might not be representing a 
unanimous view, Pritchett points out that Greek attitudes towards ambush would have been 
seen as ambivalent at best, and one cannot deny that there would have been some discomfort 
for Frontinus in approaching this very important component of stratagem.544 
Despite this, ambushes are by far the largest topic treated in the entire work and this suggests 
that the author is making a point of showing that – despite grounding his stratagems in traits 
that can be considered ‘moral’ as we have seen before – adhering to a certain ‘code of 
battlefield ethics’ is not the main aim of his collection, and that in order to be successful and 
maximise the chance of victory regardless, one has, at times, to suppress ideas of fairness.   
There is indeed no sense of wrongdoing or hint of cowardice in the actions of Romulus, who 
constitutes the first example, destroying his enemy near Fidenae by setting up an ambush and 
then feigning retreat. It is in fact the enemies of Rome who are slightly badly judged for their 
lack of tactical awareness as Frontinus refers to them as following ‘rashly’ (temere).545 This is 
indeed the tone that all the stratagems concerning ambush seem to have in common, where it 
is good generalship and the poor judgement of the enemy that is subtly emphasised, often 
leading to total annihilation. Such is the case of Sempronius Gracchus fighting the Celtiberians 
in 179 B.C., who also by a feigned retreat managed to lure them into an ambush and destroy 
them (cecidit), the emphasis being on the disorder of the enemy (inordinatos), or of Thamyris 
who managed to ‘win a complete victory’ (devicit) in 529 B.C. by using the same apparent fear 
to lure Cyrus’ troops into an ambush.546  The lack of providentia on the part of the enemy is 
repeatedly implied, as with the enemies of the Egyptians who advanced too swiftly over 
unfamiliar ground (rapidus per ignota invecti loca) and ended up surrounded, or the Romans 
fighting Viriathus – the leader of the Celtiberians – between 147-139 B.C. who too were 
ignorant of their surroundings (ignaros locorum) and were destroyed in a swamp.547 
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Therefore, what Frontinus seems to highlight is good generalship, whilst perhaps suggesting – 
rather than saying it outright, like Polybius – that the ideal of fighting according to a certain 
code, although noble, is not particularly useful to a commander. A perfect example of this can 
be found in Frontinus’ inclusion in this category of the legendary single combat between 
Melanthus and Xanthus. The story goes that there was a conflict between the Athenians and 
Boeotians (either over Oenoe and Panacton or over the deme of Melainai) which the two sides 
decided to settle by monomachia. Since the Athenian king Thymoites was too old, another 
warrior – Melanthus – took it upon himself to answer the call and fight Xanthus, the Boeotian 
king, with the promise of succeeding Thymoites to the Athenian throne.548  Frontinus narrates 
what happened next: 
Melanthus, dux Atheniensium, cum provocatus a rege hostium Xantho Boeotio descendisset 
ad pugnam, ut primum comminus stetit, "inique", inquit, "Xanthe, et contra pactum facis; 
adversus solum enim cum altero processisti." Cumque admiratus ille, quisnam se 
comitaretur, respexisset, aversum uno ictu confecit 
‘Melanthus, the Athenian general, on one occasion came out for combat, in response to 
the challenge of the king of the enemy, Xanthus, the Boeotian. As soon as they stood face 
to face, Melanthus exclaimed: "Your conduct is unfair, Xanthus, and contrary to 
agreement. I am alone, but you have come out with a companion against me." When 
Xanthus wondered who was following him and looked behind, Melanthus dispatched him 
with a single stroke, as his head was turned away’549  
Monomachia had deep roots in Roman military tradition and was considered a straightforward, 
fair way of ending a war. 550 Despite the original meaning of the story (which surely would have 
had something to do with unconventionality and victory by surprise), by presenting an ‘unfair’ 
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element – namely Melanthus’ deception – as part of an ultimately fair means of conflict 
resolution and by including the example in a category – ambush – which was not well regarded 
in Roman warfare, Frontinus is subverting the rules and expectations of ‘fairness in war’, 
ultimately showing that perhaps the most important element in warfare is victory. 
However, just as in the case of Cicero’s De officiis, Frontinus’ examples can also be interpreted 
in a relative way within the moral universe of his audience. The latter would for the most part 
be aware of the context of the events being related and of the moral characters of the figures 
being discussed, and have pre-formed judgements about them. Surely Hannibal carrying out an 
ambush, for example, would have been perceived differently than Fabius Maximus, since one 
would expect the first to behave in a less straightforward way, and it would have been more 
acceptable and in character for him as a Carthaginian, than for Fabius, to bend the rules of 
fairness. This would mean that – again similarly to Cicero’s advice – a general would not 
mindlessly emulate any stratagem but perhaps consider whether he himself had the same 
character as the general whose stratagem he emulated, and whether he was in the same 
circumstances, especially since the audience would be likely to know the eventual outcome of 
the war/battle and would therefore be able to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of a 
certain stratagem based on that as well.  
2.2 Just war 
Onasander is the only one of our authors who explicitly discusses ‘just warfare’, surely because 
the format of Frontinus’ and Polyaenus’ treatises gives them less freedom to treat such 
theoretical matters but also because ‘just war’ issues arise primarily over going to war, so 
treatments that are interested in how wars are fought are not going to be concerned them. 
One of his self-contained chapters is dedicated to the way in which war must be defensive and 
how a general must have the support of the gods.551 There is engagement with the idea of just 
war but, in many ways this is directed at the soldiers’ psychology not principles, and at making 
them believe that they are fighting for the right cause. Thus, although the author mentions the 
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support of the gods, it becomes quickly apparent that it is desirable mainly because of its effect 
on the morale and psychology of the soldiers. Consider the following: 
εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλ̓ ἀμύνονται, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντες 
ἐντελῆ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται, ὡς, ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ τῷ παρὰ 
τὸ δίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον, αὐτῇ τῇ οἰήσει, κἂν μή τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων 
ἀπαντήσειν μέλλῃ, προκατορρωδοῦσιν.  
‘For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with 
consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those 
who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the 
war with fear’552 
In other words, it is important to fight a defensive and just war not necessarily for the sake of 
an ‘ethical code’ or of an ideal of fairness, but because, if they believe in the war they are 
fighting, it makes men better fighters. So, one of the more important points that Onasander 
seems to make – both here and in the rest of the treatise – is that perception is more important 
than reality, and emphasis is placed on the soldiers and their point of view, with perception 
being assumed as their reality. The general needs to appear to be doing his best to fight 
defensively; whether he actually does so is irrelevant – and this exact point is made by Polybius 
as well: 
πολὺ γὰρ δὴ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐφρόντιζον Ῥωμαῖοι, καλῶς φρονοῦντες: ἔνστασις γὰρ 
πολέμου κατὰ τὸν Δημήτριον δικαία μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ τὰ νικήματα ποιεῖ μείζω καὶ 
τὰς ἀποτεύξεις ἀσφαλεστέρας, ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη τοὐναντίον ἀπεργάζεται 
‘For the Romans very rightly paid great attention to this matter, since, as Demetrius says, 
when the inception of a war seems just, it makes victory greater and ill-success less 
perilous, while if it is thought to be dishonourable and wrong it has the opposite effect.’553 
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 As for how Onasander’s general should fight we find Onasander’s advice in the context of 
capturing cities through treachery. After having stressed the importance of capturing everyone 
who might warn the inhabitants of the approach of the army, he makes the more general point 
that a commander needs to find the mean between open declaration of warfare and surprise, 
between justification and utility:  
ἐπελθόντα δ̓ ἐξαίφνης ἀπροσδοκήτοις χρή, κἂν μὴ κατὰ προδοσίαν μέλλῃ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ̓ 
ἐκ προρρήσεως ἀγωνίζεσθαι διὰ μάχης, μὴ ἀναβάλλεσθαι, ἀλλ̓ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα φθάνειν 
προσβάλλοντα εἴτε φρουρίῳ εἴτε χάρακι εἴτε πόλει, μάλιστα δ̓ ὅτ̓ ἂν ὀλίγον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ 
φίλιον στράτευμα καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐλαττούμενον 
‘He must fall on an unsuspecting enemy, even if he is not expecting to seize the towns 
through treachery but to fight openly after a declaration of war, he must not hesitate but 
strive in every way to attack fort or camp or town before his advance is known, especially if 
he knows that his own army is small and inferior to that of the enemy.’554 
Open declaration of warfare does not, therefore, mean that the general must forgo his tactical 
advantage and strategic thinking: he must fight within the rules however, taking any advantage 
that is permitted. Hence, in Onasander’s view ‘just war’ does not mean marching openly into 
enemy territory and joining battle at a designated time and place, but operating within the 
parameters of fairness whilst still employing intelligent generalship. 
2.3 Oaths, tyrants and fairness 
Polyaenus seems to have similar views about rules and his examples often suggest either 
bending them or, less frequently, breaking them. This mostly happens in the case of oaths and 
promises – which feature in far greater number than in Frontinus’ collection, but we shall also 
discuss the special place that tyrants hold in his collection (again as opposed to Frontinus) and 
how their actions relate to fairness. 
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However, the analysis of his text must come with a caveat due to the express provision in his 
preface that he is trying to be exhaustive. As I mentioned before, Polyaenus claims that he has 
gathered in the book ‘as many stratagems of past commanders as came into being’, so one 
must wonder what kind of agenda could fit into in this kind of ‘unselective’ approach.555 We 
have also seen that the text is not organised thematically, but prosopographically, so apart 
from the stratagems being about a certain person they do not follow any other structure, 
despite certain practices being common to all the figures (for example the use of surprise).  On 
top of this if we examine the entirety of his text we see that sometimes examples are included 
which would only barely qualify as ‘stratagems’, at least when compared to Frontinus’. Most of 
these are in book eight, the first part of which is about the deeds of Romans, and the second 
describing ‘stratagems’ of women. It is in this section that Polyaenus’ desire to include as many 
instances of ‘wit and cleverness’ as possible becomes most clear. For example, the chapter on 
Mania simply describes her life, how she was the wife of Zenis the ruler of the cities near 
Dardanus and after his death she contrived his rule, went to battle in a chariot and acted as a 
general, eventually dying at the hand of her new husband, Medias, who assassinated her in her 
chambers.556 In these circumstances we might wonder if Polyaenus cares at all about ethics in 
this work and whether the contradictions that we see are not simply the result of a lack of 
selectiveness, dictated by an overriding desire for exhaustiveness. Surely his desire to minimise 
the Roman contribution is also behind this, the inclusion of perhaps less significant stratagems 
of women being a very efficient way of achieving this goal. Nevertheless, his compilation will 
have been read and measured against the same set of norms and, irrespective of whether he 
would have intended it or not, I will also attempt to read it in a similar way.  
Thus, an extreme example of rule-breaking appears in the chapter dedicated to Lysander in 
book one, and as part of the succession of examples of Greek commanders. Lysander breaks 
the promise made in the temple of Hercules not to kill pro-Athenian sympathisers, by 
proceeding to have their throats cut. Beyond breaking a promise to an ‘enemy’, this is also 
against the general expectation that a captured city should be shown mercy, as at this stage the 
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Thasians were already in the power of Lysander and his action also violates a sacred space and 
sanctuary. 557 It also follows the general principle expressed by Lysander in the previous 
chapter, namely that ‘boys must be deceived with knuckle-bones, enemies with oaths.’558 The 
fact that this saying follows a stratagem that involves a naval battle and has nothing to do with 
oaths indicates that what is being expressed is a general principle which Polyaenus adheres to, 
simply because it is so disconnected from everything else. Indeed, he includes many other 
examples of manipulating oaths and promises similar to this one, such as the one of Thrasyllus 
and the siege of Byzantium. When the Byzantine generals feared that the city would be taken 
by force, they agreed to hand the city over at a certain time, but, after setting sail for Ionia, 
Thrasyllus’ men broke the terms, returned and captured Byzantium by force the same night.559 
Similarly we see Clearchus retreating with the Ten Thousand after the defeat of Cyrus to a 
village with unlimited provisions. When Tissaphernes promised that they could stay there after 
handing over their weapons, Clearchus at first pretended to accept, hoping that the Persians 
would disperse to the villages. However he then broke the treaty at night and then marched 
ahead of Tissaphernes.560  
Once again, the tension between working within the boundaries of an ‘ethical code’ and 
bending it can be noticed. For instance, when Dercyllidas swore to Medias the tyrant of Scepsis 
that if he came for a parley he would be allowed to return shortly to the city, he threatened to 
kill him if he did not open the gates. He then upheld his promise but only after coming in with 
his army and thus treading a fine line between keeping and breaking the oath.561  This pushing 
of boundaries is almost identical to the example of Thibron besieging a fort in Asia, where the 
garrison commander was persuaded to come out and negotiate a truce with the promise that if 
they did not agree, Thibron would escort him back into the fort. This gave Thibron’s forces a 
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chance to attack the fort and take it, whilst indeed the garrison commander was led inside the 
fort – as promised – but then killed.562  
In all these examples the promises are not broken per se but they are bent in a way which 
allows the commander to gain an advantage. This idea of manipulation of words might attract 
Polyaenus’ rhetorical side, which may be why he includes so many similar examples, such as 
Paches’ identical stratagem when he was besieging Notium, only this time it was Hippias, 
Pissuthnes’ general, who was killed. 563 Can this repetition be considered Polyaenus’ 
endorsement? The question is not easily answered because Polyaenus never comments 
explicitly either to rebuke or to commend and there is no thematic unity or guidelines which 
would help a reader makes sense of the collection.  
Turning to the context provided – or the lack thereof – can prove illuminating. If we take the 
case of breaking oaths, promises and truces, the reason why it might be justifiable to break 
them is to bring significant advantages, and this seems to be what Polyaenus is suggesting in 
Agathocles’ words: 
Ἀγαθοκλῆς, Σικελίας τύραννος, ὀμόσας τοῖς πολεμίοις παρέβη τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ 
κατασφάξας τοὺς ἁλόντας ἐπιχλευάζων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἔλεγεν ‘δειπνήσαντες 
ἐξεμέσωμεν τοὺς ὅρκους’. 
After breaking the oath he had sworn to his enemies and killing his prisoners, Agathocles, 
the tyrant of Sicily, said scornfully to his friends, “After eating let us vomit up the oaths” 564 
The fact that this comes at the beginning of the chapter on Agathocles, again disconnected 
from anything else could mean that it is the author’s own judgement. Furthermore, one may 
again wonder who Agathocles is. Is he the same tyrant of Syracuse who appeared in book two? 
If so, why does he get another chapter? Or is it his son or his grandson, with the same name? 
Given what was said before about the seeming unimportance of context in Polyaenus, it is 
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more likely that it does not matter which Agathocles this is because what Polyaenus wants to 
emphasise in the first place is this specific attitude towards oaths. 
This leads onto the matter of tyrants more broadly. There is a special and most peculiar 
category of stratagems, stories about tyrants, many of them ending with the killing of a 
segment of the population of a city, and thus posing particular problems in relation to fairness. 
Tyrants are certainly a complicated topic in the ancient world, as are the lessons that can be 
drawn from their exempla, so their inclusion here is striking for several reasons.565  
Firstly, if we again turn to Cicero’s De Officiis, we see that there are certain categories of 
opponents to which the rules of ‘lawful warfare’ do not apply. One of these is pirates, Cicero 
commenting that if one breaks his word towards them it would not be considered a 
transgression because they are not ‘lawful enemies’.566  Tyrants too are in one of these 
categories and hurting or killing them is considered acceptable under any circumstance: 
Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; 
exempli causa ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse scelus quam non 
modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur se astrinxit scelere, si 
qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo quidem Romano non videtur  
‘For it often happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed under 
ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong. 
For the sake of illustration, let us assume some particular case that admits of wider 
application: what more atrocious crime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and 
especially an intimate friend? But if anyone kills a tyrant—be he never so intimate a 
friend—he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People, at all events, are 
not of that opinion’567 
Also, as opposed to Cicero’s explanation that men are linked by bonds of fellowship and must 
act accordingly, a tyrant is not protected by these:  
                                                          
565 For an overview of tyranny in the ancient world see Lewis (2006), (2009), Andrewes (1971), McGlew (1993). 
566 Cic. Off. 3.18. 
567 Cic. Off. 3.19. 
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Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque est contra 
naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare, atque hoc omne genus 
pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate exterminandum est. 
‘We have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not 
opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill;—nay, all that 
pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society.’568 
Under these circumstances, Polyaenus’ inclusion of numerous examples where tyrants achieve 
personal power – by murdering prisoners or the inhabitants of a city – strikingly distinguishes 
him from Frontinus and Onasander. One such case is that of Theron, the son of Miltiades, who, 
when the Selinuntines were fighting the Carthaginians promised to bury the bodies of the fallen 
if he was given 300 slaves to cut wood, construct a pyre and then erect a burial mound. 
However, he persuaded the slaves to kill their masters and also of citizens in their sleep, thus 
capturing the city and becoming tyrant.569 Similarly, Polyaenus gives the example of how 
Clearchus, the tyrant of Heraclea wanted to kill many citizens but had no pretext, so he enlisted 
those between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five, took them out into marshy ground and waited 
for them to die of pestilence.570 
The inclusion of many deeds of tyrants which encompass actions against one’s own citizens 
begs the question of interpretation: what are we – and what were the ancient readers – 
supposed to make of all these examples that go against ideas of clemency and seem to 
emphasise the use of violence for personal gain? Polyaenus offers no explicit comment in any 
of the chapters and leaves the impression that everything is to be emulated. This is certainly 
the implication in the preface: 
ἀλλὰ τῆς στρατηγικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐφόδια ταυτὶ προσφέρω, ὅσα τῶν πάλαι γέγονε 
στρατηγήματα, ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς πολλὴν ἐμπειρίαν παλαιῶν ἔργων, τοῖς τε ὑπὸ ὑμῶν 
                                                          
568 Cic. Off. 3.32. 
569 Polyaen. 1.28. 
570 Polyaen. 2.30.3; also 1.42.1. 
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πεμπομένοις πολεμάρχοις ἢ στρατηγοῖς ἢ μυριάρχοις ἢ χιλιάρχοις ἢ ἑξακοσιάρχοις ἢ ὅσαι 
ἄλλαι ὅπλων ἀρχαὶ, διδασκομένοις ἀρχαίων κατορθωμάτων ἀρετὰς καὶ τέχνας. 
‘I offer this guidebook of military knowledge, all the stratagems of earlier generals, both to 
you as a collection of past experiences and to those sent by you, polemarchs, generals, 
legates of legions, tribunes, prefects of cohorts and other officers, teaching the merits and 
skills of ancient victories to their troops’571 
In the preface to book two he describes the stratagems as meant to give ‘concise aid’ 
(ὠφέλειαν σύντομον), though it is not exactly clear how and whether they provide examples of 
what one should as well as should not do. Is all this supposed to mean – as perhaps in the case 
of oaths – that good generalship must be taken at face value irrespective of its context? It 
seems that the implication is that a clever trick must be recognised as such, even if performed 
by a tyrant: the value of trickery in and of itself is clearly underscored in the preface: 
ἀνδρεία μὲν γὰρ, ὅστις ἀλκῇ χρησάμενος πολεμίων μαχομένων ἐκράτησεν, εὐβουλία δὲ, 
ἀμαχεὶ τέχνῃ καὶ δόλῳ περιγίγνεσθαι· ὡς ἔστι πρώτη δεινῶν στρατηγῶν σοφία κτᾶσθαι 
τὴν νίκην ἀκίνδυνον. 
‘For it is courage whenever one conquers an enemy in battle with strength, but it is good 
planning to win without a fight by art and trickery, so that it is the first wisdom of clever 
generals to achieve victory without risk’572 
So whilst Frontinus tries to dissociate stratagem from trickery and associate it with more 
‘positive’ qualities, Polyaenus takes the opposite approach, and uses trickery to give a positive 
spin to examples which might be considered more negative. The usefulness and prestige of 
trickery is also marked out in the preface by connection with legendary figures such as 
Autolycus, Proteus, Irus and Odysseus: Greek myth is used to give his argument force.573  
                                                          
571 Polyaen. Pr.2 
572 Polyaen. Pr. 3; he goes on to discuss Greek figures that all used trickery successfully. 
573 Polyaen. Pr. 4-12. 
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Thus, while differing from Frontinus and Onasander in degree and approach – the deeds 
included by Polyaenus are more extreme – one might also say that the latter, through valuing 
trickery irrespective of context and consequence, also encourages a utilitarian attitude centred 
on immediate victory which supersedes any ‘rules of warfare’. 
We shall see a similar approach in the following section, dedicated to how one should behave 
towards one’s enemies and allies after the war has started. 
3. Ius in bello. Virtues and dealing with the enemy.  
I will now examine how our authors approach the second major component of the code, 
namely dealing with the enemy and in particular with prisoners and those who surrender. Since 
the issue is closely intertwined with notions of clemency and justice, the question of whether a 
general should possess certain virtues will also be addressed here. The line I will hold will be 
similar to that of the previous subchapter, namely that our authors suggest that the general 
should place success above all else and that any action he takes should be geared towards this.  
In the case of this section, because of the intricate agendas of the different authors, it is better 
to discuss each of their views separately, rather than go for a thematic approach which would 
single out specific virtues. Thus, I will discuss Frontinus’ views and agenda first, followed by 
Polyaenus’ and Onasander’s. The virtues that we shall be focusing on are those that are linked 
closely to the ‘ethical code’, specifically clemency, justice and self-restraint, since they are the 
ones most consistently related to how a general behaves towards the enemy but also towards 
prisoners or inhabitants of a captured city. Other virtues, such as courage, will not feature here 
simply because an investigation into why it is essential to warfare and why the texts emphasise 
it would be superfluous. Our aim will be to see whether our authors in any way suggest that 
these virtues are useful in an abstract sense and that any ‘good general’ should possess them or 
whether they are also linked to certain situations and should play a specific role, and discipline 
is perhaps one of the best examples of this (whether it is a virtue in the same sense as 
clemency, for instance, is a different matter). 
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Before we enter a discussion about each individual author, we should briefly consider whether 
the virtues necessary in warfare are the same as those needed in life in general, or whether 
they are in any way different. Again Valerius Maximus’ Memorable Deeds and Sayings 
constitutes a good starting point, for a more general enquiry. The question might, however, be 
considered wrongheaded for a Roman world in which there is a close mix between ‘civilian’ and 
‘military’, little distinction made between the two. Indeed, the notion of the ‘civilian’ might be 
thought to be absent. Certainly, it would seem that some of the values discussed by both 
Frontinus and Valerius would be useful outside warfare. However, even those such as fortitudo, 
which one might think is most relevant in battle is considered by Valerius to be equally 
important in the ‘civil’ sphere, as he comments: 
’Togaque quoque fortitude militaribus operibus inseranda est, quia eandem laudem foro 
atque castris edita meretur. 
 ‘Bravery in the toga calls for mention among military exploits. For bravery deserves the 
same praise whether shown in Forum or camp.’574 
Indeed, there are equal examples of fortitudo in public life as there are in warfare, and the 
same can be said about iustitia, where the most notable are the almost identical prosecution of 
Scaurus by Cn. Domitius and the offer by Scaurus’ slave to furnish charges against his master 
(‘public’ sphere), and the offer by Pyrrhus’ slave to poison him (‘military’ sphere).575 Valerius’ 
chapters on Abstinentia et continentia also present the military stories of Scipio and Cato, 
juxtaposed to the domestic story of Drusus and his wife Antonia, and also that of Fabricius 
Luscinus, who refuses gold from the Samnites (but not as a result of warfare) juxtaposed to that 
of Manius Curius who refused the Samnite bribes.576 So based on the qualities that we find in 
both Frontinus and Valerius we could say that there is no specific way of applying ‘moral 
qualities’ to warfare, and no difference between civil and military virtues. What one could say 
however is that warfare is perhaps a better arena for displaying such qualities, as we do see 
                                                          
574 Val. Max. 3.2.17. 
575 Val. Max. 6.5.5 and 6.5.1d. 
576 Val. Max. 4.3.1-2 vs. 4.3.3; 4.3.5a vs. 4.3.6a. 
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that in most cases the examples that pertain to warfare outnumber those pertaining to public 
life, as for instance in abstinentia et continentia. 
3.1 Frontinus 
Gilliver is right in saying that, when it comes to the enemy, Frontinus goes for an approach that 
encourages both violence and clemency, but there is an important distinction to be made in 
terms of structure.577 In books one to three there is very little commentary on the moral virtues 
associated with correct treatment of prisoners and enemies, and when these issues do appear 
they seem not to be there in their own right but simply part of a bigger picture. The clearest 
examples where two moral traits are actually named and commented upon is in book  two 
which, in Frontinus’ own words, deals with: 
quae in ipso proelio agi solent, et deinde ea, quae post proelium 
‘those things that are usually done in the battle itself, and then those that come 
subsequent to the engagement.’578 
These virtues are magnanimity and justice. The first two ‘stratagems’ are virtually identical 
examples of the honourable treatment of a beautiful woman captured by Scipio Africanus and 
Alexander respectively, whilst the final ‘stratagem’ is an example of the justice of Domitian in 
compensating the Cubii for their lost grain. They are part of the chapter entitled De Dubiorum 
Animis in Fide Retinendis (‘On Ensuring the Loyalty of Those Whom one Mistrusts’): 
Scipio Africanus in Hispania, cum inter captivas eximiae formae virgo nubilis [alias et 
nobilis] ad eum perducta esset omniumque oculos in se converteret, summa custodia 
habitam sponso nomine Alicio reddidit insuperque aurum, quod parentes eius redempturi 
captivam donum Scipioni attulerant, eidem sponso pro nuptiali munere dedit. Qua multiplici 
magnificentia universa gens victa imperio populi Romani accessit.  
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‘When Scipio Africanus was warring in Spain, there was brought before him among the 
captive women a noble maiden of surpassing beauty who attracted the gaze of everyone. 
Scipio guarded her with the greatest pains and restored her to her betrothed, Alicius by 
name, presenting to him likewise, as a marriage gift, the gold which her parents had 
brought to Scipio as a ransom. Overcome by this manifold generosity, the whole tribe 
assented to the rule of the Roman people.’ 
Alexandrum quoque Macedonem traditum est eximiae pulchritudinis virgini captivae, cum 
finitimae gentis principi fuisset desponsa, summa abstinentia ita pepercisse, ut illam ne 
aspexerit quidem. Qua mox ad sponsum remissa, universae gentis per hoc beneficium 
animos conciliavit sibi. 
‘The story goes that Alexander of Macedon likewise, having taken captive a maiden of 
exceeding beauty betrothed to the chief of a neighboring tribe, treated her with such 
extreme consideration that he refrained even from gazing at her. When the maiden was 
later returned to her lover, Alexander, as a result of this kindness, secured the attachment 
of the entire tribe.’ 
Imperator Caesar Augustus Germanicus eo bello, quo victis hostibus cognomen Germanici 
meruit, cum in finibus Cubiorum castella poneret, pro fructibus locorum, quae vallo 
comprehendebat, pretium solvi iussit; atque ita iustitiae fama omnium fidem astrinxit. 
When the Emperor Caesar Augustus Germanicus, in the war in which he earned his title by 
conquering the Germans, was building forts in the territory of the Cubii, he ordered 
compensation to be made for the crops which he had included within his fortifications. 
Thus, the renown of his justice won the allegiance of all.579 
Nowhere does Frontinus say that virtue for its own sake is not to be praised, and the two 
examples could easily be interpreted as virtue being rewarded. However, what is highlighted 
beyond that is the commanders’ providentia for realising the strategic advantage of being well-
disposed towards one’s enemies. In each situation the person carrying out the stratagem gains 
                                                          
579 Front. Strat. 2.11.5-7. 
202 
 
a tangible benefit, namely the cooperation of a people that could otherwise prove potentially 
hostile and this is what Frontinus’ final comment reflects: in the case of Scipio we see that the 
munificentia leads to universa gens victa imperio populi Romani accessit, in that of Alexander 
his beneficium wins an alliance with the whole tribe (universae gentis animos conciliavit sibi) 
and finally Domitian’s iustitiae fama wins the good faith of all (omnium fidem astrinxit).  
Oftentimes, however, readers are at a loss when trying to identify what is being emphasised in 
a particular stratagem. Guidance is provided by the author’s own description in the heading of 
the subchapter, and we quickly realise that many of these stratagems could fit under several 
headings, or that they are indeed interchangeable. For example chapters that are essentially 
about an encircling manoeuvre, become, because of Frontinus’ classification, means of 
terrorising the enemy and there are also identical stratagems under different headings, which 
makes the reader wonder what warrants the inclusion in one category or the other.580 The only 
thing that makes the same stratagem an example of constantia in book four – a chapter dealing 
with how one should be determined and not give up in warfare – whereas in book one it can be 
found under the chapter-heading de evadendis ex locis difficillimis (‘On escaping from Difficult 
Situations’) is the author’s own emphasis of different aspects of the same story.581 Coming back 
to our earlier examples, the heading under which we find iustitia and magnificentia is de 
dubiorum animis in fide retinendis so it becomes even clearer that it is not these qualities and 
the behaviour associated with them that Frontinus wants emphasised, but how to restore trust.  
The only ‘moral quality’ that is included in a chapter title in books one to three is constantia, 
but again, as is the case for iustitia and magnificentia, it seems to be a means to an end, which 
is again made clear by the title of the chapter, De Restituenda per Constantiam Acie (‘On 
restoring the battle line by firmness’), with the emphasis on the restoration of the battle line. 
Therefore, in the same fashion indicated in the preface, where readers are invited to supply 
examples of their own to Frontinus’ text, so too in placing moral qualities in the background he 
is also inviting his readers to find them wherever they like and judge their importance for 
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themselves, whilst he himself chooses to show how they can primarily be a means to achieving 
one’s goals. 
However, in book four of the Strategemata there is a fundamentally different approach, which 
not only includes but stresses the self-same moral qualities that were not at the forefront 
before. This is one of the reasons why the authenticity of the book was called into question at 
the end of the 19th century, whereas more recent scholarship accepts that it was written as a 
later addition by Frontinus.582  Moral attributes head the chapters in book four and we can see 
many correspondences with Valerius Maximus’ own chapter headings, which again show the 
same virtues present in both ‘military’ and ‘civil’ life. For example Frontinus’ chapter De 
Disciplina (‘On Discipline’) is found in Valerius’ De Disciplina Militari (‘On Military Discipline’).583 
De Continentia (‘On restraint’) in Frontinus is found in De Abstinentia et Continentia (‘On 
abstinence and restraint’) in Valerius.584 Froninus’ De Iustitia (‘On Justice’) has an identical 
parallel in Valerius, and Frontinus’ De Affectu et Moderatione (‘On Good Will and Moderation’) 
corresponds to Valerius’ De moderatione (‘On Moderation’).585 
This leads me to believe that if Frontinus indeed wrote this book, he considered himself 
constrained to add it, thinking that his original plan had failed and that one cannot exclude the 
ethical component from warfare. Even if he is not the author of the book, its adding still shows 
that a similar concern was addressed by one of his contemporaries, once again revealing the 
importance of ‘the code’ for the Romans.  
What does make me believe that this book is a later addition by the author is that it ends with a 
category called de variis consiliis (‘On different plans’), which is the second largest subchapter 
after that on disciplina, and again reveals Frontinus’ interest in consilium, as seen in books one 
to three. These indeed show no other moral quality but the consilium which Frontinus mentions 
in his preface and would therefore make a fitting ending for his book, as such a chapter would 
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prove that although ethics are necessary, what is most important is a quality is not only part of 
the moral repertoire but also a practical skill.  
Despite talking about justice and benevolence, Frontinus also questions the fair treatment of 
prisoners and recommends their use as ‘huuman shields’ to defend against the enemy attacks, 
if the situation calls for it.586 As Gilliver points out, he does not condemn the use of violence 
against the besieged and has no qualms about recommending to presenting those encircled 
with the heads of their dead on spikes.587 Nor is he against executing prisoners individually, if it 
helps the general achieve victory, and it does not seem to matter whether the general 
performing the recommended stratagem is Roman or foreign.588 So it seems that Frontinus’ 
approach focuses more on utility, and on what will enable a general to achieve victory, being 
less worried about the theoretical confines of an ‘ethical code’. 
3.2 Polyaenus 
Moral qualities appear in Polyaenus’ text as well, especially, but not only, when it comes to 
dealing with the enemy. As in the case of Frontinus, Polyaenus presents them in situations 
where they bring a tangible benefit and one possible interpretation is that one should know 
when to display virtue appropriately; however, unlike Frontinus, virtue seems to be sometimes 
emphasised for its own sake.  
For example in the war against the Falerians, a school master led the Falerian children outside 
the wall under the pretext of exercise and handed them over to Camillus. He refused to take 
them hostage, instead ordering them to tie up the schoolmaster and take him back to their 
fathers, considering him a traitor. We can read this example as Camillus’ virtues being 
rewarded, but we can also see him as very shrewd in displaying clemency and piety in order to 
gain the trust of the Falerians to surrender: 
Φαλέριοι τὸν μὲν διδάσκαλον αἰκισάμενοι κατέφθειραν, τοῦ δὲ Καμίλλου θαυμάσαντες 
τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἄνευ μάχης παρέδωκαν· 
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‘The Falerians tortured and executed the schoolmaster, but astounded at Camillus’ piety 
and justice, they surrendered without battle.’ 
Polyaenus’ comments make explicit that here the eusebeia is useful when and because used in 
an appropriate stratagem:  
Κάμιλλος δὲ τοὺς πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἁλῶναι μὴ δυναμένους εὐσεβεῖ στρατηγήματι 
παρεστήσατο 
‘Camillus, unable to take them by force, won them over by a pious stratagem.’589 
In the same way Mucius Scaevola’s display of ‘endurance’ (καρτερίαν) by placing his hand into 
the sacrificial fire, after his failed assassination attempt of the Etruscan king Porsena, helps him 
coerce Porsena into a peace. It is also the case of Alexander who, by pouring the water out 
during a long march, manages to persuade his troops to carry on through the dessert.590 
Polyaenus again comments on this:  
οἱ Μακεδόνες ἀλαλάξαντες ἐκέλευον αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς ὁδοῦ, πρὸς τὸ δίψος εὐρώστως 
ἀντέχοντες διὰ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως ἐγκράτειαν. 
‘The Macedonians shouted and ordered him to lead on, holding out against thirst more 
firmly because of the king’s self-control’591  
Again, this could be read as Alexander’s virtue being rewarded but it is also possible to read it 
as a means of exploiting certain virtues in certain situations, the emphasis being on the fact that 
his men held out against thirst more firmly as a result. 
There is also a greater focus on discipline in the chapters about the Romans where, as we shall 
see next, it sometimes seems to be emphasised for its own sake, not because it brings tangible 
benefits. Of course the question of whether discipline is a virtue in the same way as clemency 
or justice can reasonably be posed. Valerius Maximus certainly considers it a virtue:  
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Tenacissimum vinculum, in cuius sinu ac tutela serenus tranquillusque beatae pacis status 
acquiescit 
‘the tenacious bond […] in the bosom and protection of which rests our serene and tranquil 
state of blessed peace’592  
Frontinus also clearly considers discipline a similar kind of virtue to iustitia and constantia by 
including it amongst these latter qualities in book four. In any case we do see presentations 
that differ in Polyaenus, although he never explicitly mentions discipline, but rather behaviour 
that can be associated with it. Firstly, he presents discipline as something that leads to tangible 
benefits, such as in the example of Scipio when he learned that the enemy arrived without food 
and thus restrained his men in camp, only to join battle when the enemy was starving. 593 
Secondly he covers situations in which actions that have discipline underlying them are 
appreciated for no other reason than their intrinsic value. Such is the case with Julius Caesar: 
  Καῖσαρ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῶν στρατιωτῶν οὐ πάντα παρεφύλασσεν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοὺς 
ἁμαρτάνοντας κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐτιμωρεῖτο, τὴν συγγνώμην ἀνδρείας ποιητικὴν ἡγούμενος. 
εἰ μέντοι τις ἐστασίασεν ἢ τὴν τάξιν ἔλιπεν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦτον ἀτιμώρητον παρῆκεν. 
 ‘Caesar did not pay close attention to all the soldiers’ infractions of regulations, but he also 
did not fully punish violators, as he thought pardon capable of producing courage. If, 
however someone mutinied or deserted his post, he would not let him go unpunished’594 
The importance of discipline for Augustus again shows no other benefit, something which is 
surely connected to his attempts to restore the mos maiorum: 
Σεβαστὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις καθυφιεμένους οὐκ ἀνῄρει πάντας, ἀλλ’ ἐδεκάτευεν. 
Σεβαστὸς τοῖς διὰ δειλίαν ἀπολιπομένοις κριθὰς ἀντὶ πυρῶν ἐκέλευε μετρεῖσθαι. 
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Σεβαστὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου τι ἁμαρτόντας ἐκέλευσε πρὸ τοῦ στρατηγείου λυσιζώνους 
ἑστάναι, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ πλινθοφορεῖν δι’ ὅλης ἡμέρας. 
Augustus used to execute not all who slackened in battle, but every one in ten. Augustus 
ordered barley instead of wheat to be distributed to cowardly deserters. Augustus ordered 
offenders of some regulations in the camp to stand without their belts in front of the 
general’s tent and sometimes to carry bricks all day.595 
It seems therefore that there are times where military discipline is truly important in its own 
right, as in the chapter Frontinus dedicates to it in book four, and one might argue on the basis 
of König’s analysis of the Strategemata that the whole treatise manifests a kind of 
‘metadiscipline’ in that it is very clearly and neatly organised.596   
But then we might also ask ourselves whether emphasis on discipline in its own right in warfare 
needs to be questioned further, just as one might not question why courage is considered 
useful in its own right. The reason might be that it is an integral and indivisible part of the 
Romans’ conception of warfare. This would also explain why Frontinus needs to have a whole 
section dedicated to discipline, where he both juxtaposes the lack of it and its results, but also 
presents a traditional view of the various Roman figures who enforced it for its own sake. 
However, just as in the previous chapter, it is also important to remember that Polyaenus is not 
interested in highlighting certain topics, but in historical figures, so the treatment of discipline 
might also be a result of this very approach and his desire to be exhaustive. Also, as already 
mentioned, in some of Polyaenus’ stratagems it is difficult to identify what is being highlighted 
or what the stratagem is, as he is particularly fond of rhetoric and clever sayings.597 When one 
claims to talk about all the stratagems in history, as Polyaenus does, avoiding contradiction is 
just not possible.  
Similarly what seems to be a special focus on discipline in the Roman chapters as opposed to 
the Greek ones might be simply because there are more examples of discipline in Roman 
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shameful that a Roman trusts in his left hand rather than his right. 
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sources. At the same time, it is strange that most examples of trickery come from the Greek 
world – with the emphasis on its legendary Greek roots, as the case of Greek heroes – whilst 
those of discipline come from the Roman world. It is almost as if Polyaenus were suggesting 
that stratagems are the domain of the Greeks and must be seen as such, whilst the Romans 
have the discipline which is specific to them but they should not be considered equal in terms 
of trickery – nor perhaps would they want to be considered as such, given their reputation of 
fighting fairly.  
Furthermore, as hinted before, we cannot ignore the fact that the moral qualities that are 
presented in Frontinus and Polyaenus are always linked to a historical figure. Therefore, just as 
Frontinus might want the reader to choose where to find moral attributes, so too Polyaenus at 
times wishes his readers to judge which moral attributes fit their own character and situation, 
and therefore not mindlessly emulate the historical figures presented, even if on other 
occasions he seems to emphasise the deeds more than the people performing them. 
3.3 Onasander 
Onasander also provides commentary on the virtues necessary to a general in a similar way to 
Frontinus, showing how they help achieve victory or make the general more efficient. For 
instance, temperance helps prevent the general from being distracted by pleasures and enables 
him to focus on important matters.598 Vigilance allows him to work better (ὅπως ἐπαγρυπνῇ 
ταῖς μεγίσταις πράξεσιν) and frugality is important because one must not waste the resources 
of one’s army (λιτὸν δέ, ἐπειδὴ κατασκελετεύουσιν αἱ πολυτελεῖς θεραπεῖαι δαπανῶσαι 
χρόνον ἄπρακτον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων τρυφήν).599 Like Frontinus, by starting his manual on 
generalship with these virtues he seems to legitimise any of the actions recommended for the 
general by virtue of the fact that he possesses them, and consequently he is a good man, whilst 
also showing that even men who can be described as ‘good’ make decisions that differ from 
what one might think is correct simply because the situation dictates it.  
                                                          
598 Onos. 1.2: σώφρονα μέν, ἵνα μὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀνθελκόμενος ἡδοναῖς ἀπολείπῃ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων 
φροντίδα (‘The general must be temperate in order that he may not be so distracted by the pleasures of the body 
as to neglect the consideration of matters of the highest importance’). 
599 Onos. 1.3-8. 
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Having said that, we can clearly see Onasander’s similar interest in ‘perception’ when he 
discusses what a general should allow his army to do to his enemies, but also to his allies. We 
find out that: 
Διοδεύων δὲ συμμαχίδα γῆν παραγγελλέτω τοῖς στρατεύμασιν ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς χώρας, καὶ 
μήτ̓ ἄγειν τι μήτε φθείρειν. 
‘when passing through the country of an ally, the general must order his troops not to lay 
hands on the country, nor to pillage or destroy’600 
Onasander quickly tells us why, namely that ‘small reasons alienate allies or make them quite 
hostile’601 Therefore it could be said that showing restraint and composure is important when it 
comes to the allies because it might give them a certain perception of the general and his 
troops, which might in the long run hurt the war effort. In other words, one must treat one’s 
allies well in order to win a war, and not necessarily because of the inherent rules of war. 
Dealing with the enemy is a different story, but again one should ruin the enemy’s supplies and 
country not out of principle but because it puts an end to the war more quickly: 
τὴν δὲ τῶν πολεμίων φθειρέτω καὶ καιέτω καὶ τεμνέσθω: ζημία γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ καρπῶν 
ἔνδεια μειοῖ πόλεμον, ὡς περιουσία τρέφει. 
‘the country of the enemy he should ruin and burn and ravage, for loss of money and 
shortage of crops reduce warfare, as abundance nourishes it.’602 
This is further reinforced by Onasander’s statement that the general must let the enemy know 
of his intentions because ‘the expectation of impending terror has brought those who have 
been endangered, before they have suffered at all, to terms which they previously not wished 
to accept’.603 Therefore there is no sense of cruelty or justice in Onasander’s words, but simply 
                                                          
600 Onos. 6.10. 
601 Onos. 6.10-11: μικραὶ δὲ προφάσεις ἢ ἀπηλλοτρίωσαν συμμάχους ἢ καὶ παντελῶς ἐξεπολέμωσαν. 
602 Onos. 6.11. 
603 Onos. 6.11: πολλάκις γὰρ ἡ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι δεινοῦ προσδοκία συνηνάγκασε, πρὶν ἢ παθεῖν, 
ὑποσχέσθαι τι τοὺς κινδυνεύοντας ὧν πρότερον οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν ποιεῖν. 
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cold calculation, which reinforces the sense that he too holds quite a utilitarian view of 
‘battlefield ethics’.  
Onasander also seems to give advice about plundering that resembles Cicero’s, namely that it 
should not be done indiscriminately and after every battle: 
Τὰς δ̓ ἁρπαγὰς οὔτ ̓ἐπὶ πάσης μάχης ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐδ̓ αἰεὶ πάντων, ἀλλ̓ ὧν μέν, ὧν δ̓ οὔ, 
τῶν δὲ σωμάτων ἥκιστα: ταῦτα δὲ πιπράσκειν τὸν στρατηγόν. 
‘Plundering should not be permitted after every battle nor in the case of all kinds of 
property, but only in the case of certain things, and least of all of prisoners, for these 
should be sold by the general’604 
However, if deemed essential and if the war effort requires it, the general might proceed as he 
thinks fit, even taking and selling everything (including prisoners). The question of treatment of 
prisoners is then subject to the same utilitarian ethics, although Onasander does not postulate 
the same principles in every situation. For example, in one instance the idea of fair treatment of 
prisoners is done away with and they only seem to matter in order to assert one’s power and 
encourage one’s frightened army. The author suggests that one should capture a few of the 
enemy soldiers and if they are strong they should be killed, if not they should be paraded in 
front of the troops to lift their morale.605 A slight change in view seems to occur later on, when 
what Onasander appears to say is that prisoners should be naturally protected because of a 
higher sense of fate (much as we saw in Ducrey’s examples of the Greek law of war), which is 
not kind to those who kill prisoners indiscriminately. Despite this, it seems that Onasander 
again justifies their killing if it brings a definite edge to the general: 
μὴ κτεινέτω, μάλιστα μὲν τῶν πρὸς οὕς ἐστιν ὁ πόλεμος, κἂν δοκῇ οἱ, τοὺς συμμάχους 
ἀναιρεῖν, ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους καὶ λαμπροὺς παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, 
ἐνθυμούμενος τὰ ἄδηλα τῆς τύχης καὶ τὸ παλίντροπον τοῦ δαιμονίου φιλοῦντος ὡς τὰ 
πολλὰ νεμεσᾶν 
                                                          
604 Onos. 35.1. 
605 Onos. 14.3. 
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‘Prisoners, if the war is still in progress, the general should not kill – at the very most he 
may kill, if he thinks best, the allies of those against whom the war is directed, but least of 
all those who stand in highest repute and position among the enemy, remembering the 
uncertainties of chance and the reversals caused by providence, which usually brings 
retribution’606 
The chapter dealing with the treatment of surrendered cities perhaps best expresses 
Onasander’s ethical views on the matter:  
Ταῖς δὲ προσχωρούσαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τινες ἐπιτρέποιεν αὑτὰς ἀρξάμεναι, φιλανθρώπως καὶ 
χρηστῶς προσφερέσθω: προσαγάγοιτο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. 
 ‘If any cities should open their gates in surrender early in the war, the general should treat 
them in a manner both humane and advantageous, for thus he would induce the other 
cities also to submit.’607 
This shows that while care for human life is displayed – here and in other parts of the treatise – 
what eventually prevails is utility and the advantage that such clemency brings. Therefore, by 
treating surrendering cities in a humane manner is it more likely that other cities will surrender, 
making it easier for the general to win the war, as he explains further, bringing us to the issue of 
the prevalence of perception over reality, and how one wants his actions to be perceived as 
‘correct’, rather than be ‘correct’. 608 
Conclusion 
To conclude, it seems that although our authors are aware of the existence of ethical rules of 
conduct in warfare, they come back to the dilemma pointed out by Polybius that closely 
adhering to such rules in not equivalent to good generalship. Therefore, there is a marked need 
to navigate between an ideal way of fighting and a useful one, between the symbolic 
importance of an ethical code and the practical importance of having a winning strategy that is 
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607 Onos. Strateg. 38.1. 
608 Onos. Strateg. 38.3-11. 
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deeply grounded in the practicalities of warfare. They also seem to suggest a situational 
approach, where the right course of action is dictated by the circumstances with which a 
general might be faced, but also perhaps by the general himself and his own character and 
predisposition. This means that there is an underlying assumption that the reader will play an 
active part, and that he will be a partner to the author, able to ‘construct’ his own subset of the 
manual which best suits his needs, rather than mindlessly emulate anything without any critical 
thinking. 
However, authors such as Polyaenus also seem to emphasise actions over figures – at least at 
times – and unlike Frontinus, to use trickery as the focal point of stratagems rather than shying 
away from it. While this does not exclude the focus on figures (clearly important for Polyaenus, 
whose chapter titles are in fact names of generals), it does allow the author to underscore 
certain principles which he may consider more important than others. Perception also plays a 
pivotal role in the interplay with the ethical code, and one of Onasander’s main thrusts is that 
the perception of one’s actions is more important than their intrinsically ‘ethical’ character. 
Perception is also critical in the presentation and manipulation of history. Whilst it might simply 
be a matter of availability of material, it is somewhat peculiar that Romans seem to be 
associated with discipline in Polyaenus whilst the domain of the Greeks is trickery – and it is 
plausible that Polyaenus himself would have wanted to portray the two in such a way.  
V. Conclusions 
 
I believe that this thesis has proven that military texts lend themselves to a variety of readings 
and that there is much to be gained from a parallel examination of the texts, of the different 
ways in which they interact with each other when constructing authority and discussing 
‘military knowledge’. Much more could be done with such texts, and this thesis has only 
opened up a field of discussion that can be further explored, raising some major issues with 
respect to the cultural history of the ancient ‘military manual’ 
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Its first contribution lies in understanding the variety and development of technical writing 
dealing with military matters. Recently, a move away from studying military texts in isolation 
has occurred, with scholars stressing the importance of reading several works together. 
Nonetheless, the categories of ‘artillery’ and ‘military’ manuals set out by Campbell have 
persisted, even in the most recent efforts of Roby and Formisano.609 While I have shown that 
there is ground to justify such a distinction, as both strands have their own writing tradition, 
specificity and level of technicality – I believe that they are much better understood by breaking 
down the barriers that modern scholarship has established. It is reasonably clear that generals, 
such as Pyrrhus, were interested in writing both ‘military’ and ‘artillery’ texts, and that 
knowledge of both was necessary to the definition of good generalship. It is therefore much 
more likely that there was a specific paideia both before and during the Roman Empire which 
pertained to those interested in pursuing a military career. 
This brings us to the next two major issues raised here, namely the role of military knowledge 
and the possibilities of reading military knowledge in the Roman Empire. It is obvious that, in 
Roman society, warfare would have been much more central than many of the topics of other 
technical texts. Therefore, demonstrating that one possessed military knowledge would have 
had greater appeal than, for example, purporting to be familiar with medicine, so they must 
have been more widely read and more significant than previously recognised. However, while 
scholars such as Moore and Campbell have hinted at the more general educational potential of 
‘military manuals’ and mentioned their ‘entertainment value’, their precise place and role has 
not yet been discussed.610 This thesis has made clear that the topics contained in ‘military 
manuals’ were of more general interest to educated elites, since certain aspects of them were 
part of broader intellectual debates and arguments. We have seen how the audience of the 
texts could have been broader and more diversified than expected, comprising both ‘amateur’ 
and ‘specialised’ readers, and how these readers could have used the knowledge therein for 
more than one purpose.  Swain’s point that the Greek past could also be used by non-Greeks to 
achieve their own goals can be extrapolated and applied to ‘military knowledge’: it was not only 
                                                          
609 Campbell (1987) 13, note 2. Formisano (2017), Roby (2016). 
610 Moore (2013) 472, Campbell (1987) 22.  
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the preserve of ‘military experts’, it could also be used to channel military expertise on more 
general occasions, or, on the contrary, in the case of centurions, it functioned as a sort of  
‘cultural currency’ that could be used in order to help them become part of an elite who would 
have had different cultural expectations.611  
Therefore, while scholars such as Bosworth, Stadter and Wheeler have placed great emphasis 
on the practicality of these texts, assuming that they were only meant to teach obsolete 
manoeuvres to those who wanted to experiment with them, their ‘practicality’ can be 
understood in a much broader sense, and oscillates between their value as ‘cultural currency’, 
their encouragement of a general mindset and their strict application.612 This general mindset 
or framework is a type of facultas – to use Frontinus’ phrasing – that the texts aimed to convey 
to its readership, whether it be a focus on discipline and order or keeping an open mind, and 
we can perhaps see how different authors disagreed as to what that facultas should be.  
The other important contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that ‘military manuals’ are 
also concerned with ordering knowledge, tradition, identity and power. König and Whitmarsh 
underscore that the texts discussed in their voume ‘are embedded within the overarching 
hierarchies and patterns of thought of the Roman-empire and society and within the power 
relations and power struggles of specific disciplines’.613 They go on to say that the treatment of 
Greek intellectual material depended on struggles for ‘political and cultural authority within the 
Roman elite’, and that the same applied to Roman forms of expertise and cultural authority.614 
This struggle is also evident within military manuals, but is one between the Greek and Roman 
versions of the same discipline.  Under the guise of self-deprecation, common amongst 
technical writers, Greek authors use various strategies to show the pre-eminence of Greek 
military science with respect to its Roman counterpart, on the one hand, and to integrate the 
two in a framework of continuity, creating a succession of ‘empires of knowledge’ but also a 
universal sense of military knowledge, on the other.615 This approach is brought about by the 
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612 Stadter (1980) 42-43; Devine (1993); Wheeler (1978) 353. 
613 König and Whitmarsh (2007) 7. 
614 König and Whitmarsh (2007) 25. 
615 König and Woolf (2017) 7-9; König (2009) 43-44; König and Whitmarsh (2007) 17-20. 
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high esteem in which the Romans held themselves when it came to warfare: claims of 
usefulness of other military practices would both be treated with suspicion, and welcomed in 
the name of the integrating nature of the Romans. Therefore, the way in which military 
knowledge is presented by authors such as Onasander fits the pattern of superimposition of 
certain core Roman values and preservation of cultural particularities argued for by Woolf.616 
However, at the same time, the approaches of Arrian and Aelian perhaps create a unique type 
of ‘science’, where the position of primacy of either ‘Greek’ or ‘Roman’ knowledge is constantly 
renegotiated and adjusted under the umbrella of one uniform superstructure of succession 
which makes primacy itself irrelevant. The creation of this type of knowledge corresponds to an 
equally mixed elite, also jostling for position.     
This brings us to the next previously ignored aspect of military manuals: their role in 
constructing identity. Similarly to long-standing arguments about sophistic performance, we 
have seen how the Ektaxis contributes to the construction of Arrian’s identity, an identity which 
corresponds to Hadrianic (and perhaps more broadly Roman) ideas of Greekness.617 More 
generally, the texts engage with the identity of the Roman Empire and of the emperors, the two 
Taktika picking out an aspect of Greek military identity – the phalanx – which brings something 
significant to the construction of the emperors’ image as military commanders. Arrian stresses 
how the Roman Empire recognises diversity and inclusiveness, recreating a microcosm of 
empire within the pages of the Ektaxis, and paralleling his portrayal as a commander to that of 
Hadrian as emperor, and, in the words of Jason König, entwining his ‘own self-representation 
with images of Imperial authority’.618 However, the identity that Trajan and Hadrian wanted to 
project, which emphasised military prowess, directly encouraged the writing of ‘military 
manuals’ and influenced the type of ‘manual’ authors choose to write similarly to the way in 
which the patronage of Augustus and the more general political context around him stimlulated 
the growth in popularity of astrology and horoscopy.619 This is not only noticeable in the 
composition of the two Taktika, but also in Apollodorus’ dedication to Trajan of his Poliorketika, 
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which is also meant to contribute to this image of the emperor as a proficient commander and 
reinforces the idea that there was a specific paideia required of any successful general. I have 
also pointed out that Arrian also borrows the authority of Xenophon, and that of the Greek past 
more generally, as do Aelian and Polyaenus. Their use of the Greek past, though, seems less 
restrictive and focused than Bowie argued, and while the Classical past does figure extensively, 
there seems to be little interest in selecting examples or figures from a specific period, instead 
the emphasis being placed on military skil and ‘military tradition’.620 Arrian and Aelian refer to 
generals that one would consider both ‘Classical’ and ‘Hellenistic’ when establishing the Greek 
tradition of the taktika, while Polyaenus alternates between mythological and real figures, 
between ‘Classical’, ‘Hellenistic’ and unidentifiable Greek figures. In his text, one could even 
argue that we are faced with an almost ‘generic Greekness’, as seen before in the example of a 
certain anonymous Harmost or in figures that would be almost impossible to identify (or 
differentiate from each other) without extensive research.  
The final point supported by this thesis is that ‘military manuals’ hold a place in the discussions 
about ethics on the battlefield, and that a clear distinction between theory and practice must 
be made, a distinction that is somewhat missing from Gilliver and Ducrey’s approaches.621 I 
have shown that there were clearly ‘rules of warfare’ that should be followed, and that these 
rules did not differ much from general notions of fairness and justice present in other authors, 
such as Cicero. However, military manuals are more concerned with success in battle and the 
application of such rules is situational. They should be followed when they bring an advantage 
but can also be ignored if necessary. Some authors (like Onasander) make this more explicit, 
whereas others (like Frontinus) even suggest that not to take advantage of procedures that 
might be considered unethical is an instance of poor generalship. 
Finally, the strongest point that I wish to make is that, when dealing with military manuals, it is 
crucial to understand that all these aspects and facets worked together. A text need not be 
exclusively practical or only discuss the importance of knowledge or of constructing identity, 
but it can simultaneously cover all these aspects, which would have a different impact and 
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appeal to different readers. In the same way in which an animated film has different layers of 
significance, and contains both a generally accessible storyline and themes which cater more to 
adults, so too the reader of ‘military manuals’ must jostle through an intricate web of 
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